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3Abstract
In this thesis I study the e¤ects of institutional trading on the comovement
of nancial assets. In the rst chapter, joint work with Christopher Polk, we
connect stocks through common active mutual fund ownership, and use these
connections to forecast cross-sectional variation in return covariance, controlling
for similarity in style and other pair characteristics. We argue this covariance is
due to contagion based on return decomposition evidence, cross-sectional het-
erogeneity in the extent of the e¤ect, and the magnitude of average abnormal
returns to a cross-stock reversal trading strategy exploiting information in these
connections. We show that the typical long/short hedge fund covaries negatively
with this strategy suggesting that hedge funds may potentially exacerbate the
price dislocation we document. In the second chapter I study the sources of
change in the systematic risks of stocks added to the S&P 500 index. Firstly,
using vector autoregressions (VARs) and a two-beta decomposition, I nd that
I cannot reject the hypothesis that all of the well-known change in beta comes
from the cash-ow news component of a rms return. Secondly, I study funda-
mentals of included rms directly to reduce any concerns that the VAR-based
results are sensitive to my particular specication. As ownership structure can-
not directly inuence fundamentals, these results challenge previous ndings, as
they are consistent with the change in beta being due to a selection e¤ect. In
the third chapter, joint work with Daniel Bergstresser, we explore index-based
comovement in the market for Credit Default Swaps (CDS). We exploit the ad-
ditions of individual CDS contracts in the Markit CDX Index, a major credit
derivative benchmark. We nd that for single name CDS contracts, comove-
ment increases after inclusion in the index. Comparing movements in the CDS
spreads to movements of the bonds of the same issuers, the CDS spread co-
movement increases signicantly more than the bond spread comovement. This
pattern of evidence is consistent with the excess comovement in equity markets
documented by Barberis et al (2005) and others.
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1 Connected Stocks
(Joint work with Christopher Polk)
1.1 Introduction
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) have ar-
gued that institutional features may play an important role in the movement of
stocksdiscount rates, causing returns to comove above and beyond that implied
by their fundamentals. In this paper we propose a new way to document that
type of institutional comovement. Specically, we forecast the o¤-diagonal ele-
ments of the rm-level covariance matrix using measures of institutional connect-
edness. By measuring institutional comovement in such a bottoms-up fashion,
we can more precisely measure the covariation linked to institutional features.
We focus on connecting stocks through active fund ownership, as that insti-
tution not only may reect existing patterns in covariation but may layer on
additional covariation as well. In particular, we study how common ownership
of two stocks by an active fund manager can forecast the pair-wise covariation
of those stocks, controlling for various other characteristics of the pair.
We nd that active fund connectedness predicts higher covariance, control-
ling for similarity along the dimensions of industry, size, book-to-market ratio,
and momentum as well as the extent to which a pair of stocks are connected
through common analyst coverage. The predictive e¤ect is both statistically and
economically quite signicant. This nding continues to hold after controlling
for a wide variety of other pair characteristics in addition to these standard style
controls.
We provide evidence consistent with common ownership causing the in-
creased covariation associated with ownership. First, a decomposition of the
covariation into cash-ow and discount-rate news components reveals that much
of the aforementioned patterns are due to the interaction between the cash-ow
news of one stock in the pair and the discount-rate news of the other stock in
the pair. Interestingly, the ability of common analyst coverage to predict cross-
sectional variation in comovement is primarily due to the covariance of cash-ow
news with cash-ow news, in strong contrast to the ownership results. Second,
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common ownership has a stronger e¤ect on subsequent covariation when the
stocks in the pair are small and/or the common owners are experiencing either
strong inows or outows.
Previous and current research looks at related questions: Is there informa-
tion in institutional holdings about future returns? Or more particularly, does
variation in assets under management result in price pressure? Most of these
studies are concerned with cross-sectional and time series predictability of ab-
normal returns. Any implications for comovement are secondary, if examined
at all. We begin by measuring comovement and then we turn to the impli-
cations for predictability of returns at the end of the analysis. In particular,
we measure a stocks connected return and show that this connected return
predicts cross-sectional variation in average returns. Specically, we dene the
connected return for a particular stock as the return on a portfolio consisting of
all the stocks in our sample which are connected to a particular stock through
common ownership.
We document that trading strategies using the return on a stocks connected
portfolio as a conrming signal for a short-term, cross-stock reversal e¤ect gen-
erate signicant abnormal returns up to 7% per year, controlling for market,
size, value, momentum, and the own-stock, short-term reversal factors. This ev-
idence we provide is again consistent with ownership-based connections causing
the comovement.
Finally, we use our connected return strategy to explain hedge fund index re-
turns in standard performance attribution regressions. We show that the typical
hedge fund and in particular the typical long-short hedge fund load negatively
on our trading strategy. In fact, the exposures of these value-weight hedge fund
indexes are more negative than the corresponding exposure of a value-weight
portfolio of the active mutual funds in our sample. This suggests that the typi-
cal hedge fund may be part of the problem (creating the covariance) instead of
part of the solution.1
Our work builds on a growing literature. It is now well known that there
is a relation between mutual fund ows and past performance (Ippolito (1992),
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998)). A recent paper by Coval
1Consistent with this conclusion, Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2009) argue that
hedge funds consume rather than provide liquidity.
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and Sta¤ord (2007) documents that extreme ows result in forced trading that
temporarily moves prices away from fundamental value as in the general asset
re sales model of Shleifer and Vishney (1992) through the price pressure mech-
anism of Scholes (1972). Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad (2010) and Mitchell,
Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) document broadly similar ndings in the bond and
convertible bond markets respectively. Unlike these papers which study partic-
ular events, our analysis explores the extent to which institutional connections
a¤ect second moments more generally.
Recent theoretical work has emphasized the importance of delegated port-
folio management and agency frictions to price movements such as these.2 In
particular, Vayanos and Woolley (2008) show how fund ows can generate co-
movement and lead-lag e¤ects of the type we document. Their model provides
strong theoretical motivation for our empirical analysis. More generally, begin-
ning with Shleifer and Vishny (1997), researchers have studied the role of funding
in arbitrage activity and the extent to which arbitrageurs should be expected to
demand or provide liquidity.3 On a related issue, Sadka (2009) shows that the
typical hedge fund loads on a liquidity risk factor and that sensitivity to that
liquidity risk is priced in the cross section of hedge fund returns. Measuring
the extent to which hedge fundsperformance can be attributed to a trading
strategy that exploits temporary price dislocations due to institutional-driven
comovement follows naturally from that theory and empirical evidence.
Four recent working papers analyze issues related to stock return comove-
ment and/or institutional ownership. Lou (2009) shows that ow-driven demand
shocks more generally a¤ect prices than just in the extreme re-sale situations
of Coval and Sta¤ord and that in fact that mechanism goes a long way to ex-
plaining mutual fund performance persistence, the smart money e¤ect, and price
momentum among large-cap stocks. Unlike Lou (or Coval and Sta¤ord for that
matter), we avoid having to measuring the impact of ows on stock returns
and instead use the actual connected return as a signal of the strength of the
contagion e¤ect resulting from ownership-based connections in the stock market.
Moreover, whereas Lous focus is on momentum e¤ects, we instead examine how
the presence of institutional connectedness interacts with the short-term reversal
2See, for example, Darrell Du¢ es 2010 AFA presidential address.
3Many researchers have built on the ideas in Shleifer and Vishny (1997), including Gromb
and Vayanos (2002), Vayanos (2004), and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). For a recent
survey of this literature, see Gromb and Vayanos (2010).
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e¤ect found in stock returns.
Sun (2008) uses standard clustering techniques to identify subsets of funds
that hold similar stocks. Sun shows that the typical stocks return covaries with
the equal-weight average return on all of the stocks in the top ve fund clusters
holding the stock in question. Moreover, Sun shows that this covariance is
stronger if the average ow for the top ve clusters in question is lower than the
tenth percentile of the historical distribution of fund ows for that group of ve
fund clusters. In contrast, our approach models the pair-specic covariation as a
function of the number of common funds holding the stock, controlling for style
e¤ects. Additionally, Sun does not examine any implications of the covariance
she documents for protable trading strategies.
Chen, Chen, and Li (2009) study the determinants of cross-sectional variation
in pair-wise correlations and show that a large portion of that cross-sectional
variation is persistent, yet unexplained by a long list of variables. They do not
use the degree of active fund ownership to connect stocks. Like us, Chen, Chen,
and Li develop a trading strategy that uses the return on the portfolio of stocks
that comove with the stock in question. However, their trading strategy is a
momentum strategy buy (sell) stocks that have a high (low) comovers return.
In contrast, our strategy is a contrarian one sell (buy) stocks that have a high
(low) connected portfolio return.
A paper written subsequent to our work that builds on our analysis is Green-
wood and Thesmar (2009). Greenwood and Thesmar point out that owners of
stocks can have correlated trading needs and thus the stocks that they hold
can comove, even if there are no overlapping holdings. Greenwood and Thes-
mar show that these correlated trading needs predict future price volatility and
cross-sectional variation in comovement.
Chen, Hanson, Hong, and Stein (2008) explore whether hedge funds take
advantage of the mutual fund ow-forced trading that Coval and Sta¤ord doc-
ument. They argue that hedge funds take advantage of that opportunity as
average returns of long-short hedge funds are higher in months when the num-
ber of mutual funds in distress is large. In particular, Chen, Hanson, Hong, and
Stein suggest that this evidence is consistent with hedge funds front-running the
trades of distressed mutual funds. Our ndings are consistent with their results
but further show that the typical hedge fund apparently winds up on the wrong
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side of the price dislocation that we study.
In summary, we show that understanding connectedness is a simple way to
identify institutional-based stock comovement and its link to short-term reversal
patterns. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we sum-
marize our methodology and data sources. In Section 3, we describe our results.
Section 4 concludes.
1.2 Methodology
1.2.1 Measuring Commonality
We measure the amount of comovement in each pair that can be described
by commonality in active mutual funds and equity analysts. At each quarter-
end, we measure the number of funds (Fij;t) that held both stocks i and j in
their portfolios. As recent work by Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2009) suggests
that analyst recommendations facilitate herding by mutual fund managers, we
create similar measures of common analyst coverage. Specically, we measure
the number of analysts (Aij;t) that issued at least one earnings forecast for
both stocks i and j during the twelve month period preceding t. We use annual
forecasts for our measure of common coverage as quarterly earnings forecasts are
not issued as consistently. For each cross section, we calculate the normalized (to
have unit standard deviation) rank transform of Fi;j and Ai;j which we denote
as F ij;t and A

ij;t.
1.2.2 Modeling Cross-Sectional Variation in Comovement
To measure how commonality is linked to comovement, we estimate cross-
sectional regressions forecasting subsequent cross-products of monthly returns
for each pair of stocks. We initially forecast cross products of returns rather
than cross products of unexpected returns because means are di¢ cult to mea-
sure (Merton (1980)).
Our goal is to determine whether institutional connectedness contributes to
a benchmark forecast of second moments. This is because one might expect
that covariation, whether due to fundamentals or not, can be linked to the
characteristics of the two rms in a pair. The prototypical example is industry
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classication; we expect rms in similar industries to covary more, all else equal.
To capture that similarity, we measure industry similarity as the number of
consecutive SIC digits that are equal for a given pair, NUM_SIC.
In addition to industry similarity, we use three characteristics that help ex-
plain di¤erences in the cross-section of returns, namely, size, book-to-market,
and momentum. Previous research by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart
(1997) has documented the link between these characteristics and common re-
turn factors. Therefore, we expect higher correlation between two stocks if they
have a greater similarity in the characteristics mentioned above. To measure
this similarity, each quarter we rst calculate every stocks percentile ranking
on a particular rm characteristic. Our measures of similarity, SAME_SIZE,
SAME_BEME, and SAME_MOM , are then just the negative of the ab-
solute di¤erence in percentile ranking across a pair for a particular characteristic.
As with our institutional connectedness measures, we do not use these variables
directly but instead work with normalized rank transforms, which we continue
to denote with an asterisk superscript. As institutional ownership is correlated
with size, we also create very general size controls based on the normalized rank
transform of the percentile market capitalization of the two stocks, SIZE1 and
SIZE2 (where we label the larger stock in the pair as the rst stock), and the
interaction between the two market capitalization percentile rankings.
The benchmark forecasting cross-sectional regression that we estimate is
therefore the following:
ri;t+1rj;t+1 = a+ bf  F ij;t + ba  Aij;t + bs  SAME_SIZEij;t (1.1)
+bb  SAME_BEMEij;t + bm  SAME_MOMij;t
+bk NUM_SICij;t + bs1  SIZE1ij;t + bs2  SIZE2ij;t
+bs12  SIZE1SIZE2ij;t + "ij;t.
The dependent variable is the cross-product of returns at time t + 1, updated
monthly. The terms on the right hand side are measured at t and are all updated
quarterly. We also estimate an alternative specication:
1 CONNECTED STOCKS 18
ri;t+1rj;t+1 = a+ bf  F ij;t + ba  Aij;t (1.2)
+
9X
s=0
bs DDIFF_SIZEij;t=s +
9X
b=0
bb DDIFF_BEMEij;t=b
+
9X
m=0
bm DDIFF_MOMij;t=m +
3X
k=0
bk DNUM_SICij;t=k
+bs1  SIZE1ij;t + bs2  SIZE2ij;t
+bs12  SIZE1SIZE2ij;t + "ij;t
In this version of the regression, our control variables for a pairs di¤erence in
location across size, book-to-market, and momentum deciles as well as similarity
in SIC code at the rst, second, third, and fourth digit are allowed to come in
through a simple but exible dummy-variable specication.
In both cases, we estimate these coe¢ cients using the approach of Fama and
McBeth (1973). All independent variables are cross-sectionally demeaned as
well as normalized to have unit standard deviation so that the intercept a mea-
sures the average cross-sectional e¤ect and the regression coe¢ cients are easily
interpreted. We calculate Newey-West standard errors of the Fama-MacBeth es-
timates that take into account autocorrelation in the cross-sectional slopes out
to four lags.
1.2.3 Data and Sample
Stock returns come from the monthly le in CRSP. We use common stocks (share
codes 10 and 11) from NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ whose market capitalization
is above the NYSEmedian market cap. We choose this screening criteria because
common ownership by active managers and common coverage by analysts is not
pervasive: small stocks, especially in the beginning of the sample, have little
institutional ownership in general. Limiting the data in this way also keeps the
sample relatively homogeneous.
The data on mutual fund holdings come from the merge between the CDA /
Spectrum database provided by Thomson Reuters and the CRSP Mutual Fund
database. We use the Mutual Fund Links dataset created by Russ Wermers
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and o¤ered by Wharton Research Data Services. As our focus is on US active
mutual funds, we remove index, tax-managed funds and international funds by
applying standard screening criteria used in the literature.4 In addition, for a
fund to be in our sample we require it to hold at least one stock in our stock
sample at a point in time.
We obtain data on analysts from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System
(I/B/E/S) database. At each point in time, we observe the stocks covered by
each analyst through the earnings forecasts that they issue. For an analyst to be
in our sample, we require that he or she follow at least one of the stocks in our
stock sample by issuing a one-year earnings forecast (the most common forecast
issued by an analyst).
Our sample covers the period 1983 to 2007. Table 1.1 conrms the well-
known marked increase in funds over this period. The number of analysts has
also increased, though not as dramatically. Table 1.2 reports estimates of aggre-
gate and rm-level VARs. These estimates allow us to decompose returns into
their cash-ow news and discount-rate news components using the approach of
Campbell (1991). We summarize his method and the particular VAR speci-
cations that we use to implement his technique in the Appendix. Table 1.3
reports various summary statistics for returns and the news components. Con-
sistent with Vuolteenaho (2002), cash-ow news makes up a larger portion of
total return variance.
1.3 Results
Table 1.3 measures the extent of active managersand analystsworkloads. For
these active managers, the median load is 40 above-median NYSE capitalization
stocks. For analysts, the median load over this subset of stocks is ve rms.
Consequently, this workload results in typically 16 analysts covering a rm and
37 funds holding the stock of that rm. Because of the growth of funds over this
period, these full-sample numbers mask a strong trend in the number of funds
holding a stock. In the early part of the sample (1983-1989), the median number
of funds holding one of the above-median NYSE capitalization stocks was nine.
In the later part of the sample (2000-2007), that median number increased to
4We specically follow the algorithm described in Cremers and Petajisto (2009).
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102.
Our specic interest is how these numbers translate to the number of common
owners or the amount of common coverage for a pair of stocks. We report those
numbers in Table 1.4. In terms of coverage, it is quite rare to share an analyst
with another rm. In fact, only 5% of all pairs have an analyst in common. In
contrast, it is relatively common to share active fund ownership with another
stock as more than 75% of all stock pairs have a common active fund owner.
Typically, a pair would have roughly seven funds in common. Table 1.4 shows
that the number of ownership-based connections among above-median NYSE
capitalization stocks has increased dramatically over the period we study. In
1988, the median number of ownership connections was 3. In 2007, the median
number of ownership connections was 19. Our use of only rank-transformed
variables in the analysis is exactly because of this trend. Figure 1.1 plots how
the average number of common owners in the cross section of pairs we study has
evolved over time. For interpretability, we scale this measure by the expected
number of common owners per pair under the assumptions that all funds hold
the same number of stocks in our sample at a particular point in time as the
average fund at that time. One can see that relative to this benchmark, the
average number of connections has varied through time but has trended up over
the sample period.
Table 1.5 Panel A reports the result of our forecasting cross-sectional vari-
ation in realized cross products. We begin by estimating simpler versions of
equation (1.1). In column (1), we estimate a specication with only common
ownership as a forecasting variable. That variable is highly statistically signif-
icant, with a coe¢ cient of 0.00030 and a t-statistic of 6.11. Recall that the
common fund variable has been normalized to have a standard deviation of one
and a mean of zero. Therefore the constant term, 0.00216, reects the average
realized cross product and is a useful benchmark to understand the economic sig-
nicance of our nding. Specically, the coe¢ cient on common funds indicates
that a change of one standard deviation in the degree of common ownership re-
sults in an increase in the forecasted cross product that is approximately 14% of
the average amount of covariation. In column (2) of Table 1.5 Panel A, we pre-
dict covariation using our measure of common ownership and common coverage,
absent any other controls. The coe¢ cient on our measure of common funds is
0.00027 with a t-statistic of 5.73, only 10% smaller than the estimate in column
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(1). Thus there seems to be little correlation in the extent to which F ij;t and
Aij;t drive cross-sectional variation in comovement. The coe¢ cient on common
analyst coverage, 0.00018, indicates that a one standard deviation increase in
the amount of common analysts results in an increase in comovement of more
than 8% of the average realized covariation. The coverage-based coe¢ cient is
also measured quite precisely with a t-statistic of 7.49.
Being able to forecast di¤erences in comovement using institutional connect-
edness may not be surprising if the predictability simply reects the fact that
fund managers and analysts choose to hold stocks that are similar and therefore
would be expected to comove regardless of the common ownership or coverage.
For example, growth managers will tend to hold growth stocks, and previous
research has shown that those types of stocks tend to covary. Therefore, we
include four controls for whether the stocks in the pair are similar. Column (3)
of Table 1.5 Panel A reports the result of that analysis. Recall that these control
variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of one and transformed
(in the case of size, book-to-market, and momentum) so that higher values indi-
cate greater style similarity. We nd a strong e¤ect for a one-standard deviation
move in industry similarity as the coe¢ cient is 0.00020 with a t-statistic of
7.30. There is a relatively strong pattern for similarity in book-to-market as
well. The coe¢ cient associated with a one-standard deviation move in similar-
ity in this style is 0.00012 (t-statistic of 2.78). The similarity in momentum
has the same one-standard deviation e¤ect on di¤erences in comovement as the
similarity in book-to-market (coe¢ cient of 0.00012), but with a slightly lower
t-statistic of 2.28. The e¤ect on comovement due to size is statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero. More importantly, the coe¢ cient on common ownership
barely changes (0.00024, a drop of only 0.00003) and remains quite statistically
signicant. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient on common ownership has the strongest
one-standard-deviation inuence among the variables under consideration.
In column (4) of Table 1.5 Panel A, we estimate the full benchmark spec-
ication. Here we now include very general controls for the size of the stocks
in the pair. All else equal, one might expect that having large stocks in the
pair would increase comovement as these stocks will reect more of the markets
movements. More generally, one might think that size is very important in de-
termining the extent of institutional ownership of a stock. Though these controls
are important in describing cross-sectional variation in comovement, the institu-
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tional connectedness variables are still quite signicant and in fact the measured
coe¢ cients become stronger, with the coe¢ cient on common ownership doubling
in magnitude.5
The nal column of Table 1.5 Panel A generalizes our controls for stock sim-
ilarity by turning to dummy variables to capture the di¤erence in size, beme, or
momentum decile across the pair.6 We also dummy the number of common SIC
digits. We report these dummy coe¢ cient estimates of equation (1.2) in Panel
B of Table 1.5. The results show that this exibility appears to be important.
For example, the increase in comovement when a pair goes from having zero to
one SIC digit in common is much more important than going from having two to
three SIC digits in common. Nevertheless, this more exible specication does
not a¤ect the coe¢ cient on our common ownership variable.
In Table 1.6, we use alternative measures of comovement between two stocks.
In the rst column of Table 1.6, we repeat the estimates from the fourth column
of Table 1.5 Panel A (our full benchmark specication) for ease of comparison.
In column (2), we keep the same control variables as in the full benchmark
specication of Table 1.5 Panel A but replace the monthly return cross product
with the corrected sum of daily return cross products (Srirj =
NP
k=1
ri;krj;k  
1
N
NP
k=1
ri;k
NP
k=1
rj;k) for the N days within month t+1. We nd that the coe¢ cient
on F ij;t has much more statistical signicance (t-statistic of 9.05) and continues
to be quite economically signicant (20% of the average e¤ect, as estimated by
the constant term). The increase in statistical signicance is consistent with the
notion that high-frequency estimates of second moments are more precise. In
columns (3) and (4), we again keep the same control variables as in Table 1.5
but replace the monthly return cross product with Pearson and Fisher measures
of the correlation coe¢ cient of the daily returns on stock i and j within month
t+1. The coe¢ cient remains economically large and has a t-statistic over 16 in
both cases. This result conrms that our measure of connectedness forecasts
cross-sectional variation in correlation. Taken together, the results in Table 1.6
ease concerns of our use of the realized monthly return cross product (and its
5Note that by including these additional size controls, the coe¢ cient on SAME_SIZEij;t
changes sign due to the correlation among the size variables.
6Note that our dummies are for the di¤erence in characteristic deciles across the rms in
a pair, so that ones prior of the sign of the coe¢ cient should be the negative of that in Panel
A of the Table.
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components) throughout the rest of the paper.
To summarize, the main conclusion from Tables 1.5 and 1.6 is that institu-
tional connectedness, whether through common coverage or common ownership,
gives economically and statistically signicant ability to forecast subsequent co-
movement. It is worth noticing that we are only examining in-sample forecasting
of cross-sectional variation in the covariance matrix. However, given that the
literature currently concludes that 1/N rules are about the best one can do
out-of-sample, it would be interesting to explore how our method and our char-
acteristics perform in out-of-sample tests such as those in DeMiguel, Garlappi,
and Uppal (2007). Since the characteristics we are using are relatively persistent,
we hope that our method and model will perform relatively well out-of-sample,
consistent with the related claims of Brandt, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2009).
1.3.1 Robustness to additional controls and measures of common
ownership
Our regressions have controlled for similarity in characteristics that are known
to describe variation in fund managers investing themes. A recent paper by
Chen, Chen, and Li (2009) documents that variables other than similarity
in these characteristics forecast cross-sectional variation in pair-wise correla-
tions. As a further robustness test, we control for their long list of pair char-
acteristics. In particular, we include past ve-year monthly return correlation,
RETCORRij;t; past protability correlation, ROECORRij;t; the past correla-
tion in the stocksabnormal trading volume, V OLCORRij;t; the absolute value
of the di¤erence in ve-year log sales growth rates, DIFFGROWTHij;t; the
absolute di¤erence in nancial leverage ratios (dened as long-term debt / total
assets), DIFFLEVij;t; the absolute value of the di¤erence in the two stockslog
share prices, DIFFPRICEij;t; a dummy variable in the two rms are located
in the same state, DSTATEij;t ; a dummy variable if the two stocks belong to the
S&P 500 index, DINDEXij;t; and a dummy variable if the two stocks are on the
same stock exchange, DLISTINGij;t . Thus our specication is
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yij;t+1 = (1.3)
[ri;t+1rj;t+1; ij;F isher]
= a+ bf  F ij;t + ba  Aij;t + bs  SAME_SIZEij;t
+bb  SAME_BEMEij;t + bm  SAME_MOMij;t
+bk NUM_SICij;t + bs1  SIZE1ij;t + bs2  SIZE2ij;t
+bs12  SIZE1SIZE2ij;t
+bret RETCORRij;t + broe ROECORRij;t
+bvol  V OLCORRij;t + bgrth DIFFGRTHij;t
+blev DIFFLEV ij;t + bprice DIFFPRICEij;t
+bstate DSTATEij;t + bindex DINDEXij;t
+blisting DLISTINGij;t + "ij;t
where y is either the realized cross product or the realized Fisher return
correlation over the next month.
The rst two regressions in Table 1.7 repeat the key regressions from Tables
1.5 and 1.6, but including these additional controls. In particular, in regression
2 of Table 1.7, we reproduce the essence of the main ndings of Chen, Chen, and
Li (2009). Stock pairs with relatively higher past return, protability, or volume
correlation have relatively higher return correlation in the future. Stock pairs
that are located in the same state and belong to the same S&P index also have
relatively higher return correlation (In contrast to Chen, Chen, and Li, though
we nd that stocks that trade on the same exchange do tend to have higher
return correlation in the future, that e¤ect is not statistically signicant). Fi-
nally, stock pairs that are relatively more similar in their past sales growth rates,
their current share price, or their current leverage ratio have relatively higher
correlation in the future. None of these empirical regularities subsume our nd-
ing that two stocks with relatively higher common ownership have predictably
higher subsequent comovement. We return to the three remaining columns of
Table 1.7 in the next section.
Table 1.8 varies the denition of common ownership for our benchmark spec-
ication (Panel A) and our specication that includes the Chen, Chen, and Li
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variables (Panel B). We rst replace the number of common owners, Fij;t, with
the total net assets of all common owners across the two stocks, F TNAij;t . Our
next alternative is to measure common ownership as the total dollar ownership
by all common funds of the two stocks scaled by the total market capitalization
of the two stocks, F%CAPij;t . Finally, we use as our last measure the total dollar
ownership by all common funds of the two stocks scaled by the Total Net As-
sets of all common owners, F%TNAij;t . In this section, we focus on the rst two
columns of each Panel. All denitions continue to forecast cross-sectional varia-
tion in the realized return cross-product (the rst regression in each Panel) and
the subsequent return correlation (the second regression in each Panel). Though
di¤erences in the relative forecasting ability appear relatively minor, it is com-
forting to see that our primary denition consistently has the largest t-statistic
and provides the largest R2. We return to the third column of each Panel in
Table 1.8 in the next section.
1.3.2 Connectedness and temporary components of returns
Tables 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 document that institutional connectedness helps pre-
dict cross-sectional variation in comovement. The rest of the analysis will focus
on exploring why connecting stocks through common fund ownership matters. A
likely explanation is that the e¤ect we nd is consistent with a causal relationship
due to price pressure arising from ows as in Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) and Lou
(2009). To provide additional evidence that this is the case, we rst decompose
unexpected returns into discount-rate news and cash-ow news. Two rms can
be correlated because shocks to their cash-ows move together, because shocks
to their discount rates move together, or because the shocks to the cash-ows
of one rm move with the shocks to the discount-rates of the other rm. What
is useful about this decomposition in this context is that institutions cannot
directly a¤ect fundamentals. Therefore, predicting this portion of the decompo-
sition clearly reects the endogenous choice of institutions. Of course, a higher
return covariance arising from higher covariance between the discount-rate news
of the pair is also consistent with plausible endogeneity-based explanations. For
example, rms may tend to hold pairs that load on a particular priced common
factor, not captured by size, book-to-market, or momentum, whose expected
return varies through time. Consider, however, covariation between the cash-
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ow news of one rm and the discount-rate news of another. This covariation
predictability seems much more di¢ cult to explain away as simply reecting the
endogenous choice of the fund manager and seems quite more likely to be due
to institutions having a causal role.
The methodology we now follow is very similar to the one described above,
but we change the left hand side of equation 1.3. Specically, the new equation
we estimate has the form:
yij;t+1 = (1.4)
[Ni;CFt+1Nj;CFt+1 ; Ni;CFt+1Nj;DRt+1  Nj;CFt+1Ni;DRt+1 ;
Ni;DRt+1Nj;DRt+1 ]
= a+ bf  F ij;t + ba  Aij;t + bs  SAME_SIZEij;t
+bb  SAME_BEMEij;t + bm  SAME_MOMij;t
+bk NUM_SICij;t + bs1  SIZE1ij;t + bs2  SIZE2ij;t
+bs12  SIZE1SIZE2ij;t
+bret RETCORRij;t + broe ROECORRij;t
+bvol  V OLCORRij;t + bgrth DIFFGRTHij;t
+blev DIFFLEV ij;t + bprice DIFFPRICEij;t
+bstate DSTATEij;t + bindex DINDEXij;t
+blisting DLISTINGij;t + "ij;t
where y is a vector of the various components of the realized return cross-
product. The results of our covariance decomposition can be found in the third,
fourth, and fth regressions of Table 1.7. In the third regression, we nd that
a modest but statistically signicant proportion of the e¤ect is due to the co-
variance of cash-ow news with cash-ow news. For the ownership-based con-
nection, the estimate is a statistically signicant 0.00010. As argued above, this
component must reect the choices that fund owners make. The fth regres-
sion in Table 7 shows that there is also a statistically signicant but even less
economically important relation between common fund ownership and subse-
quent covariance between the discount-rate news of one stock in the pair and
the discount-rate news of the other stock in the pair.
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The fourth column of Table 1.7 reports the main nding of this section.
Consistent with the price pressure explanation, common fund ownership has
a statistically signicant relation with the covariation between cash-ow news
and discount-rate news of the stocks in the pair. The measured coe¢ cient is
0.00027, with a t-statistic of 5.59. Note that the average e¤ect is -.00076. Thus
for the typical stock pair, the interaction between cash-ow news for one stock
and discount-rate news for the other stock tends to reduce return covariance
between the stocks in the pair, but for stocks with common ownership, return
covariation is increased.
The nding that the typical interaction between cash-ow news and discount-
rate news across stocks reduces covariance is consistent with the ndings of
Vuolteenaho (2002), who nds that the typical stocks cash-ow news is posi-
tively correlated with its own discount-rate news, reducing rm volatility. Vuolte-
enaho interprets this nding as being consistent with a simple story where the
typical project is zero NPV. Given his results, it comes as no surprise that
the typical cross-stock e¤ect is negative. In this context, our nding that the
ownership-based component increases covariance is all the more striking.
Interestingly, the ability of common analyst coverage to forecast subsequent
return covariation mainly arises from the covariation of cash-ow news of one
stock with the cash-ow news of another. The fact that the common coverage
institutional connection works di¤erently than the common ownership institu-
tional connection makes the price pressure interpretation of the main nding of
this section more compelling.
The third regression in each Panel of Table 1.8 investigates the impact of
varying the denition of our measure of institutional connectedness on the ability
of common ownership to forecast this component of the return covariance. All
four measures appear to be capturing the component of return covariance that
is due to the covariance of the discount-rate news of one stock in the pair with
the cash-ow news of the other stock in the pair.
1.3.3 When does connectedness matter?
To provide additional evidence in support of the causal interpretation, we now
exploit cross-sectional heterogeneity in stock pair characteristics. Specically,
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in Table 1.9, we interact the coe¢ cient on common funds with dummies for
the size of the pair of stocks and the total net ow into the common funds.
Specically, each quarter we sort pairs into quintiles based on their total market
capitalization. We independently sort pairs into quintiles based on their total
net ow. We follow the literature in dening ows (see Coval and Sta¤ord,
2007). Therefore, the net relative investment ow of funds into fund i in quarter
t is dened as:
FLOWi;t =
TNAi;t   TNAi;t 1  (1 +Ri;t)
TNAi;t 1
(1.5)
where TNAi;t is the Total Net Assets of fund i in quarter t andRi;t is the fund
return over the period t 1 to t reported by CRSP Mutual Fund Database. Fund
ows are reported quarterly before 1991 and monthly thereafter. To compute
the quarterly ows, we rst compute the monthly ows, then we sum them up
and nally we divide them by the previous quarter TNA.
Panel A of Table 1.9 estimates the interaction for the benchmark speci-
cation of Table 1.5. We nd that common ownership e¤ect on comovement is
stronger for pairs of smaller stocks. In every row, there is a strong decline in
the coe¢ cient as we move to pairs of larger stocks. Moreover, we nd that the
common ownership e¤ect on comovement is strong for low net ows and high
net ows. The lowest estimate in each column always occurs in the fourth row.
We generally nd a stronger e¤ect for inows than for outows, though for the
largest pairs, this di¤erence is not statistically signicant. Figure ?? shows these
patterns graphically.
In Panel B of Table 1.9, we repeat our exercise of interacting the coe¢ cient
on F ij;t with dummies for the pairs location in sorts based on the size of the pair
of stocks and the total net ow into the common funds for the full specication
of Table 1.7. Consistent with our interpretation, Panel B of Table 1.9 shows that
the cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of the coe¢ cient documented in
Table 1.9 Panel A also shows up in the full specication.
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1.3.4 Connected trading strategies
Here we measure the prots to various trading strategies based on our nding
that ownership-based connectedness can be linked to temporary components of
returns. If stock i experiences a negative cash ow shock and connected stock
js price also drops, we conjecture that the drop is due to price pressure, which
we expect to revert. Our trading strategy is thus very simple: we buy (sell)
stocks that have gone down (up) if their connected stocks have gone down (up)
as well.
Each month, we sort our subset of stocks into quintiles based on past one-
month return. We independently sort stocks into quintiles based on the past
one-month return, riC;t, on their portfolio of connected stocks. We use F ij;t to
generate the weights on the connected stocks in the portfolio. Dene
F ij;t = F

ij;t if Fij;t > 0
F ij;t = 0 if Fij;t = 0
Thus the return on the portfolio is riC;t =
JX
j=1
F ij;t 1rj;t
JX
j=1
F ij;t 1
.
We rst consider two simple trading strategies. The rst strategy buys stocks
that are in the low own-return and low connected-return portfolio while selling
stocks that are in the high own-return and high connected-return portfolio. This
strategy uses the connected return as a conrming signal of whether the own
stock is under or overvalued. We interpret such a strategy as exploiting the
price pressure induced by common ownership. The second strategy buys stocks
that are in the low own-return and high connected-return portfolio while selling
stocks that are in the high own-return and low connected-return portfolio. This
quite di¤erent bet would be consistent with a standard pairs trading strategy or
with industry momentum. Thus, the second strategy uses the connected return
as a contrarian signal. For each strategy we generate the cumulative buy-and-
hold abnormal return by regressing the t + 1; t + 2; :::; t + 12 returns on the
ve-factor model
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rp;t+1   rf;t+1 = 5 + bRMRFt+1 + sSMBt+1 + hHMLt+1 (1.6)
+mMOMt+1 + rSTREVt+1 + "p;t+1
where the factors are the four factors of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart
(1997), augmented with the short-term reversal factor.7 We include this factor
as we are sorting the target stock on its past month return, though we also show
results excluding that factor from our regression.
Figure 1.3 graphs the cumulative abnormal returns on these two di¤erent
trading strategies. There are two important features of the graph. One, the
average abnormal return in the rst month after the sort is signicantly higher
when the connected return is used as a contrarian signal. Two, the cumulative
average abnormal buy-and-hold return is twice as large eight months after the
sort when the connected stock return is used as a conrming signal. These two
features are consistent with stocks being pushed away from fundamental value
by mutual-fund trading, with the connected return being a useful measure of
the extent of that temporary misvaluation. Thus, compared to the standard
short-term reversal e¤ect, the misvaluation is larger but takes more time to
revert. Figure 1.4 emphasizes this di¤erence. The trading strategies are the
same as in Figure 3, except that we use the previous three-month return on
a stock and the previous three-month return on the connected portfolio. The
cumulative abnormal buy-and-hold return when the connected return is used as
a conrming signal rather than a contrarian signal is now nearly twice as large.
As a consequence, we evaluate the average returns on portfolio sorts that take
these predictable patterns in the cross section of average returns into account.
Table 1.10 reports the four and ve-factor alphas from independent portfolio
sorts based on the past three-month return on the own stock and the past three-
month connected portfolio return. To further ensure our strategies do not merely
reect the standard one-month reversal e¤ect, we rst skip a month after the sort
and then hold the stocks in question for ve months, following the methodology
of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
There are two general patterns in Table 1.10 that are consistent with our
7All factors are from Ken Frenchs website.
1 CONNECTED STOCKS 31
initial conclusions concerning Figures 1.3 and 1.4. Holding the own return con-
stant, as one moves from high to low connected return, alphas generally increase.
Holding the connected return constant, as one moves from high to low own re-
turn, the alphas increase. As a consequence, we design two composite connected
stocks trading strategies that use the connected return as a conrming signal.
The rst strategy, CS1, buys the low own return / low connected return
portfolio and sells the high own return / high connected return portfolio so that
its return is rCS1 = rlow own = low connected  rhigh own = high connected. The ve-factor
alpha for CS1 is an impressive 57 basis points per month with a corresponding
t-statistic of 2.95. The second strategy, CS2, buys the average (across the own
return quintiles) low connected return portfolios and sells the average (across the
own return quintiles) high connected return portfolios so that its return is rCS2 =
rlow connected rhigh connected. This strategy earns 32 basis points per month, with a
t-statistic of 2.60. Though this strategy ignores the information in the interaction
between a stocks own return and its connected return, the performance is still
strong. For completeness, we plot the corresponding cumulative abnormal buy-
and-hold performance of this strategy in Figure 1.5.
Table 1.11 includes additional explanatory variables, in particular a linear
time trend, and end-of-quarter dummies, in the performance attribution of our
rst connected stocks trading strategy, CS1. We also include the liquidity fac-
tors of Sadka (2006) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). Documenting that our
connected stocks trading strategy covaries with these popular measures of liq-
uidity provides further conrmation of the source of the abnormal return. We do
nd that CS1 positively covaries with the non-traded liquidity factor of Pastor
and Stambaugh across all of the specications we consider.8 Our CS1 strategy
also covaries with the Sadka factor, though the result is not statistically signi-
cant. Similar conclusions hold for a version of Table 1.11 (not shown) analyzing
the second connected stocks trading strategy, CS2.
8We has also used the traded factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) as a sixth factor
in our performance attribution. The abnormal returns on our connected strategy remain
economically and statistically signicant
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1.3.5 Hedge Fund Index attribution
Our last analysis uses our two connected stocks trading strategies, CS1 and CS2,
in performance attribution of hedge fund index returns using the CSFB/Tremont
Hedge Fund Indexes. These indexes have been used in a number of studies in-
cluding Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001); Agarwal and Naik (2004); Getmansky,
Lo, and Makarov (2003); and Bondarenko (2004). We focus on two particu-
lar indexes. The rst one is the index of all hedge funds. As CFSB weights
hedge fund returns by assets under management and captures more than 85%
of all assets under management in this investing space, this index gives a good
representation of the extent to which our connected stock strategy reects the
general health of the hedge fund industry.9 We also examine the performance
of the long/short component of the CSFB index to measure the extent to which
funds that specically invest in equities are exposed to the connected stocks
factor.
Table 1.12 reports the results of this analysis. We nd that hedge funds in
general and long/short managers in particular load negatively on the connected
stocks trading strategy. The coe¢ cient in the rst column of Panel A in Ta-
ble 1.12 estimates a regression of the overall hedge fund index excess return on
the return on our rst connected strategy, rCS1, and the four factors of Fama
and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), augmented with the short-term reversal
factor. The coe¢ cient is -0.0658 with a t-statistic of -2.08. The second column
of the Table instead attributes the performance of the hedge fund index to the
connected strategy and the eight hedge fund factors of Fung and Hsieh (2001,
2004).10 Though hedge funds in the aggregate load on these eight factors to
various degrees, our connected stocks factor remains important in describing
the returns on hedge funds. The coe¢ cient is now more economically and sta-
tistically signicant; the point estimate is now -0.1114 and has an associated
t-statistic of -6.09. Both results suggest that our trading strategy is useful tool
to measure the state of the hedge fund industry.
Perhaps more interesting results are in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.12. In
column 3, we measure the degree to which the Long/Short subset of hedge funds
9Note that the CFSB does not include managed accounts or funds of funds in its indexes.
10We downloaded three of the Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors from
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls.
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covaries with our connected return trading strategy in the presence of the Fama-
French/Carhart factors and the short-term reversal factor. In column 4, we use
the Fung and Hsieh factors as controls instead. In both cases, we nd that
the returns on this subset of hedge funds strongly negatively covary with our
connected return factor with loadings that are approximately 25-50% larger in
absolute value. The t-statistics are correspondingly larger. This nding is very
comforting as one would expect this subset of hedge funds to be more exposed
to our factor.
For the sake of comparison, we also estimate the loading of a value-weight
portfolio consisting of all of the active mutual funds in our sample over the same
time period. This portfolio has a smaller (in absolute value) sensitivity to the
connected strategy as the estimate is -0.0265 with an associated t-statistic of
-2.65. Though we do not observe complete holdings data for all hedge funds
and therefore cannot see the exact positions of these long/short hedge funds,
these results suggest that these hedge funds do not take full advantage of the
opportunities that price pressure from mutual fund ows provide. In fact, one
can argue that perhaps hedge funds are exacerbating rather than mitigating the
price pressure patterns documented in this paper. Panel B of Table 1.12 repeats
the analysis replacing rCS1 with rCS2, the version of our connected strategy that
ignores the information in the interaction between a stocks own return and its
connected return. We nd results that are qualitatively similar. In particular,
the loading on rCS2 is statistically and economically signicant. Additionally,
the loading for the Long/Short subset of hedge funds is again much larger in
absolute magnitude.
Figure 1.6 provides evidence on why it is not surprising that the typical
hedge fund loads negatively on our connected strategy. This gure plots both
the loadings of the two hedge fund indexes on the connected strategies as well
as the cumulative abnormal return on the connected strategy in event time,
where the event is the forming of the connected stock trading strategy (either
CS1 or CS2). One reasonable interpretation of this gure is that hedge funds
follow a momentum strategy that e¤ectively front-runs mutual funds in distress.
However, the typical hedge fund is unable to exit its positions in time and
therefore exacerbates the price dislocation they help initiate.
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1.4 Conclusion
We show that stocks are connected through their common fund ownership. In
particular, pairs of stocks that are connected in this fashion covary more to-
gether, controlling for similarity in industry, size, book-to-market equity ratio,
and past return momentum as well as common analyst coverage. We present
additional evidence that suggests the incremental comovement may be causal.
First, the e¤ect is stronger for pairs of relatively smaller stocks and is stronger for
pairs whose common owners are experiencing strong inows or outows. More-
over, the e¤ect ows through the interaction of cash-ow news for one stock with
the discount-rate news of the other. Finally, trading strategies that exploit the
fact that temporary price pressure must eventually revert are quite protable. A
trading strategy that uses the return on the portfolio of stocks that a particular
stock is connected to as a conrming signal generates annual abnormal returns
of up to 7%. As a consequence, we provide a simple way to document the extent
to which ownership-based connections result in equity market contagion. In an
application, we document that hedge funds in general and an equity-focused
subset in particular covary negatively with our trading strategy (and more so
than the mutual funds we originally study), suggesting that hedge funds on av-
erage may be part of the cause of the excess covariation and price dislocation
that contagion from ownership-based connections generates.
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1.5 Tables
Table 1.1: Number of Stocks, Analysts and Funds Per Year
This table lists the total number of stocks, pairs of stocks, analysts and funds for every year of
the sample period. The sample consists of all NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ stocks that are above
NYSE median capitalization as of the end of each quarter. We show only the statistics for
the last quarter of each year in our sample. The number of unique stock pairs is n(n 1)
2
,
where n is the number of stocks. The fourth column lists the number of analysts that cover
(dened as issuing a one-year earnings forecast) at least one of the stocks in the sample. The
fth column lists the number of funds that hold at least one of the stocks in the sample.
Year Stocks Pairs Analysts Funds
1983 830 344035 1945 226
1984 824 339076 1987 236
1985 815 331705 1918 260
1986 798 318003 1873 314
1987 803 322003 1981 374
1988 767 293761 1820 400
1989 763 290703 1893 440
1990 801 320400 2110 477
1991 826 340725 1774 542
1992 845 356590 1649 618
1993 851 361675 1715 802
1994 864 372816 1868 922
1995 898 402753 2001 1015
1996 925 427350 2066 1124
1997 923 425503 2232 1280
1998 932 433846 2462 1457
1999 945 446040 2564 1592
2000 900 404550 2873 1742
2001 868 376278 2749 1875
2002 841 353220 2771 1919
2003 856 365940 2723 1914
2004 829 343206 2579 1909
2005 801 320400 2542 1874
2006 758 286903 2471 1754
2007 744 276396 2446 1693
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Table 1.2: Aggregate and Firm-level VAR
Panel A shows the OLS parameter estimates for a rst-order monthly aggregate VAR model
including a constant, the log excess market return (reM ), the term yield spread (TY ), the
log price-earnings ratio (PE), and the small-stock value spread (V S). Each set of two rows
corresponds to a di¤erent dependent variable. The rst ve columns report coe¢ cients on
the ve explanatory variables and the sixth column reports the corresponding adjusted R2.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period for the dependent variables is Decem-
ber 1928 - May 2009, providing 966 monthly data points. Panel B shows the pooled-WLS
parameter estimates for a rst-order monthly rm-level VAR model. The model state vec-
tor includes the log stock return (r), stock momentum (MOM ), and the log book-to-market
(BM ). We deneMOM as the cumulative stock return over the last year, but excluding the
most recent month. All three variables are market-adjusted: r is adjusted by subtracting rM
whileMOM andBM are adjusted by removing the respective month-specic cross-sectional
means. Rows corresponds to dependent variables and columns to independent (lagged depen-
dent) variables. The rst three columns report coe¢ cients on the three explanatory variables
and the fourth column reports the corresponding adjusted R2. The weights used in the WLS
estimation are proportional to the inverse of the number of stocks in the corresponding cross
section. Standard errors (in parentheses) take into account clustering in each cross section.
The sample period for the dependent variables is January 1954 - December 2008, providing
660 monthly cross-sections and 1,658,049 rm-months.
PANEL A: Aggregate VAR
Variable Constant reM;t TYt PEt V St R
2
reM;t+1 0.0674 0.1118 0.0040 -0.0164 -0.0117 2.81%
(0.0189) (0.0318) (0.0025) (0.0048) (0.0054)
TYt+1 -0.0278 0.0001 0.9212 -0.0051 0.0620 86.40%
(0.0943) (0.1585) (0.0127) (0.0243) (0.0269)
PEt+1 0.0244 0.5181 0.0015 0.9923 -0.003 99.10%
(0.0126) (0.0212) (0.0017) (0.0032) (0.0036)
V St+1 0.0180 0.0045 0.0008 -0.0010 0.9903 98.24%
(0.0169) (0.0283) (0.0022) (0.0043) (0.0048)
PANEL B: Firm-level VAR
Variable ri;t MOMi;t BMi;t R2
ri;t+1 -0.0470 0.0206 0.0048 0.64%
(0.0066) (0.0023) (0.0007)
MOMi;t+1 0.9555 0.9051 -0.0015 91.85%
(0.0052) (0.0018) (0.0007)
BMi;t+1 0.0475 -0.0107 0.9863 97.10%
(0.0050) (0.0017) (0.0011)
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Table 1.3: Ownership, Coverage, and Stock Returns: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the sample dened in Table 1.1 over the following
variables: number of analysts that cover each stock, number of stocks covered by each analyst,
number of funds that hold each stock and number of stocks held by each fund. We also report
summary statistics for the net monthly stock return (Ri;t), cash ow news (NCF;i;t), discount
rate news (NDR;i;t) as well as the cross products of net monthly returns and their components.
There are a total of 420,108 analyst-months and 297,312 fund-months. There are 41,374,135
pair-quarters. Summary statistics are reported for those observations for which values of all
variables are available. Panel A reports these summary statistics for the full sample, while
Panels B, C, and D report summary statistics for the sample by decade.
PANEL A: 1983-2007
Variable Mean Median Std Min Max
Analysts per Stock 17.8 16 10.2 1 68
Stocks per Analyst 6.9 5 7.3 1 95
Funds per Stock 63.8 37 78.9 1 799
Stocks per Fund 55.1 40 61.8 1 1026
Ri;t 0.0113 0.0102 0.1040 -0.9968 2.2663
 NDR;i;t 0.0039 0.0049 0.0539 -0.9106 0.7997
NCF;i;t -0.0033 -0.0021 0.0855 -2.2437 1.2282
Ri;tRj;t 0.0023 0.0002 0.0102 -1.1332 4.6802
Ri;tRi;t 0.0109 0.0028 0.0365 0.0000 5.1363
NDR;i;tNDR;j;t 0.0022 0.0006 0.0015 -0.6131 0.4112
NCF;i;tNCF;j;t 0.0007 0.0001 0.0071 -1.1618 2.2651
 NCF;i;tNDR;j;t -0.0011 -0.0003 0.0056 -1.7364 1.6953
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PANEL B: 1983-1989
Variable Mean Median Std Min Max
Analysts per Stock 19.6 18 12.2 1 63
Stocks per Analyst 8.6 6 9.4 1 95
Funds per Stock 13.4 9 13.7 1 164
Stocks per Fund 39.9 32 32.9 1 433
Ri;t 0.0159 0.0128 0.0931 -0.7614 1.3564
 NDR;i;t 0.0010 0.0003 0.0529 -0.6545 0.7997
NCF;i;t -0.0050 -0.0053 0.0699 -1.0319 0.8077
Ri;tRj;t 0.0026 0.0002 0.0081 -0.3457 1.1692
Ri;tRi;t 0.0089 0.0027 0.0228 0.0000 1.8398
NDR;i;tNDR;j;t 0.0022 0.0007 0.0013 -0.2385 0.1915
NCF;i;tNCF;j;t 0.0005 0.0000 0.0048 -0.3045 0.6535
 NCF;i;tNDR;j;t -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0045 -0.4420 0.5010
PANEL C: 1990-1999
Variable Mean Median Std Min Max
Analysts per Stock 17.3 16 9.4 1 68
Stocks per Analyst 7.4 5 7.8 1 95
Funds per Stock 55.1 40 54.2 1 583
Stocks per Fund 51.8 39 56.9 1 820
Ri;t 0.0138 0.0111 0.1045 -0.8265 2.2663
 NDR;i;t 0.0131 0.0121 0.0478 -0.5696 0.6107
NCF;i;t -0.0060 -0.0044 0.0862 -1.2374 1.2282
Ri;tRj;t 0.0019 0.0002 0.0105 -1.1332 4.6802
Ri;tRi;t 0.0111 0.0029 0.0415 0.0000 5.1363
NDR;i;tNDR;j;t 0.0018 0.0004 0.0014 -0.2125 0.3580
NCF;i;tNCF;j;t 0.0006 0.0000 0.0072 -0.6511 1.3763
 NCF;i;tNDR;j;t -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0052 -0.7384 0.5000
PANEL D: 2000-2007
Variable Mean Median Std Min Max
Analysts per Stock 16.9 16 9.0 1 62
Stocks per Analyst 5.4 4 4.6 1 65
Funds per Stock 129.1 102 98.0 1 799
Stocks per Fund 59.7 43 67.6 1 1026
Ri;t 0.0032 0.0065 0.1140 -0.9968 1.5625
 NDR;i;t -0.0039 0.0004 0.0602 -0.9106 0.6733
NCF;i;t 0.0019 0.0052 0.0994 -2.2437 1.1418
Ri;tRj;t 0.0023 0.0001 0.0122 -1.0351 2.2124
Ri;tRi;t 0.0130 0.0029 0.0421 0.0000 2.4414
NDR;i;tNDR;j;t 0.0027 0.0006 0.0019 -0.6131 0.4112
NCF;i;tNCF;j;t 0.0010 0.0001 0.0094 -1.1618 2.2651
 NCF;i;tNDR;j;t -0.0017 -0.0007 0.0073 -1.7364 1.6953
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Table 1.4: Distribution of Common Fund Ownership and Analyst Coverage
Panel A reports the distribution of the variable Fij;t measuring the number of funds holding
both stocks in a pair over the last quarter. Panel B reports the distribution of the variable
Aij;t measuring the number of analysts forecasting one-year EPS for both stocks in a pair
over the past quarter. The distribution is shown for the average of all the sample (ALL), for
the rst and the last year in the sample (1983 and 2007 respectively), and for every ve years.
There are 41,374,135 pair-quarters.
PANEL A: The Cross-sectional Distribution of Common Fund Ownership
FUNDS IN COMMON (Fij;t) Percentiles
Year Mean Std 0% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99% 100%
ALL 9.26 16.97 0 1 3 11 37 76 640
1983 0.74 1.46 0 0 0 1 3 7 52
1985 0.89 1.77 0 0 0 1 4 8 58
1990 2.87 4.63 0 0 1 4 11 21 115
1995 8.14 10.38 0 2 5 11 26 49 231
2000 14.86 21.89 0 4 8 19 47 106 543
2005 22.80 24.35 0 8 15 29 64 120 500
2007 25.73 23.51 0 12 19 32 66 121 463
PANEL B: The Cross-sectional Distribution of Common Analyst Coverage
ANALYSTS IN COMMON (Aij;t) Percentiles
Year Mean Std 0% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99% 100%
ALL 0.24 1.46 0 0 0 0 1 6 53
1983 0.38 1.73 0 0 0 0 2 8 43
1985 0.42 1.86 0 0 0 0 2 9 48
1990 0.39 1.97 0 0 0 0 1 10 53
1995 0.25 1.41 0 0 0 0 1 7 39
2000 0.16 1.07 0 0 0 0 1 4 40
2005 0.16 1.20 0 0 0 0 0 5 43
2007 0.16 1.18 0 0 0 0 0 5 37
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Table 1.5: Connected Comovement
This table reports Fama-McBeth estimates of monthly cross-sectional regressions forecasting
the realized cross-product of returns, ri;t+1rj;t+1, for the sample of stocks dened in Ta-
ble 1.1. The independent variables are updated quarterly and include our main measures
of institutional connectedness, common funds (Fij;t) and common analysts (Aij;t), and a
series of controls at time t: We measure the negative of the absolute value of the di¤er-
ence in size, BE/ME and momentum percentile ranking across the two stocks in the pair
(SAME_SIZEij;t, SAME_BEMEij;t, and SAME_MOM ij;t respectively). We
also measure the number of similar SIC digits, NUM_SICij;t, for the two stocks in a
pair as well as the size percentile of each stock in the pair and an interaction (SIZE1ij;t,
SIZE2ij;t, and SIZE1SIZE2ij;t where stock 1 is always the larger stock in the pair).
All independent variables are then rank transformed and normalized to have unit standard
deviation, which we denote with an asterisk superscript. We report estimates of regressions
using various subsets of these variables in Panel A. For regression (5), we replace the variables
measuring the di¤erence in size, BE/ME, and momentum percentile rankings as well as the
similarity in SIC code across the pair with a full set of dummy variables, which we report in
Panel B. (Note that the dummy variables in Panel B now capture the di¤erence in style across
the pair, as described in the text.) We calculate Newey-West standard errors (four lags) of the
Fama-MacBeth estimates that take into account autocorrelation in the cross-sectional slopes.
PANEL A
Dependent Variable: ri;t+1rj;t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
F ij;t 0.00030 0.00027 0.00024 0.00050 0.00050
( 6.11) ( 5.73) ( 5.64) ( 6.77) ( 6.80)
Aij;t 0.00018 0.00010 0.00013 0.00011
( 7.49) ( 6.20) ( 7.87) ( 9.59)
Constant 0.00216 0.00216 0.00216 0.00217 0.00355
( 8.46) ( 8.46) ( 8.46) ( 8.47) ( 7.89)
SAME_SIZEij;t 0.00002 -0.00028
( 1.17) (-4.77)
SAME_BEMEij;t 0.00012 0.00009
( 2.78) ( 2.30)
SAME_MOMij;t 0.00012 0.00012
( 2.28) ( 2.37)
NUM_SICij;t 0.00020 0.00019
( 7.30) ( 7.02)
SIZE1ij;t 0.00097 0.00075
( 5.51) ( 5.76)
SIZE2ij;t 0.00013 0.00030
( 2.30) ( 4.25)
SIZE1SIZE2ij;t -0.00057 -0.00054
(-4.79) (-4.72)
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PANEL B
dummy estimates for specication (5) in Panel A
Value DIFF_SIZEij;t DIFF_BEMEij;t DIFF_MOMij;t NUM_SICij;t
0 -0.00105
(-3.56)
1 0.00003 -0.00010 -0.00028 -0.00062
( 2.34) (-4.03) (-6.02) (-2.24)
2 0.00011 -0.00012 -0.00042 -0.00078
( 3.21) (-3.26) (-5.47) (-3.55)
3 0.00019 -0.00017 -0.00048 0.00040
( 3.48) (-3.14) (-5.38) ( 2.20)
4 0.00025 -0.00022 -0.00052
( 3.50) (-3.28) (-5.09)
5 0.00028 -0.00025 -0.00055
( 3.18) (-3.12) (-4.67)
6 0.00028 -0.00028 -0.00055
( 2.76) (-2.95) (-4.21)
7 0.00028 -0.00033 -0.00052
( 2.32) (-2.90) (-3.43)
8 0.00025 -0.00039 -0.00044
( 1.82) (-2.69) (-2.29)
9 0.00021 -0.00039 -0.00013
( 1.29) (-2.12) (-0.52)
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Table 1.6: Connected Comovement: Alternative Measures
This table reports Fama-McBeth estimates of monthly cross-sectional regressions forecasting
measures of stock-pair comovement for the sample of stocks dened in Table 1.1. In par-
ticular, we forecast the realized cross-product of monthly returns, ri;t+1rj;t+1, the corrected
sum of squares (Srirj ) using daily return data in month t+1, as well as the daily return
Fisher correlation (Fisher) or the daily return Pearson correlation (Pearson) realized in
month t+1. The independent variables are updated quarterly and include our main mea-
sures of institutional connectedness, common funds (Fij;t) and common analysts (Aij;t), and
a series of controls at time t: We measure the negative of the absolute value of the di¤er-
ence in size, BE/ME and momentum percentile ranking across the two stocks in the pair
(SAME_SIZEij;t, SAME_BEMEij;t, and SAME_MOM ij;t respectively). We
also measure the number of similar SIC digits, NUM_SICij;t, for the two stocks in a
pair as well as the size percentile of each stock in the pair and an interaction (SIZE1ij;t,
SIZE2ij;t, and SIZE1SIZE2ij;t). All of these variables are then rank transformed and
normalized to have unit standard deviation, which we denote with an asterisk superscript. We
calculate Newey-West standard errors (four lags) of the Fama-MacBeth estimates that take
into account autocorrelation in the cross-sectional slopes.
Variable ri;t+1rj;t+1 Sxy Pearson Fisher
F ij;t 0.00050 0.00037 0.01806 0.02020
( 6.77) ( 9.05) (16.34) (16.10)
Aij;t 0.00013 0.00010 0.01269 0.01605
( 7.87) ( 5.89) (13.64) (12.77)
Constant 0.00217 0.00185 0.18278 0.20026
( 8.47) ( 8.17) (20.93) (19.74)
SAME_SIZEij;t -0.00028 -0.00007 0.00925 0.01143
(-4.77) (-1.64) ( 6.72) ( 7.36)
SAME_BEMEij;t 0.00009 0.00001 0.00264 0.00319
( 2.30) ( 0.85) ( 5.53) ( 5.75)
SAME_MOMij;t 0.00012 -0.00000 0.00615 0.00724
( 2.37) (-0.30) ( 8.66) ( 8.58)
NUM_SICij;t 0.00019 0.00014 0.00909 0.01096
( 7.02) ( 4.88) (11.99) (11.59)
SIZE1ij;t 0.00097 0.00025 -0.03347 -0.04032
( 5.51) ( 2.60) (-8.07) (-8.44)
SIZE2ij;t 0.00013 0.00007 -0.00582 -0.00634
( 2.30) ( 1.34) (-2.99) (-2.88)
SIZE1SIZE2ij;t -0.00057 -0.00019 0.02160 0.02636
(-4.79) (-2.82) ( 7.80) ( 8.17)
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Table 1.7: Connected Comovement: Additional Controls and Decomposition
This table reports Fama-McBeth estimates of monthly cross-sectional regressions fore-
casting the realized cross-product of returns, ri;t+1rj;t+1, the daily return Fisher corre-
lation (Fisher), and the cross products of the return components (cash-ow-news and
discount-rate-news), NCF;i;t+1NCF;j;t+1,  NDR;i;t+1NCF;j;t+1 NDR;j;t+1NCF;i;t+1, and
NDR;i;t+1NDR;j;t+1 for the sample of stocks dened in Table 1.1. We estimate
y = a+ bfF ij;t+baAij;t+bsSAME_SIZEij;t+bbSAME_BEMEij;t
+bm  SAME_MOMij;t + bkNUM_SICij;t+bs1SIZE1ij;t
+bs2SIZE2ij;t+bs12SIZE1SIZE2ij;t+bret RETCORRij;t
+broe ROECORRij;t+ + bvol  V OLCORRij;t + bgrth DIFFGRTHij;t
+blevDIFFLEV ij;t + bprice DIFFPRICEij;t+bstate DSTATEij;t
+bindex DINDEXij;t + blisting DLISTINGij;t + "ij;t
where y= [ri;t+1rj;t+1; Fisher; NCF;i;t+1NCF;j;t+1;
 NDR;i;t+1NCF;j;t+1 NDR;j;t+1NCF;i;t+1; NDR;i;t+1NDR;j;t+1]. The return
news components are extracted using the return VAR estimates shown in Table 1.2 and the
methodology documented in the Appendix. We estimate the same equation as in Table 1.5,
but with additional variables as a robustness check. The additional variables are constructed
as in Chen, Chen, Li (2009) and are as follows: past return correlation, RETCORRij;t;
past protability correlation, ROECORRij;t; the past correlation in the stocks abnormal
trading volume, V OLCORRij;t, the absolute value of the di¤erence in ve-year log sales
growth rates, DIFFGRTH ij;t; the absolute di¤erence in nancial leverage ratios (dened
as long-term debt / total assets), DIFFLEV ij;t; the absolute value of the di¤erence
in the two stocks log share prices, DIFFPRICEij;t; a dummy variable in the two
rms are located in the same state; DSTATEij;t ; a dummy variable if the two stocks both
belong to the S&P 500 index, DINDEXij;t; and a dummy variable if the two stocks are on
the same stock exchange, DLISTINGij;t . All of these variables (except the dummies) are
then rank transformed and normalized to have unit standard deviation, which we denote
with an asterisk superscript. The return components are constructed from the aggregate
and rm-level VARs estimated in Table 1.2 as described in the Appendix. We calculate
Newey-West standard errors (four lags) of the Fama-MacBeth estimates that take into
account autocorrelation in the cross-sectional slopes.
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Variable ri;t+1rj;t+1 Fisher NCF;iNCF;j
 NDR;iNCF;j
 NDR;jNCF;i
NDR;iNDR;j
F ij;t 0.00051 0.01080 0.00010 0.00027 0.00002
( 6.44) (11.80) ( 2.82) ( 5.59) ( 2.05)
Aij;t 0.00008 0.01336 0.00011 -0.00004 0.00000
( 5.18) (11.01) ( 8.67) (-3.87) ( 0.94)
Constant 0.00228 0.19159 0.00051 -0.00076 0.00203
( 8.28) (17.09) ( 6.42) (-4.42) ( 8.94)
SAME_SIZEij;t -0.00023 0.01430 -0.00013 -0.00007 -0.00001
(-4.00) ( 9.10) (-3.75) (-1.30) (-0.88)
SAME_BEMEij;t 0.00006 0.00189 0.00007 -0.00004 0.00002
( 1.94) ( 4.13) ( 3.75) (-2.94) ( 5.27)
SAME_MOMij;t 0.00007 0.00456 0.00015 -0.00009 0.00000
( 1.74) ( 6.70) ( 3.95) (-5.80) ( 0.05)
NUM_SICij;t 0.00013 0.00846 0.00008 0.00002 0.00000
( 5.47) ( 9.74) ( 8.38) ( 1.28) ( 2.16)
SIZE1ij;t 0.00081 -0.04500 0.00044 0.00024 0.00005
( 4.81) (-9.11) ( 4.28) ( 1.58) ( 1.25)
SIZE2ij;t 0.00012 -0.00184 0.00002 0.00002 0.00001
( 2.37) (-0.90) ( 0.63) ( 0.51) ( 1.06)
SIZE1SIZE2ij;t -0.00048 0.02815 -0.00024 -0.00018 -0.00003
(-4.28) ( 8.46) (-3.46) (-1.76) (-1.37)
RETCORRij;t 0.00040 0.02369 0.00026 0.00002 0.00004
( 8.02) (13.57) ( 4.44) ( 0.51) ( 4.82)
ROECORRij;t 0.00005 0.00116 0.00002 0.00002 0.00000
( 3.67) ( 3.42) ( 3.24) ( 2.71) ( 1.10)
V OLCORRij;t 0.00005 0.00389 0.00003 0.00001 0.00000
( 3.99) ( 7.12) ( 3.32) ( 0.95) ( 0.35)
DIFFGRTHij;t 0.00016 -0.00217 -0.00006 0.00020 -0.00001
( 5.50) (-2.76) (-3.01) ( 5.95) (-2.13)
DIFFLEV ij;t -0.00002 -0.00319 -0.00000 -0.00001 0.00000
(-1.40) (-6.39) (-0.18) (-1.25) ( 1.79)
DIFFPRICEij;t 0.00007 -0.00592 -0.00002 0.00007 0.00000
( 3.61) (-9.55) (-1.89) ( 3.88) ( 0.84)
DSTATEij;t 0.00049 0.00864 0.00010 0.00029 0.00000
( 5.80) ( 7.69) ( 4.19) ( 4.47) ( 0.56)
DINDEXij;t -0.00024 0.02035 0.00002 -0.00023 0.00003
(-1.68) ( 4.82) ( 0.31) (-1.81) ( 1.48)
DLISTINGij;t -0.00019 0.00310 0.00027 -0.00049 0.00004
(-1.78) ( 1.32) ( 2.18) (-4.16) ( 2.09)
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Table 1.8: Alternative Measures of Connectedness
This table reports Fama-McBeth estimates of monthly cross-sectional regressions forecasting
measures of stock-pair comovement for the sample of stocks dened in Table 1.1. In particular,
we forecast the realized cross-product of monthly returns, ri;t+1rj;t+1, the daily return Fisher
correlation (Fisher), or NDR;i;t+1NCF;j;t+1 NDR;j;t+1NCF;i;t+1 realized in month t+1.
The independent variables are updated quarterly and include our main measures of institu-
tional connectedness, common funds (Fij;t) and common analysts (Aij;t), and a series of
controls at time t: Each row varies the denition of common ownership for our benchmark
specication (Panel A, as in Table 1.5) and our specication that includes the Chen, Chen,
and Li variables (Panel B, as in Table 1.7). As measures of common ownership, we use the
number of common owners, Fij;t; the Total Net Assets of all common owners across the two
stocks, F TNAij;t ; the total ownership by all common funds in dollars of the two stocks scaled
by the total market capitalization of the two stocks, F%CAPij;t ; and the total ownership by all
common funds in dollars of the two stocks scaled by the Total Net Assets of all common own-
ers, F%TNAij;t . All of these variables are then rank transformed and normalized to have unit
standard deviation, which we denote with an asterisk superscript. We calculate Newey-West
standard errors (four lags) of the Fama-MacBeth estimates that take into account autocorre-
lation in the cross-sectional slopes.
Panel A: Benchmark Panel B: All
Variable ri;t+1rj;t+1 Fisher
 NDR;iNCF;j
 NDR;jNCF;i
ri;t+1rj;t+1 Fisher
 NDR;iNCF;j
 NDR;jNCF;i
F ij;t 0.00047 0.01952 0.00017 0.00050 0.01075 0.00027
( 6.36) (13.95) ( 3.94) ( 6.43) (11.77) ( 5.61)
Avg R2 0.82% 4.60% 1.09% 1.61% 6.40% 2.68%
FTNAij;t 0.00044 0.01138 0.00014 0.00039 0.00516 0.00018
( 6.00) (12.49) ( 3.31) ( 5.80) ( 6.06) ( 5.01)
Avg R2 0.79% 4.34% 1.07% 1.59% 6.36% 2.65%
F%CAPij;t 0.00042 0.01056 0.00018 0.00036 0.00580 0.00020
( 6.83) (13.70) ( 6.31) ( 6.48) ( 7.06) ( 5.69)
Avg R2 0.79% 4.33% 1.04% 1.60% 6.38% 2.66%
F%TNAij;t 0.00029 0.00798 0.00018 0.00026 0.00569 0.00017
( 6.30) (12.25) ( 5.58) ( 6.08) ( 8.71) ( 5.40)
Avg R2 0.70% 4.25% 0.96% 1.53% 6.35% 2.58%
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Table 1.9: Connected Comovement: Cross-sectional Variation
This table reports Fama-McBeth estimates of monthly cross-sectional regressions forecasting
the realized cross-product of returns, ri;t+1rj;t+1, as well as the cross products of the return
components, (NCF;i;t+1)  ( NDR;j;t+1) for the sample of stocks dened in Table 1.1. We
estimate
y = a+
5X
k=1
5X
l=1
bf k;lF ij;t+baAij;t+bsSAME_SIZEij;t
+bbSAME_BEMEij;t+bm  SAME_MOMij;t + bkNUM_SICij;t
+bs1SIZE1ij;t+bs2SIZE2ij;t+bs12SIZE1SIZE2ij;t
+bret RETCORRij;t+broe ROECORRij;t+ + bvol  V OLCORRij;t
+bgrth DIFFGRTHij;t + blevDIFFLEVij;t + bstate DSTATEij;t
+bindex DINDEXij;t + bprice DIFFPRICEij;t
+blisting DLISTINGij;t + "ij;t
where y= [ri;t+1rj;t+1]. Panel A only considers a subset of these variables that are used
in the regression in Table 1.5. Panel B estimates the full regressions specication. All of
these variables (except the dummies) are then rank transformed and normalized to have unit
standard deviation, which we denote with an asterisk superscript. In each Panel, we enhance
the particular specication by interacting the common fund variable with dummies for the
ranking of the pair based on quarterly independent sorts (as of time t) on the pairs total
market capitalization (k dimension of bf k;l) and the total fund ows of the common funds
(l dimension of bf k;l). We calculate Newey-West standard errors (four lags) of the Fama-
MacBeth estimates that take into account autocorrelation in the cross-sectional slopes.
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PANEL A: Dependent var: ri;t+1rj;t+1
Benchmark controls of Table 1.5 included but not shown
bf k;l estimates Size of the pair (k)
Low 2 3 4 High Low - High
Low 0.00081 0.00075 0.00065 0.00051 0.00046 0.00034
( 4.50) ( 5.30) ( 5.85) ( 5.67) ( 5.05) ( 2.54)
Total 2 0.00063 0.00059 0.00054 0.00043 0.00041 0.00022
net ( 4.99) ( 5.45) ( 5.43) ( 4.98) ( 4.78) ( 2.96)
ow 3 0.00068 0.00066 0.00061 0.00049 0.00045 0.00023
from ( 4.28) ( 4.60) ( 4.70) ( 4.50) ( 4.33) ( 2.51)
common 4 0.00065 0.00058 0.00055 0.00042 0.00035 0.00029
funds ( 5.91) ( 6.20) ( 6.93) ( 6.20) ( 5.17) ( 4.37)
High 0.00119 0.00097 0.00074 0.00060 0.00048 0.00071
( 5.99) ( 5.74) ( 6.57) ( 6.18) ( 5.59) ( 4.71)
Low - 3 0.00013 0.00009 0.00004 0.00002 0.00002
( 0.78) ( 0.77) ( 0.40) ( 0.29) ( 0.39)
High - 3 0.00051 0.00030 0.00014 0.00010 0.00003
( 3.53) ( 2.27) ( 1.66) ( 1.38) ( 0.57)
PANEL B: Dependent var: ri;t+1rj;t+1
All controls of Table 1.7 included but not shown
bf k;l estimates Size of the pair (k)
Low 2 3 4 High Low - High
Low 0.00077 0.00077 0.00069 0.00057 0.00050 0.00027
( 4.70) ( 5.29) ( 5.84) ( 5.81) ( 5.47) ( 1.93)
Total 2 0.00060 0.00059 0.00057 0.00049 0.00046 0.00014
net ( 5.47) ( 6.27) ( 6.15) ( 5.93) ( 5.54) ( 1.64)
ow 3 0.00064 0.00062 0.00059 0.00052 0.00049 0.00016
from ( 5.25) ( 5.94) ( 5.97) ( 5.51) ( 5.00) ( 1.90)
common 4 0.00064 0.00058 0.00059 0.00050 0.00043 0.00021
funds ( 7.07) ( 8.17) ( 8.49) ( 7.55) ( 6.13) ( 3.37)
High 0.00120 0.00100 0.00081 0.00070 0.00057 0.00063
( 5.95) ( 6.10) ( 7.02) ( 6.39) ( 5.53) ( 4.42)
Low - 3 0.00013 0.00015 0.00010 0.00005 0.00002
( 0.92) ( 1.36) ( 1.42) ( 1.07) ( 0.53)
High - 3 0.00056 0.00038 0.00022 0.00018 0.00008
( 3.88) ( 3.12) ( 3.38) ( 2.74) ( 1.97)
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Table 1.10: Alphas on Connected Trading Strategies
This table presents the protability of a simple trading strategy exploiting stock connectedness.
We independently sort stocks into quintiles based on their own return over the last three
months and the return on their connected portfolio over the last three months. We measure the
connected return as riC;t=
PJ
j=1 F

ij;t 1rj;t=
PJ
j=1 F

ij;t 1 where F

ij;t= F

ij;t if Fij;t> 0
and F ij;t= 0 if Fij;t= 0. Each portfolio holds the associated stocks for the next ve months.
We estimate coe¢ cients from monthly regressions of (rp;t   rf;t), the equal-weight excess
return on the portfolio of the stocks associated with the particular trading strategy, on four
and ve factors. Panel A reports 4; four factor alphas (Carhart alphas) and Panel B reports
5 ve factor alphas (Carhart plus short-term reversal). In each panel, we also report the
average returns on 1) a connected strategy, CS1, which buys the low own return / low
connected return portfolio and sells the high own return / high connected return portfolio and
2) a second connected strategy, CS2, which buys the average (across the own return quintiles)
low connected return portfolios and sells the average (across the own return quintiles) high
connected return portfolios.
PANEL A: FOUR FACTOR ALPHAS
Connected portfolio
Low 2 3 4 High L - H Avg L-H
Low 0.0042 0.0046 0.0044 0.0036 0.0008 0.0034
(2.97) (3.97) (3.82) (2.93) (0.59) (1.81)
2 0.0053 0.0040 0.0029 0.0029 0.0009 0.0044
Own (4.54) (4.46) (3.33) (3.16) (0.88) (3.13)
Return 3 0.0037 0.0024 0.0015 0.0005 0.0000 0.0036 0.0036
(3.41) (2.72) (1.84) (0.54) (0.01) (2.81) (3.01)
4 0.0028 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0014 0.0042
(2.35) (0.05) (-.79) (-1.3) (-1.7) (3.05)
High 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0024 -0.0027 -0.0022 0.0026
(0.32) (-.40) (-2.8) (-2.9) (-2.0) (1.66)
L - H 0.0038 0.0050 0.0068 0.0063 0.0030 0.0064
(2.43) (3.73) (4.89) (4.55) (1.95) (3.37)
PANEL B: FIVE FACTOR ALPHAS
Connected portfolio
Low 2 3 4 High L - H Avg L-H
Low 0.0040 0.0043 0.0041 0.0031 0.0005 0.0035
(2.84) (3.73) (3.54) (2.53) (0.39) (1.85)
2 0.0053 0.0038 0.0027 0.0027 0.0007 0.0046
Own (4.50) (4.29) (3.10) (2.91) (0.65) (3.29)
Return 3 0.0035 0.0022 0.0013 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0037 0.0037
(3.25) (2.42) (1.60) (0.33) (-.22) (2.83) (3.04)
4 0.0027 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0017 0.0044
(2.25) (-.27) (-1.1) (-1.4) (-2.1) (3.18)
High 0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0026 -0.0028 -0.0023 0.0023
(0.01) (-.88) (-3.0) (-2.9) (-2.1) (1.46)
L - H 0.0040 0.0052 0.0067 0.0059 0.0028 0.0063
(2.56) (3.87) (4.78) (4.21) (1.82) (3.30)
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Table 1.11: The Connected Strategy and Liquidity Risk
This table measures the loadings of the connected stock trading strategy on two com-
mon liquidity factors as well as on time e¤ects. We study the connected strategy, CS1,
formed in Table 1.10, which buys the low own return / low connected return portfo-
lio and sells the high own return / high connected return portfolio so that its return is
rCS1= rlow own = low connected rhigh own = high connected. We regress rCS1 on a constant,
liquidity factors from the work of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), PS_INNOV , and Sadka
(2006), SADKA_PV , the Fama-French/Carhart factors, a short-term reversal factor, a
trend, and seasonal (quarterly) dummies. Column 1 report loadings of our connected strategy
on the ve factors used in Table 10. Columns 2 and 3 report loadings of our connected strat-
egy on both liquidity factors for the period March 1983 to December 2005 (Sadkas liquidity
factor is only available during that period). Columns 4 to 6 include the PS liquidity factor,
a trend, and quarterly seasonal dummies as additional explanatory variables, over the period
June 1980 to December 2008.
Dependent Variable: Connected Strategy
1 2 3 4 5 6
Alpha 0.0063 0.0063 0.0062 0.0063 0.0107 0.0109
(3.30) (3.28) (2.87) (3.28) (2.95) (3.02)
PS_INNOV 0.0638 0.0630 0.0708
(2.03) (2.00) (2.23)
SADKA_PV 0.3564
(0.95)
RMRF -0.0081 -0.0377 0.0350 -0.0392 -0.0048 -0.0372
(-0.16) (-0.75) (0.63) (-0.78) (-0.10) (-0.74)
SMB -0.3664 -0.3711 -0.4150 -0.3707 -0.3501 -0.3549
(-5.97) (-6.07) (-6.22) (-6.05) (-5.61) (-5.71)
HML -0.1797 -0.1907 -0.1208 -0.1920 -0.1621 -0.1746
(-2.53) (-2.69) (-1.50) (-2.70) (-2.24) (-2.42)
UMD -1.0164 -1.0132 -1.0120 -1.0136 -1.0191 -1.0164
(-22.32) (-22.34) (-20.29) (-22.31) (-22.34) (-22.41)
ST_Reversal 0.0164 0.0218 0.0398 0.0215 0.0201 0.0255
(0.28) (0.37) (0.62) (0.37) (0.34) (0.44)
Trend 0.0000
(-0.44)
Q1 -0.0065 -0.0064
(-1.24) (-1.22)
Q2 -0.0087 -0.0099
(-1.70) (-1.94)
Q3 -0.0029 -0.0027
(-0.56) (-0.53)
Obs 343 343 274 343 343 343
R2 65% 66% 67% 66% 66% 66%
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Table 1.12: Hedge Fund and Mutual Fund Exposure to the Strategy
This table measures the exposure of two CSFB hedge fund return indexes (all and long/short)
as well as the value-weight average active mutual fund return (net of fees) to the con-
nected strategy described in Table 1.10. We regress fund index returns in excess of the
t-bill return on a constant, the connected strategy and either the eight Fung and Hsieh
(2001, 2004) hedge fund factors or the Fama-French/Carhart model plus a short-term re-
versal factor. The time period is January 1994 to December 2008. Panel As analysis uses
as the additional explanatory variable the connected strategy (CS1) in Table 1.10 that
buys the low own return and low connected return portfolio and sells the high own re-
turn and high connected return (rCS1= rlow own = low connected rhigh own = high connected).
Panel Bs analysis uses as the additional explanatory variable the connected strategy (CS2)
in Table 1.10 that buys the average (across the own-return quintiles) low connected re-
turn portfolio and sells the average (across the own-return quintiles) high connected return
(rCS2=rlow connected rhigh connected).
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PANEL A: CS1
HF ALL HF LONG/SHORT MF ALL (vw)
Alpha 0.0020 0.0022 0.0026 0.0012 -0.0013
(1.70) (2.06) (2.73) (1.09) (-3.56)
rCS1 -0.0658 -0.1114 -0.0817 -0.1707 -0.0265
(-2.08) (-6.09) (-3.14) (-9.44) (-2.65)
RMRF 0.3794 0.5097 0.9934
(13.07) (21.34) (108.3)
SMB 0.0852 0.1498 0.0562
(2.31) (4.95) (4.84)
HML 0.0850 -0.0558 -0.0044
(2.16) (-1.72) (-0.35)
UMD 0.0761 0.1223 -0.0071
(1.84) (3.60) (-0.54)
ST Reversal -0.0492 -0.0820 -0.0232
(-1.67) (-3.38) (-2.50)
Bond-trend -0.0226 -0.0084
(-2.96) (-1.11)
Currency-trend 0.0113 0.0050
(1.93) (0.86)
Commodity-trend 0.0131 0.0028
(1.63) (0.35)
Equity Market 0.1965 0.4140
(4.97) (10.59)
Size Spread 0.0629 0.2172
(1.88) (6.56)
Bond Market -0.1235 -0.0090
(-3.41) (-0.25)
Credit Spread -0.1816 0.0429
(-3.33) (0.79)
Emerging Market 0.0829 0.0897
(3.55) (3.89)
Obs 173 164 173 164 173
R2 56% 60% 82% 76% 99%
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PANEL B: CS2
HF ALL HF LONG/SHORT MF ALL (vw)
Alpha 0.0019 0.0025 0.0024 0.0015 -0.0014
(1.62) (2.16) (2.47) (1.29) (-3.89)
rCS2 -0.1158 -0.1793 -0.0943 -0.2649 0.0006
(-2.36) (-4.44) (-2.30) (-6.24) (0.03)
RMRF 0.3761 0.5071 0.9934
(12.99) (20.96) (106.2)
SMB 0.0759 0.1564 0.0698
(2.01) (4.98) (5.75)
HML 0.0815 -0.0523 0.0016
(2.07) (-1.59) (0.12)
UMD 0.1015 0.1726 0.0209
(3.31) (6.74) (2.11)
ST Reversal -0.0528 -0.0854 -0.0236
(-1.80) (-3.48) (-2.49)
Bond-trend -0.0244 -0.0114
(-3.07) (-1.36)
Currency-trend 0.0097 0.0027
(1.60) (0.41)
Commodity-trend 0.0149 0.0058
(1.78) (0.66)
Equity Market 0.1834 0.3911
(4.43) (9.00)
Size Spread 0.0723 0.2347
(2.04) (6.32)
Bond Market -0.1078 0.0128
(-2.79) (0.31)
Credit Spread -0.1442 0.0982
(-2.51) (1.62)
Emerging Market 0.0811 0.0880
(3.31) (3.42)
Obs 173 164 173 164 173
R2 56% 57% 81% 71% 99%
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1.6 Figures
Figure 1.1: Average institutional connections
Average Institutional Connections
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This gure plots the time-series evolution of the ratio of the average number of common
funds per pair in each cross section of stock pairs to the average number of common funds
per pair if all funds in that cross section held the same number of stocks as the average fund
holds.
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Figure 1.2: Cross-sectional variation in the institutional connectedness e¤ect
This gure plots the point estimates from Table 9 Panel A. In that table we interact the
coe¢ cient on the number of common funds per pair with dummies for the size of the pair
of stocks and the total net ow into the common funds. Specically, each quarter we sort
pairs into quintiles based on their total market capitalization. We independently sort pairs
into quintiles based on their total net ow. Thus the interactions reect the cross-sectional
variation in stock-pair heterogeneity.
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Figure 1.3: One-month reversals and connected returns
This gure graphs the abnormal performance of buy-and-hold strategies that trade the
one-month reversal strategy conditional on the return on a stocks connected portfolio. Stocks
are sorted into 25 portfolios based on independent quintile sorts on a stocks own one-month
return and its one-month connected return. The top half of the gure buys (sells) stocks whose
own returns are relatively low (high) and whose connected returns are relatively low (high).
The bottom half of the gure buys (sells) stocks whose own returns are relatively low (high)
and whose connected returns are relatively high (low). The left side of the gure benchmarks
returns against the Fama-French/Carhart four-factor model while the right side of the gure
benchmarks returns against the Fama-French/Carhart model augmented with the one-month
reversal factor.
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Figure 1.4: Three-month reversals and connected returns
This gure graphs the abnormal performance of buy-and-hold strategies that trade a three-
month reversal strategy conditional on the return on a stocks connected portfolio. Stocks are
sorted into 25 portfolios based on independent quintile sorts on a stocks own three-month
return and its three-month connected return. The top half of the gure buys (sells) stocks
whose own returns are relatively low (high) and whose connected returns are relatively low
(high). The bottom half of the gure buys (sells) stocks whose own returns are relatively
low (high) and whose connected returns are relatively high (low). The left side of the gure
benchmarks returns against the Fama-French/Carhart four-factor model while the right side
of the graphs benchmarks returns against the Fama-French/Carhart model augmented with
the one-month reversal factor.
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Figure 1.5: One-month reversals and connected returns, alternative strategy
This gure graphs the abnormal performance of buy-and-hold strategies that trade a
one- and three-month reversal strategy based solely on the return on a stocks connected
portfolio. Stocks are sorted into 25 portfolios based on independent quintile sorts on a stocks
own and connected one-month (top two gures) or three-month (bottom two gures) returns.
Each graph buys (sells) the average (across the own return quintiles) low (high) connected
return portfolios. The left two graphs in the gure benchmark returns against the Fama-
French/Carhart four-factor model while the right two graphs in the gure benchmark returns
against the Fama-French/Carhart model augmented with the one-month reversal factor.
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Figure 1.6: Loadings of hedge fund returns on connected strategies
Loadings of HF returns on Connected Strategy and HF factors
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This gure plots the loadings of hedge fund returns on the connected strategy in event
time as well as the cumulative ve-factor abnormal return. The top graph denes the con-
nected strategy, CS1, which buys the low own return / low connected return portfolio and
sells the high own return / high connected return portfolio so that its return is rCS1 =
rlow own = low connected   rhigh own = high connected. The second graph uses as the connected
strategy, CS2, which buys the average (across the own return quintiles) low connected re-
turn portfolios and sells the average (across the own return quintiles) high connected return
portfolios so that its return is rCS2 = rlow connected   rhigh connected.
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A Appendix
A.1 Decomposing Stock Returns
The price of any asset can be written as a sum of its expected future cash ows,
discounted to the present using a set of discount rates. Campbell and Shiller
(1988a, 1988b) develop a loglinear approximate present-value relation that allows
for time-varying discount rates. Campbell (1991) extends the loglinear present-
value approach to obtain a decomposition of returns:
rt+1   Et rt+1 = (Et+1   Et)
1X
j=0
jdt+1+j   (Et+1   Et)
1X
j=1
jrt+1+j(1.7)
= NCF;t+1  NDR;t+1;
where d denotes log dividend growth, r denotes log returns, NCF denotes news
about future cash ows (future dividends), and NDR denotes news about future
discount rates (i.e., expected returns). This equation says that unexpected stock
returns must be associated with changes in expectations of future cash ows or
discount rates.
A.2 Measuring the components of returns
An important issue is how to measure the shocks to cash ows and to discount
rates. One approach, introduced by Campbell (1991), is to estimate the cash-
ow-news and discount-rate-news series using a vector autoregressive (VAR)
model. This VAR methodology rst estimates the terms Et rt+1 and (Et+1  
Et)
P1
j=1 
jrt+1+j and then uses realization of rt+1 and equation (1.7) to back out
cash-ow news. Because of the approximate identity linking returns, dividends,
and stock prices, this approach yields results that are almost identical to those
that are obtained by forecasting cash ows explicitly using the same information
set. Thus the choice of variables to enter the VAR is the important decision to
make when implementing this methodology.
When extracting the news terms in our empirical tests, we assume that the
data are generated by a rst-order VAR model
zt+1 = a+  zt + ut+1, (1.8)
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where zt+1 is a m-by-1 state vector with rt+1 as its rst element, a and   are
m-by-1 vector and m-by-m matrix of constant parameters, and ut+1 an i.i.d.
m-by-1 vector of shocks.
Provided that the process in equation (1.8) generates the data, t+1 cash-ow
and discount-rate news are linear functions of the t+ 1 shock vector:
NDR;t+1 = e1
0ut+1; (1.9)
NCF;t+1 = (e1
0 + e10)ut+1:
where e1 is a vector with rst element equal to unity and the remaining elements
equal to zeros. The VAR shocks are mapped to news by , dened as  
 (I    ) 1 so that e10 measures the long-run signicance of each individual
VAR shock to discount-rate expectations.
A.3 Aggregate VAR Specication
In specifying the monthly aggregate VAR, we follow Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(2004), choosing the same four state variables that they study. The rst element
of our state vector is the excess log return on the market (reM), the di¤erence
between the annual log return on the CRSP value-weighted stock index (rM) and
the annual log riskfree rate, obtained from Professor Kenneth Frenchs website.
The second element of our state vector is the term yield spread (TY ), provided
by Global Financial Data and computed as the yield di¤erence between ten-year
constant-maturity taxable bonds and short-term taxable notes, in percentage
points. The third variable is the log smoothed price-earnings ratio (PE), the log
of the price of the S&P 500 index divided by a ten-year trailing moving average
of aggregate earnings of companies in the index, based on data available from
Bob Shillers website. As in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), we carefully
remove the interpolation inherent in Shillers construction of the variable to
ensure the variable does not su¤er from look-ahead bias. Our nal variable
is a version of the value spread introduced by Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho
(2003), but for small stocks (V S), which we construct using the data made
available by Professor Kenneth French on his website. The portfolios, which
are constructed at the end of each June, are the intersections of two portfolios
formed on size (market equity, ME) and three portfolios formed on the ratio
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of book equity to market equity (BE=ME). As in Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(2004), we generate intermediate values of V S by accumulating total returns on
the portfolios in question.
Table 1.2 Panel A reports the VAR model parameters, estimated using OLS.
Each row of the table corresponds to a di¤erent equation of the VAR. The rst
ve columns report coe¢ cients on the ve explanatory variables: a constant,
and lags of the excess market return, term yield spread, price-earnings ratio,
and small-stock value spread. OLS standard errors are reported in parentheses
below the coe¢ cients. The rst row of Table 1.2 Panel A shows that all four
of our VAR state variables have some ability to predict monthly excess returns
on the aggregate stock market. In our sample, monthly market returns display
momentum; the coe¢ cient on the lagged excess market return is a statistically
signicant 0.1118 with a t-statistic of 3.52. The regression coe¢ cient on past
values of the term yield spread is positive, consistent with the ndings of Keim
and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell (1987), and Fama and French (1989), but with
a t-statistic of only 1.6. The smoothed price-earnings ratio negatively predicts
the return with a t-statistic of 3.42, consistent with the nding that various
scaled-price variables forecast aggregate returns (Campbell and Shiller, 1988a,
1988b, 2003; Roze¤1984; Fama and French 1988, 1989). Finally, the small-stock
value spread negatively predicts the return with a t-statistic of 2.16, consistent
with Brennan, Wang, and Xia (2001), Eleswarapu and Reinganum (2004), and
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). In summary, the estimated coe¢ cients, both
in terms of signs and t-statistics, are consistent with previous research.
The remaining rows of Table 1.2 Panel A summarize the dynamics of the
explanatory variables. The term spread can be predicted with its own lagged
value and the lagged small-stock value spread. The price-earnings ratio is highly
persistent, with past returns adding some forecasting power. Finally, the small-
stock value spread is highly persistent and approximately an AR(1) process.
A.4 Firm-level VAR Specication
We implement the main specication of our monthly rm-level VAR with the
following three state variables. First, the log rm-level return (ri) is the monthly
log value-weight return on a rms common stock equity. Following Vuolteenaho
(2002), to avoid possible complications with the use of the log transformation,
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we unlever the stock by 10 percent; that is, we dene the stock return as a
portfolio consisting of 90 percent of the rms common stock and a 10 percent
investment in Treasury Bills. Our second state variable is the momentum of the
stock (MOM), which we measure following Carhart (1997) as the cumulative
return over the months t  11 to t  1. Our nal rm-level state variable is the
log book-to-market equity ratio (we denote the transformed quantity by BM in
contrast to simple book-to-market that is denoted by BE=ME) as of the end of
each month t.
We measure BE for the scal year ending in calendar year t   1, and ME
(market value of equity) at the end of May of year t.11 We update BE=ME over
the subsequent eleven months by dividing by the cumulative gross return from
the end of May to the month in question. We require each rm-year observation
to have a valid past BE=ME ratio that must be positive in value. Moreover, in
order to eliminate likely data errors, we censor the BE=ME variables of these
rms to the range (.01,100) by adjusting the book value. To avoid inuential
observations created by the log transform, we rst shrink the BE=ME towards
one by dening BM  log[(:9BE + :1ME)=ME].
The rm-level VAR generates market-adjusted cash-ow and discount-rate
news for each rm each month. We remove month-specic means from the state
variables by subtracting rM;t from ri;t and cross-sectional means from MOMi;t
and BMi;t. As in Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2010), instead of sub-
tracting the equal-weight cross-sectional mean from ri;t, we subtract the log
value-weight CRSP index return instead, because this will allow us to undo the
market adjustment simply by adding back the cash-ow and discount-rate news
extracted from the aggregate VAR.
After cross-sectionally demeaning the data, we estimate the coe¢ cients of
11Following Fama and French (1993), we dene BE as stockholdersequity, plus balance
sheet deferred taxes (COMPUSTAT data item 74) and investment tax credit (data item 208)
(if available), plus post-retirement benet liabilities (data item 330) (if available), minus the
book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, we use redemption (data item 56),
liquidation (data item 10), or par value (data item 130) (in that order) for the book value
of preferred stock. We calculate stockholdersequity used in the above formula as follows.
We prefer the stockholdersequity number reported by Moodys, or COMPUSTAT (data item
216). If neither one is available, we measure stockholdersequity as the book value of common
equity (data item 60), plus the book value of preferred stock. (Note that the preferred stock
is added at this stage, because it is later subtracted in the book equity formula.) If common
equity is not available, we compute stockholdersequity as the book value of assets (data item
6) minus total liabilities (data item 181), all from COMPUSTAT.
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the rm-level VAR using WLS. Specically, we multiply each observation by the
inverse of the number of cross-sectional observation that year, thus weighting
each cross-section equally. This ensures that our estimates are not dominated
by the large cross sections near the end of the sample period. We impose zero
intercepts on all state variables, even though the market-adjusted returns do not
necessarily have a zero mean in each sample. Allowing for a free intercept does
not alter any of our results in a measurable way.
Parameter estimates, presented in Table 1.2 Panel B imply that expected
returns are high when past one-month return is low and when the book-to-
market ratio and momentum are high. Book-to-market is the statistically most
signicant predictor, while the rms own stock return is the statistically least
signicant predictor. Momentum is high when past stock return and past mo-
mentum are high and the book-to-market ratio is low. The book-to-market
ratio is quite persistent. Controlling for past book-to-market, expected future
book-to-market ratio is high when the past monthly return is high and past
momentum is low.
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2 Cash-Flow Driven Covariation
2.1 Introduction
In standard nance models fundamentals drive asset prices. There is however a
large body of the literature documenting departures of prices from fundamen-
tals12. It is di¢ cult to explain under the traditional paradigm market anomalies
(e.g. momentum, reversal, value e¤ect). Some of the evidence interpreted as
favouring non-fundamental-based theories concerns index e¤ects, both in rst
and second moments. For instance, Vijh (1994) and Barberis, Shleifer and Wur-
gler (2005) nd that index additions are followed by an increase in covariation,
and argue that this e¤ect is not driven by fundamentals.
Index additions have been widely used as a quasi-natural experiment to dis-
tinguish between competing theories. For example, a number of papers show
that there is a signicant jump in price levels following index additions and
deletions13. Much of these ndings have been interpreted as evidence of non-
fundamental-based theories. Some research, however, have challenged the inter-
pretation of this e¤ect. Dennis et al. (2003) for example argue that index addi-
tions are not fully information-free events, as they are followed by increases in
earnings. While the interpretation of these e¤ects in the rst moments has been
subject to debate among academics, changes in second moments (covariances)
around index inclusions are widely accepted as evidence of non-fundamental-
based theories14.
In this paper I show that S&P 500 index inclusions are followed by changes in
cash-ow covariances. I specically take on the task of disentangling how much
of the change in beta after an index addition corresponds to a fundamental ef-
fect and how much to a non-fundamental e¤ect. I provide evidence of changes
in cash-ow newscovariances after index additions using a two beta decompo-
12For instance, two recent papers survey the importance and implications of the limits of
arbitrage for asset prices (Gromb and Vayanos, 2010, and Schwert, 2003).
13Starting with Harris and Gurel (1986), and Shleifer (1986), there are many studies that
report signicant changes in price levels. See Gromb and Vayanos (2010) for a survey on these
e¤ects.
14Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) say regarding Denis et al.: "Denis et al. (2003)
nd that index additions coincide with increases in earnings. [...] Perhaps more importantly,
even if inclusions signal something about the level of future cash ows, there is no evidence
that they signal anything about cash ow covariances".
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sition. Following Campbell and Mei (1993), I decompose beta into discount-rate
and cash-ow shocks of the individual rm with the market. I nd that I can-
not reject the hypothesis that all of the well-known change in beta comes from
the cash-ow news component of a rms return. As investors cannot directly
inuence fundamentals, these results challenge previous ndings, as they are
consistent with the change in beta being due to a selection e¤ect.
The non-fundamental interpretation of the documented change in beta after
an index inclusion is based on the key assumption that there is no change in fun-
damentals after index inclusions, nor a change in cash-ow covariances. S&P 500
index inclusions are considered as information-free events, because Standard and
Poors clearly states that by choosing a rm to be added to the index they do not
signal anything about the future fundamentals of that company. Consequently,
a change in beta of stocks after the addition must reect a change in discount-
rates covariances, providing in this way evidence of friction- or sentiment-based
comovement. My approach allows me to test whether the assumption actually
holds.
Using vector-autoregressions (VARs), I break the returns of stocks added to
the S&P 500 index into cash-ow and discount-rate components. That allows
me to decompose the betas in two, one related to cash-ows and the other
related to discount-rates of the event stocks. I nd that, on average, the beta
of the discount rate component does not change after an index inclusion, and
that the beta of the cash-ow component does, and moreover accounts for the
overall change in beta. I use a sample of index additions from September 1976
to December 2008.
I then study accounting-based fundamentals of included rms directly to
reduce any concerns that the VAR-based results are sensitive to my particular
specication. Using the return on equity as a direct measure of cash ows, this
analysis conrms that post inclusion, the protability of a company added to
the index varies signicantly more with the protability of the S&P 500, and
signicantly less with the protability of all non-S&P 500 stocks.
These results strongly suggest that Standard and Poors choices do not trigger
or cause a change in betas after index inclusions, but rather it selects stocks
that exhibit a growth in betas. S&P 500 Index is meant to be representative
of the economy. Stocks are normally added following a deletion - which usually
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occurs due to mergers. The results are consistent with a story where Standard
and Poors chooses stocks that are going to be more central to the economy,
that will reect the state of the economy, and thus that will have fundamentals
more correlated to fundamentals of other representative rms in the economy.
These results (where monthly frequency is used) complement the results found
in Barberis et al. (2005). At higher frequencies, such as daily, the change in
beta observed after an index addition reects the change in speed at which
information is incorporated into stocks. Due to market frictions, information is
updated in S&P 500 stocks quicker than in non-S&P 500 stocks. In other words,
the systematic risk does not change, what changes is how fast market news are
embedded into stock prices. The results of the current paper, all computed
at the monthly frequency (because a return decomposition is not feasible at
higher frequencies), show that at lower frequencies there is indeed a change in
the systematic risk of the stocks added to the index, and that this change is not
causal, but reects the evolutions of the fundamentals of event companies.
To better understand how the selection mechanism works, I develop a match-
ing procedure, and measure the change in betas for companies that could have
been added but were not. I nd that matched stocks exhibit similar patterns
in betas, and in some cases the di¤erence in di¤erences in betas is signicant,
as in previous literature. Using the beta decomposition, I nd that the di¤er-
ence in di¤erences is driven by cash-ow covariances, thus providing evidence
of Standard and Poors signaling something about future cash-ow covariances.
This nding is consistent with Standard and PoorsCommittee being a better
predictor of future cash-ow covariances and relevance in the economy than the
basic and always imperfect matching algorithm that we employ.
Finally I explore the e¤ect in di¤erent subsamples to uncover e¤ects that
might be hidden in the overall sample. First, subsampling in the time dimen-
sion, I nd that the e¤ect is stronger in the last part of the sample, and that
the e¤ect is driven by cash-ow covariances. Secondly, I study whether stocks
with di¤erent characteristics di¤er in the change in beta experienced after in-
clusion. I divide the included rms into growth and value stocks, by comparing
the cross-sectionally adjusted book-to-market ratios. Growth rms tend to be
more intangible and more opaque, while value rms are more stable, if they are
nancially sound. Because the change in beta also reects the size of the com-
panies added, growth stocks should exhibit a higher change in beta than value
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stocks. Consistent with my prior, I nd that the change in beta is higher for
growth rms.
The results are robust to two other specications of the VAR. Allowing for
a more exible and richer specication, I rst estimate a second-order VAR,
and show that the results are very robust to this new VAR. I also test a second
alternative specication of the VAR, where rm-level and aggregate variables
are state variables all together in a unique VAR, as opposed to the benchmark
specication, where I estimate two di¤erent VARs, one for rm-level adjusted
returns, and another one for market returns. Results are also very robust to the
use of this alternative specication. The results are however ambiguous when I
use the alternative cash-ow risk measure suggested by Da andWarachka (2009),
based on an analyst earnings beta. In their paper they also show that the two
ways of decomposing results (earnings beta and VAR) lead to di¤erent results.
This paper relates to two strands of the literature. On the one hand, it is
related to the stock return comovement literature. It is well known that certain
groups of stocks tend to have common variation in prices. These studies are
divided in two groups: one supporting a fundamental view of comovement and
the other supporting a friction- or sentiment-based view of comovement. The
fundamentals-based view of comovement argues that stocks in certain groups
(value or growth stocks) have common variation because of the characteristics
of their cash-ows. For example, Fama and French (1996) argue that value stocks
tend to comove because they are companies in nancial distress and vulnerable
to bankruptcy. Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2009) nd that the protability
of value stocks covaries more with market-wide protability than that of growth
stocks. The alternative view of comovement is the friction- or sentiment-based
view, and argues that the stock market prices di¤erent groups of stocks di¤er-
ently at di¤erent times. For example, Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Barberis,
Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) argue that it is changes in investor sentiment that
creates correlated movement in prices, although they lack common fundamen-
tals. In this paper, I support the fundamentals-based view of comovement.
On the other hand, this paper is also related to the stream of the literature
that studies the e¤ects of index inclusions. A large body of literature explores the
price e¤ects of index inclusions. Some studies assume that S&P 500 inclusions
are information-free events. Shleifer (1986) and Harris and Gurel (1986) nd that
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there is an increase in price after an addition, but the e¤ect dissipates after two
weeks. They argue these ndings are consistent with a perfectly elastic demand
for stocks. Some authors claim that the index e¤ect has a long-term impact
on price. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) do not nd a full reversal in prices,
which suggests that the long-term demand curve is donward sloping. Other
studies claim that S&P 500 inclusions are not information-free events. Dennis
et al. (2003) nd that a better monitoring improves the e¢ ciency of managers
of added companies, resulting in higher earnings after inclusions. Dhillon and
Johnson (1991) nd that the corporate bonds of companies added also respond
to the listing announcement, and thus conclude that the announcement conveys
new information about fundamentals. In this paper, I nd supporting evidence
of S&P 500 inclusions not being fully information-free events.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I describe the
decomposition of returns and betas. Section 3 shows the VAR framework and
VAR estimations. In Section 4 I show the empirical results, and the robustness
checks. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Decomposing Stock Returns and Betas
The main purpose of this paper is to understand the sources of change in betas
around S&P 500 inclusions, and the novelty of this paper is precisely to break
return betas into discount-rate and cash-ow betas in the context of S&P 500
additions to distinguish between fundamentals and sentiment theories. In this
Section I describe carefully how we can break betas into discount rate and cash-
ow betas. Drawing from previous literature, I will rst explain how returns are
decomposed, and then I turn to apply this decomposition to betas.
2.2.1 Decomposing Returns
Following the Gordon growth formula, the price of a nancial asset is expressed
as the sum of its expected future cash ows, discounted to the present with a
set of discount rates. The source of change in the price of the asset comes from
either a change in the expected stream of cash ows, or from a change in the
expected discount rates.
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Decomposing returns in the context of index additions is useful because it
allows me to distinguish between fundamentals and sentiment stories for two
reasons. The rst one is that investors cannot directly a¤ect the fundamen-
tals of a rm. As a consequence, any impact of investor sentiment in prices
is made through the channel of discount rates. Changes in investor sentiment,
thus, means that investors change the discount rates they apply to otherwise
unchanged set of cash-ows. Secondly, the origin of a change in price matters
for long-term investors, such as pension funds. If returns drop caused by an
increase in discount rates, these investors are not too concerned, because this
is partially compensated by better future investment opportunities. However, if
the drop in current returns reect a fall in the expected cash-ows, this loss is
not compensated. A good example of this e¤ect is the recent study by Camp-
bell, Giglio, and Polk (2010), where they show how similar drops in aggregate
returns can a¤ect long-term investors very di¤erently depending on the sources
of these downturns.
To decompose returns, I follow the framework set up by Campbell and Shiller
(1988a, 1988b). They loglinearize the log-return:
rt+1 = log(Pt+1 +Dt+1)  log(Pt) (2.1)
where r denotes log-return, P the price, and D the dividend. They approximate
this expression with a rst order Taylor expansion around the mean log dividend-
price ratio, (dt   pt), where lowercase letter denote log transforms. This approx-
imation yields
rt+1  k + pt+1 + (1  )dt+1   pt (2.2)
where   1=(1 + exp(dt   pt))
k    log()  (1  ) log(1=  1)
In this approximation, the log sum of price and dividend is replaced by a
weighted average of log price and log dividend.
We now solve iteratively equation 2.2, by taking expectations and assuming
that limj!1 j(dt+j   pt+j) = 0, and get
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pt   dt = k
1   + Et
1X
k=1
j[dt+1+j   rt+1+j] (2.3)
This accounting identity states that the price dividend ratio is high when the
expected stream of future dividend growth (d) is high or when expected returns
are low.
Drawing from this result, Campbell (1991) develops a return decomposition
based on the loglinearization. The results obtained in equation 2.3 are plugged
into equation 2.2. Then, substracting the expectation of log return, we get
rt+1   Et rt+1 = (Et+1   Et)
1X
j=0
jdt+1+j   (Et+1   Et)
1X
j=1
jrt+1+j
= NCF;t+1  NDR;t+1; (2.4)
where NCF and NDR denote news about future cash ows (future dividends),
and news about future discount rates (i.e., expected returns) respectively. Unex-
pected stock returns are thus a combination of changes in expected future cash
ows and expected future discount rates.
2.2.2 Decomposing Betas
If a stocks beta is dened as the correlation of the stock return with the mar-
ket return, then we can break betas into di¤erent components using the return
decomposition described above. Previous research has used the return decompo-
sition shown in equation 2.4 to break systematic risk in di¤erent ways. Campbell
and Mei (1993) decompose the returns on stock portfolios (sorted on size or in-
dustry) and compute the cash-ow and discount-rate news of each portfolio.
They dene two beta components, one measuring the sensitivity of cash-ow
news of the portfolio with the market and the other measuring the sensitivity of
discount-rate news of the portfolio with the market. The two beta components
are the following:
CFi;M 
Covt(Ni;CF;t+1; rM;t+1)
V art(rM;t+1)
(2.5)
and
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DRi;M 
Covt(Ni;DR;t+1; rM;t+1)
V art(rM;t+1)
(2.6)
These two beta components add up to the traditional market beta of the
CAPM:
i;M = CFi;M + DRi;M (2.7)
Unlike Campbell and Mei (1993), I will break the betas on individual stocks
(those added to the S&P 500 index), rather than on stock portfolios.
2.3 A VAR framework
2.3.1 Measuring the components of returns
I use vector autoregressions (VARs) to measure the shocks to cash ows and
to discount rates, following Campbell (1991) approach. The VAR methodology
rst estimates the terms Et rt+1 and (Et+1   Et)
P1
j=1 
jrt+1+j and then uses
realization of rt+1 and equation 2.4 to back out cash-ow news. Because of the
approximate identity linking returns, dividends, and stock prices, this approach
yields results that are almost identical to those that are obtained by forecasting
cash ows explicitly using the same information set. Thus the choice of variables
to enter the VAR is the important decision in implementing this methodology.
When extracting the news terms in our empirical tests, I assume that the
data are generated by a rst-order VAR model
zt+1 = a+  zt + ut+1, (2.8)
where zt+1 is a m-by-1 state vector with rt+1 as its rst element, a and   are
m-by-1 vector and m-by-m matrix of constant parameters, and ut+1 an i.i.d.
m-by-1 vector of shocks.
Assuming that the process in equation (2.8) generates the data, t + 1 cash-
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ow and discount-rate news are linear functions of the t+ 1 shock vector:
NDR;t+1 = e1
0ut+1; (2.9)
NCF;t+1 = (e1
0 + e10)ut+1:
where e1 is a vector with rst element equal to unity and the remaining elements
equal to zero. The VAR shocks are mapped to news by , dened as  
 (I    ) 1 so that e10 measures the long-run signicance of each individual
VAR shock to discount-rate expectations.
2.3.2 Aggregate VAR Specications
For my analysis I need to break individual stock returns into cash-ow and
discount-rate news. However, as pointed out by Vuolteenaho (2002), it is useful
and accurate to carry out the decomposition in two steps. Because aggregate
returns behave di¤erently than rm-level returns, it is reasonable to estimate
a VAR for market returns, using aggregate variables, and a VAR for rm-level
market-adjusted returns, using rm-level variables. Consistent with Vuolteenaho
(2002), I show in the last section that estimating a unique VAR for rm-level
stock returns delivers similar results.
I rst estimate an aggregate VAR, to predict market returns. In specifying
the aggregate VAR, I include four variables, following Campbell and Vuolteenaho
(2004). The data are all monthly, from December 1928 to May 2009.
The rst element the VAR is the excess return on the market (rem), calculated
as the di¤erence between the monthly log return on the CRSP value-weighted
stock index (rm) and the monthly log risk-free rate (rf). I take the excess return
series from Kenneth Frenchs website15. The second element in the VAR is
the term yield spread (TY ), provided by Global Financial Data and computed
as the yield di¤erence between ten-year constant-maturity taxable bonds and
short-term taxable notes, in percentage points16. The third variable is the log
smoothed price-earnings ratio (PE), the log of the price of the S&P 500 index
divided by a ten-year trailing moving average of aggregate earnings of companies
15http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
16This last variable is only available until 2002, from that year until the end of the series I
compute the TY series as the di¤erence between the yield on the 10-Year US Constant Matu-
rity Bond (IGUSA10D) and the yield on the 1-Year US Constant Maturity Bond (IGUSA1D).
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in the index. I take the price-earnings ratio series from Robert Shillers website17.
As in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), I carefully remove the interpolation
inherent in Shillers construction of the variable to ensure the variable does not
su¤er from look-ahead bias. The nal variable is the small-stock value spread
(V S), which I construct using the data made available by Professor Kenneth
French on his web site. The portfolios, which are constructed at the end of
each June, are the intersections of two portfolios formed on size (market equity,
ME) and three portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity to market equity
(BE=ME). I generate intermediate values of V S by accumulating total returns
on the portfolios in question.
The motivation for the use of these variables is the following. Term yield
spread tracks the business cycle, as pointed out by Fama and French (1989),
and there are several reasons why we should expect aggregate returns to be
correlated to the business cycle. Second, if price-earnings ratio is high and
expected earnings growth is constant, then long-run expected returns must be
low, so we expect a negative coe¢ cient of this variable in the VAR. Finally,
the small-stock value spread is included given the evidence in Brennan, Wang,
and Xia (2001) and others that relatively high returns for small growth stocks
predict low aggregate returns in the market.
Table 2.1 reports the VAR model parameters for the aggregate VAR, esti-
mated using OLS. Every row of the table corresponds to a di¤erent equation
of the VAR. The rst ve columns report coe¢ cients on the ve explanatory
variables: a constant, and lags of the excess market return, term yield spread,
price-earnings ratio, and small-stock value spread. OLS standard errors are
reported in parentheses below the coe¢ cients.
The rst row in Table 2.1 shows that all four of my VAR state variables have
some ability to predict monthly excess returns on the market excess returns.
Monthly market returns display momentum; the coe¢ cient on the lagged market
excess return is a statistically signicant 0.1118 with a t-statistic of 3.52.
The regression coe¢ cient on past values of the term yield spread is positive,
consistent with the ndings of Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell (1987),
and Fama and French (1989), but with a t-statistic of 1.6. As expected, the
smoothed price-earnings ratio negatively predicts market excess returns, with t-
17http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
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statistics of 3.41, consistent with the nding that various scaled-price variables
forecast aggregate returns (Campbell and Shiller, 1988ab, 2003; Roze¤ 1984;
Fama and French 1988, 1989). Finally, the small-stock value spread negatively
predicts market excess returns with t-statistics of 2.16, consistent with Brennan,
Wang, and Xia (2001), Eleswarapu and Reinganum (2004), and Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004). The estimated coe¢ cients, both in terms of signs and t-
statistics, are consistent with previous research.
The remaining rows in Table 2.1 summarize the dynamics of the explanatory
variables. The term spread can be predicted with its own lagged value and the
lagged small-stock value spread. The price-earnings ratio is highly persistent,
with past returns adding some forecasting power. Finally, the small-stock value
spread is highly persistent and approximately an AR(1) process.
2.3.3 Firm-level VAR Specication
After the estimation of an aggregate VAR, I now turn to estimate a rm-level
VAR for market-adjusted returns. I implement the main specication of my
monthly rm-level VAR with the following three state variables. First, the log
rm-level return (ri) is the monthly log value-weight return on a rms common
stock equity. Following Vuolteenaho (2002), to avoid possible complications
with the use of the log transformation, I unlever the stock by 10 percent; that
is, I dene the stock return as a portfolio consisting of 90 percent of the rms
common stock and a 10 percent investment in Treasury Bills. My second state
variable is the momentum of the stock (MOM), which I measure following
Carhart (1997) as the cumulative return over the months t   11 to t   1. My
nal rm-level state variable is the log book-to-market equity ratio (I denote
the transformed quantity by BM in contrast to simple book-to-market that is
denoted by BE=ME) as of the end of each month t.
I measure BE for the scal year ending in calendar year t   1, and ME
(market value of equity) at the end of May of year t18. I update BE=ME over
18Following Fama and French, we dene BE as stockholders equity, plus balance sheet
deferred taxes (COMPUSTAT data item 74) and investment tax credit (data item 208) (if
available), plus post-retirement benet liabilities (data item 330) (if available), minus the
book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, we use redemption (data item 56),
liquidation (data item 10), or par value (data item 130) (in that order) for the book value of
preferred stock. We calculate stockholdersequity used in the above formula as follows. We
prefer the stockholders equity number reported by Moodys, or COMPUSTAT (data item
2 CASH-FLOW DRIVEN COVARIATION 75
the subsequent eleven months by dividing by the cumulative gross return from
the end of May to the month in question. I require each rm-year observation
to have a valid past BE=ME ratio that must be positive in value. Moreover,
in order to eliminate likely data errors, I censor the BE=ME variables of these
rms to the range (.01,100) by adjusting the book value. To avoid inuential
observations created by the log transform, I rst shrink the BE=ME towards
one by dening BM  log[(:9BE + :1ME)=ME].
The rm-level VAR generates market-adjusted cash-ow and discount-rate
news for each rm and month. I remove month-specic means from the state
variables by subtracting rM;t from ri;t and cross-sectional means from MOMi;t
and BMi;t. As in Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2010), instead of subtract-
ing the equal-weight cross-sectional mean from ri;t, I subtract the log value-
weight CRSP index return, because this will allow us to undo the market ad-
justment simply by adding back the cash-ow and discount-rate news extracted
from the aggregate VAR.
After cross-sectionally demeaning the data, I estimate the coe¢ cients of the
rm-level VAR using WLS. Specically, I multiply each observation by the in-
verse of the number of cross-sectional observation that year, thus weighting each
cross-section equally. This ensures that my estimates are not dominated by the
large cross sections near the end of the sample period. I impose zero intercepts
on all state variables, even though the market-adjusted returns do not necessar-
ily have a zero mean in each sample. Allowing for a free intercept does not alter
any of my results in a measurable way.
Parameter estimates, presented in Table 2.2, imply that expected returns
are high when past one-month return is low and when the book-to-market ratio
and momentum are high. Book-to-market is the statistically most signicant
predictor, while the rms own stock return is the statistically least signicant
predictor. Momentum is high when past stock return and past momentum
are high and the book-to-market ratio is low. The book-to-market ratio is quite
persistent. Controlling for past book-to-market, expected future book-to-market
ratio is high when the past monthly return is high and past momentum is low.
216). If neither one is available, we measure stockholdersequity as the book value of common
equity (data item 60), plus the book value of preferred stock. (Note that the preferred stock
is added at this stage, because it is later subtracted in the book equity formula). If common
equity is not available, we compute stockholdersequity as the book value of assets (data item
6) minus total liabilities (data item 181), all from COMPUSTAT.
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2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Data
I use S&P 500 index inclusions between September, 1976 and December 31, 2008.
There are 745 inclusion events in the sample period. Following prior studies, I
exclude the events where the included rm is a spin-o¤ or a restructured version
of a rm already in the index, if the rm is engaged in a merger or takeover
around the inclusion event, or if the event occurs so close to the end of the
sample that the data required for estimating post-event betas are not available.
I do not consider deletion events in this study for two main reasons. Firs,
most of the deletions from the S&P 500 (over 80%) are derived from a spin-o¤,
mergers or restructuring. The second reason is that the evidence of beta shifts
followed by deletions reported in the literature is smaller and less signicant
than that of additions.
I use monthly and quarterly data, from CRSP and Compustat. The analysis
is done at the monthly frequency, because the return decomposition is done
monthly. Higher frequency return decomposition is not considered, because the
state variables used in the VAR are based on accounting variables, available at
low frequencies.
Data for inclusion events comes from two sources: CRSP Index le, provided
by Standard and Poors, and Je¤rey Wurglers website. From 1976 to 2000
I use Je¤rey Wurglers sample (590 additions), that includes information on
whether the addition is related to mergers or spin o¤s. From 2001 to 2008 I
obtain the data from CRSP Index le (155 additions), and manually investigate
confounding events, using Nexis, Wall Street Journal, the companyswebsites,
Google.com, and Wikipedia. I exclude 33 additions that are related to mergers
or spin-o¤s. I also require the additions to have enough data on the return
decomposition.
2.4.2 Changes in Betas in a VAR Framework
2.4.2.1 Benchmark case I rst conduct a basic bivariate regression where
I measure the change in beta of the event stocks with respect to the S&P 500
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return, controlling for the non S&P 500 return. I do this following the empir-
ical approach of Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005). They conjecture that
controlling for the return of the "exiting" group (all non S&P 500 stocks) gives
more power to distinguish between fundamentals and friction- or sentiment-
based views.
I build a panel of all the event stocks, using a window of 36 months before
and 36 months after the addition. I include the interaction of reSP;t and r
e
nSP;t
with a dummy variable Iit that takes value 1 if the stock is included in the index.
The subscript t reects event time (months around the inclusion), not calendar
time. The equation I estimate is therefore the following:
rei;t = i + 
b
SP r
e
SP;t + 
b
nSP r
e
nSP;t + SP Iitr
e
SP;t + nSP Iitr
e
nSP;t + "i;t (2.10)
The coe¢ cients of the interactions IitreSP;t and IitrenSP;t (SP and nSP
respectively) reect the average changes in betas after the addition to the S&P
500 index has taken place. The excess return on the S&P 500 index, reSP , is
computed as the di¤erence between the monthly return on the S&P 500 index,
obtained from the CRSP Index File, and the monthly riskfree rate, obtained
from Professor Kenneth Frenchs website. The return renSP are excess returns on
a capitalization-weighted index of the non-S&P 500 stocks in the NYSE, AMEX,
and Nasdaq, and are inferred from the following identity:
rM;t =

CAPM;t 1   CAPSP;t 1
CAPM;t 1

rnSP;t +

CAPSP;t 1
CAPM;t 1

rSP;t (2.11)
where total capitalization of the S&P 500 (CAPSP ) is from the CRSP Index
on the S&P 500 Universe le. Returns on the value-weighted CRSP NYSE,
AMEX, and Nasdaq index (rM) and total capitalization (CAPM) are from the
CRSP Stock Index le.
The constant in this regression has the i subscript, which means that I include
rm dummies. It is reasonable to assume that the alphas for each event stock
are di¤erent. Moreover, if two additions are close together in time, there can
be overlap in the time periods covered by the regressions associated with each
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event. To account for this cross-sectional autocorrelation, I cluster standard
errors by time (month).
Table 2.3 shows the results for this regression. Consistent with previous
literature (Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler, 2005), I nd that beta with respect
to S&P 500 returns jumps and beta with respect to non S&P 500 returns falls,
both signicantly. The second row displays the average change in S&P 500 beta,
SP , 0.425, accurately estimated with a t-stat of 6.25. The fourth row shows
the average change in non S&P 500 beta, nSP , with the coe¢ cient -0.291,
estimated with a a t-stat of 4.59.
2.4.2.2 Cash-ow and discount-rate betas The results reported in Table
2.3, in line with those found by Barberis et. al, have been interpreted as evidence
of friction- or sentiment-based comovement. The argument is the following.
Standard and Poors state clearly that in choosing a company to be included
in the index, they do not signal anything about the future performance of the
company. As a consequence, any change in the betas of companies added to
the index should be attributed to sentiment, because fundamentals have not
changed.
Sentiment- or friction-based theories predict that the increase in beta is due
to an induced common factor in the discount rates. Investors cannot a¤ect
directly the fundamentals (cash-ows) of a rm. However, they can apply similar
discount rates to stocks in the same group, thus inducing an excess comovement.
Examining the components of the change in beta follows naturally from this
argument. If the excess comovement is driven by sentiment- or friction-based
reasons, then the observed change in beta should be coming from a change in
discount rate betas, and we should not observe a change in cash ow covariances.
If, however, the change is driven by cash-ow covariances, then this is support
for a fundamentals-based view of comovement.
To implement this test, I simply substitute the excess returns of event stocks,
rei;t, for their cash-ow news (NiCF;t) and (negative of) discount-rate news ( NiDR;t)
in the left-hand side of equation 2.10:
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 NiDR;t = i + DRbSP reSP;t + DRbnSP renSP;t + DRSP IitreSP;t + DRnSP IitrenSP;t + "i;t
(2.12)
and
NiCF;t = i+
CFb
SP r
e
SP;t+
CFb
nSP r
e
nSP;t+
CF
SP Iitr
e
SP;t+
CF
nSP Iitr
e
nSP;t+"i;t (2.13)
so that I can identify the changes in beta due to discount rates, and those due
to cash-ows. This decomposition implies that the overall change in beta with
respect to S&P 500 (and similarly with non S&P 500 stocks), is approximately
equal to the sum of changes in cash-ow betas and discount rate betas:
SP  DRSP + CFSP
nSP  DRnSP + CFnSP (2.14)
Table 2.4 shows the changes in cash-ow and discount rate betas. The rst
column replicates the benchmark column of table 2.3. The second and third
columns show the results for the change in the di¤erent beta components. The
change in discount rate beta with respect to the S&P 500 is an insignicant
-0.008 (second row, second column), and 0.049 with respect to the non S&P 500
stocks, whereas the changes in cash-ow betas are 0.391 and -0.286 (for S&P
500 and non S&P 500 respectively), accurately estimated with t-stats of 6.15
and 4.62. This result strongly supports the idea that, at the monthly frequency,
sentiment- or friction-based comovement is negligible if not inexistent.
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of average betas around the inclusion event.
Rolling regressions are estimated with windows of 36 months from month  36
to month +72. In the top panel we observe the evolution of the overall average
betas. S&P 500 betas increase signicantly after inclusion, and non S&P 500
decrease after inclusion. Below, in the central panel, rolling average discount
rate betas are plotted, showing a very mild pattern of variation. Finally, in the
bottom panel, we see how all the action in the change in beta is originated in
the cash-ow betas.
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2.4.3 Results from a direct approach
In this subsection I avoid the need for a VAR estimation, and thus show that
my results do not depend on the VAR specication nor on the state variables
used in the VAR. The main result arising from the previous section is that the
changes in overall betas with S&P 500 and non S&P 500 returns come from
cash-ow betas. In other words, I have found evidence that the fundamentals
of stocks added to the S&P 500 index tend to comove more with fundamentals
of the S&P500 after inclusion than before.
I use the return on equity (roeit) to proxy for rm-level cash ow fundamen-
tals, as done previously in the literature (Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho, 2003,
2009). The specication is very simple: I regress the individual roeit on the
aggregate return on equity for the S&P 500 (roeSP;t), on the aggregate return
on equity for the rest of the market (roenSP;t), and on the interaction of these
two variables with a dummy variable Iit that is equal to 1 if the stock is in the
index and equal to 0 if it is not. The hypothesis is that if there is a change in the
cash-ow covariances of the event stocks with the S&P 500 index, then I should
observe a positive coe¢ cient for the rst interaction term (IitroeSP;t) and a neg-
ative coe¢ cient for the second interaction term (IitroenSP;t). The specication
is then
roei;t = i+
b
SP roeSP;t+
b
nSP roenSP;t+SP IitroeSP;t+nSP IitroenSP;t+"i;t
where roei;t is the return on equity, dened as roei;t = log(1 + NIt=BEt 1)
where NI is net income and BE book equity, in t and t   1 respectively. To
avoid extreme observations, roei;t is winsorized between  1 and 2 (on a given
quarter, the return on equity cannot be lower than  100% or higher than 200%).
roeSP;t and roenSP;t are calculated as the log of 1 plus the sum of NIt over the
sum of BEt 1, for all December scal year end stocks in each group of S&P 500
and non S&P 500 stocks. As in the previous analyses, I include rm dummies,
and the standard errors are clustered by time to account for cross-sectional
autocorrelation.
I run a pooled-OLS quarterly regression. Results are presented in table 2.5.
The results conrm my ndings in the VAR approach. When a stock is not in
the index, its beta with S&P 500 return on equity is 0.227 and its beta with
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the rest of the market return on equity is 0.716, with both coe¢ cients estimated
precisely with t-statistic above 3. However, once the stock has been added to
the index, the betas turn to 0.488 and 0.211 for S&P 500 and rest of the market
return on equities.
2.4.4 Matched stocks
The results from the VAR and from the direct approach strongly suggest that
S&P 500 additions do not trigger a change in betas, rather, it selects stocks
that exhibit a growth in betas. In other words, the observed change in beta of
stocks added to the S&P 500 is not a consequence of being added, but rather,
a motive for being added. S&P 500 index is meant to be representative of the
economy, normally composed by large rms. The results are consistent with a
story where Standard and Poors chooses stocks that are going to be more central
to the economy, by having fundamentals more correlated with the fundamentals
of other representative companies.
A natural exercise that helps to distinguish between causality and selection
is a matching procedure. We can identify stocks of similar characteristics than
those added to the S&P 500, but that happened not to be added. If S&P 500
additions are triggering or causing a change in beta, then event stocks should
exhibit a change in betas coming from the discount rates, whereas matched
stocks should not. If, however, it is Standard and Poors that is selecting stocks
from certain sector and characteristics, then we would observe similar patterns
of comovement in matched stocks as well.
Following Barberis et al., for each event stock I search for a matching stock
similar in size and industry. I choose a stock in the same size decile at the
moment of inclusion and 36 months before inclusion. I rst match at the SIC4
level. If no match can be found, I allow the matched stock to be in the same
SIC3 level. If no match is found, I then go back to SIC4 level and allow the
matched stock to be within one size decile at inclusion, then within one size
decile 36 months before inclusion. If no match can be found, I repeat the size
allowance for SIC3 level, and then for the SIC2 level. I nally repeat the same
algorithm for allowance of two size deciles at inclusion and then 36 months before
inclusion.
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Table 2.6 shows the results of the changes in beta using matched stocks. I
nd that matched stocks exhibit similar patterns in betas, as matched stocks
also experience a signicant change in beta with respect to S&P 500 returns, of
0.261. The crucial result in this table is that the di¤erence in di¤erence in betas,
though mildly signicant (0.165 with a t-stat of 1.91), it all comes from the cash-
ow component: 0.158 with a t-stat of 2. This is both evidence of Standard and
Poors signaling something about future cash-ow covariances, and of Standard
and PoorsCommittee being a better predictor of future cash-ow covariances
and relevance in the economy than the basic and always imperfect matching
algorithm that we employ.
Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of rolling average betas (for the overall betas,
and their discount-rate and cash-ow components). The top panel shows the
betas for the event rms (those included in the S&P 500), and the bottom panel
shows the evolution of betas for matched rms (rms that could have been
included in the index, but were not).
2.4.5 Reconciling with Barberis et al.
How do these results compare to those of Barberis et al.? They provide evidence
of an excess-comovement coming from sentiment, and in this paper I provide
evidence of a cash-ow driven comovement after index inclusions. In this sub-
section I explicitily compare both results to better understand how they relate
to each other.
Barberis et al. provide empirical evidence supportive of three sentiment- or
friction-based views of comovement. The category view, proposed by Barberis
and Shleifer (2003), argues that investors, in order to simplify portfolio decisions,
allocate funds at the category level, instead of asset level. Thus if there are noise
traders with correlated sentiment, and they are e¤ective in a¤ecting prices, they
create an excess comovement into each by moving funds from one to another
category. Habitat view is based on the fact that many investors limit their
investment universe to a preferred habitat, due to transaction costs, or lack of
information. This in turns creates a common factor in the returns of these assets
that is uncorrelated to fundamentals. The information difussion view stems from
the fact that due to market frictions, the information is incorporated quicker into
the prices of some stocks than others.
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The two main contributions of their paper with respect to Vijh (1994) are as
follows. They rst extend the sample and show that the results are stronger in
the recent period. Secondly they run bivariate regressions to enhance the power
of the tests, by controlling in the regressions for non-S&P 500 returns. This
methodology follows from the rst two views of sentiment-based comovement:
when a stock joins a group of stocks, the comovement of the stock with the new
group should go up (as seen in Vijh), but also, and this is the novel approach,
the comovement of the stock with the group to which it belonged (the leaving
group), should drop.
They show that the evidence of excess-comovement after index inclusions is
strong when using daily data, and becomes weaker when using lower frequencies
of the data. Results for weekly and monthly data, although present, are less
powerful than those using daily data. So the frequency used in the analysis
matters. To understand how the three views contribute to the e¤ect, Barberis
et al. add a nal section in the paper where they repeat the daily analysis using
Dimson betas: using ve leads and ve lags of the right hand side variables,
namely, S&P 500 index and non-S&P 500 index. They nd that most of the e¤ect
dissappears when controlling for Dimson betas. Some of the e¤ect remains in the
univariate analysis, however statistical signicance dissappears in the bivariate
analysis, which is, in turn, the novel methodology they propose to enhance the
power of the tests. Results are also shown only for event stocks, suggesting that
di¤erence in di¤erences for matched stocks is not signicant.
In this paper I show that there is a signicant change in the covariances after
index inclusions, and that such a change comes from the cash-ow component of
the return covariance. I only use monthly frequency, as a return decomposition
at higher frequencies is not feasible given the frequency of the variables that
predict returns.
The results of Barberis et al., with especial emphasis on the Dimon betas
analysis, together with my results strongly suggest that at high frequencies, the
change in beta reects the friction-based view of information difussion. Stocks
in the S&P 500 index incorporate information quicker than stocks outside the
S&P 500 index. In other words, an inclusion in the index changes the speed
at which information is incorporated, but it does not change the systematic
risk of the stocks added to the index. At lower frequencies, however, when
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we observe a change in the systematic risk of a stock added to the index, this
change does not reect a change in the speed of information incorporation (a
causal e¤ect triggered by the inclusion), but rather it reects the evolution of the
fundamentals of the stock added to the Index. This evolution in fundamentals
is also present in matched stocks that were not added to the Index.
2.4.6 Robustness to di¤erent subsamples
2.4.6.1 Subsample in the time dimension I explore the e¤ect in di¤er-
ent time subsamples to uncover e¤ects that might be hidden in the full-sample
period. Previous research has found that the change in beta after index addi-
tions has grown over time. Consistent with those ndings, I nd that the e¤ect
is stronger in the last part of the sample. This analysis, shown in table 2.7,
reects three ndings. Firstly, the e¤ect of the change in beta with respect to
S&P 500 index comes from the cash-ow components of the stocks added rather
from the discount rates in both parts of the subsample. The changes in beta for
the two subsamples are 0.230 and 0.533, estimated with t-stats above 3, where
almost all the e¤ect is cash-ow originated (0.297 and 0.393).
Secondly, I nd that the di¤erence in di¤erences using matching stocks is
also coming from the cash-ow components in both subsamples. Thirdly it is
interesting to note that when breaking the sample in early and recent parts
we observe that the change in beta related to discount rates is negative in the
rst part of the subsample and positive in the second part: -0.077 and 0.90
respectively signicant at the 10% level of signicance. This alone could be
interpreted as evidence of sentiment-based comovement in the later part of the
sample. However, we observe that the same pattern is observed in matched
stocks, that were not added to the index (-0.061 and 0.084).
2.4.6.2 Subsample in growth value dimension In this subsection I study
whether stocks with di¤erent characteristics di¤er in the change in beta experi-
enced after inclusion. I divide the included rms into growth and value stocks, by
comparing the cross-sectionally adjusted book-to-market ratios. Growth rms
tend to be more intangible and more opaque, while value rms are more stable,
if they are nancially sound. Because the change in beta also reects the size
of the companies added, growth stocks should exhibit a higher change in beta
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than value stocks. Table 2.8 reports the results. Consistent with my prior, I nd
that the change in beta is higher for growth rms (0.547 versus 0.356). The re-
sults for matched rms exhibit similar patterns, and the di¤erence in di¤erence,
although insignicant, is also coming from the cash-ow components of beta.
2.4.7 Robustness to a second-order VAR
After considering parsimonious VAR specications, I turn now to test the results
using richer VAR equations, both in the rm-level and in the aggregate. Recall
that the news terms used in the benchmark event study around S&P 500 index
inclusions are the sum of the news extracted from an aggregate VAR and a
rm-level VAR. In the benchmark specication I only use one lag of the state
variables, assuming that higher order lags would not a¤ect present values of the
variables, as widely used in the literature related to stock-return decomposition.
The benchmark aggregate specication assumes that the data generating
process is a rst-order monthly VAR. I use the following four state variables:
excess return on the market (rem), the term yield spread (TY ), the log smoothed
price-earnings ratio (PE), and the small-stock value spread (V S). Previous
research has shown that these variables could help predict returns at a longer
horizons (Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho, 2010). Without being exhaustive
(there are many possible specications), I will test the results by using a second-
order VAR, i.e., allowing for up to two lags to predict the state variables. The
methodology is similar to the rst order VAR:
zt+1 = a+ A1zt + A2zt 1 + ut+1 (2.15)
which for analytical derivations of the news terms according to Campbell (1991),
it can also be expressed as:"
zt+1
zt
#
=
"
a
0
#
+
"
A1 A2
I 0
#"
zt
zt 1
#
+
"
ut+1
0
#
(2.16)
Table 2.9 shows the results for the second-order aggregate VAR. To avoid
an unncessary display of zeros and the identity matrix, I only show A1 and
A2. The results are similar to the rst-order VAR. Due to the additional free
parameters, however, the standard errors are somewhat larger. The coe¢ cients
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for the second lag are estimated less accurately. Market returns exhibit now a bit
of reversal in the second lag (with a coe¢ cient of -0.04), term yield spread and
price earning ratio keeps the positive sign in the second lag estimate, and the
small stock value spread ips sign with respect to the rst lag. The intercepts
and the R-Squares are very similar to the previous specication.
I now turn to the rm-level market adjusted VAR. The variables used in the
benchmark rst-order VAR are the following: market adjusted log stock return
(ri), the previous year return, excluding the last month (MOMi), and the log
book-to-market (BMi). I motivate this lag order as a second-order cointegrat-
ing VAR. Previous research has also shown that these variables have predictive
power beyond the rst month (Vuolteenaho, 2002, and Campbell, Polk, and
Vuolteenaho, 2010). Consistent with Vuolteenaho (2002), I nd that the results
are very similar to the rst-order VAR. Table 2.10 shows the coe¢ cients of the
secon-order market-adjusted rm-level VAR. As in the aggregate VAR, the stan-
dard errors of the second-order coe¢ cients are large, and thus the coe¢ cients
are not accurately estimated. Monthly returns also exhibit reversal in the sec-
ond lag, and the previous year return computed in the second lag predicts also
positively the returns. The coe¢ cient for book-to-market shows a di¤erent sign
for the second lag, which is consistent with the rst-order VAR given the degree
of correlation between the book-to-market at time t and the book-to-market at
time t  1.
Following the same methodology, I extract the news from each of the new
VARs (the second-order aggregate VAR and second-order rm-level VAR), I add
them up, yielding NiDR;t and NiCF;t, and compute the changes in cash ow and
discount rate betas after the addition in the S&P 500 index, as before. Table
2.11 shows the changes in overall beta (which I include again for comparison
purposes), and the changes in the new cash ow and new discount rate betas.
The main results are very robust to the use of a second order VAR. In column
three we observe that the change in beta after an S&P 500 addition comes from
the cash-ow beta. The overall change in beta is a stronly signicant 0.430, the
change in discount rate beta is an insignicant  0:035, and the change in cash
ow beta is a stronly signicant 0.424. Consistent with the results from the
rst order VAR, matched stocks also experience a change in the cash ow betas
(column 6), and the di¤erence in di¤erence is all coming from the cash-ows
(see column 9), although it is estimated less accurately.
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2.4.8 An alternative specication of the VAR
In the benchmark specication, the cash-ow and discount-rate news are ex-
tracted from two di¤erent VARs. The rationale for estimating two di¤erent
VARs hinged in the fact that rm-level idiosyncratic returns behave di¤erently
than market returns. A clear example shown in Tables 1 and 2 is that rm-
level returns exhibit a clear short-term reversal after one month, while market
returns display momentum after one month. Following Vuolteenaho (2002) and
Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2010), I estimated in the previous section
an aggregate VAR to extract the market return news and a rm-level VAR to
extract rm-level market adjusted returns, to account for the aforementioned
di¤erences and to more accurately predict the two components of a rm return:
the idiosyncratic and the market component.
In this subsection I show that the main results of the paper are not driven
by the choice of extracting the news from two di¤erent VARs. I now estimate a
VAR for rm-level excess returns, instead of rm-level market-adjusted returns.
In the state vector I now include rm-level and market-wide variables. By doing
so, I intend to allow market-wide variables to a¤ect expected returns and cash
ows on all stocks. The model is then written this way:
"
zi;t+1
xt+1
#
= A+  
"
zi;t
xt
#
+ ui;t+1
where zi;t+1 is the vector of rm-specic variables, and the rst element of
this vector is the excess log return. Following Vuolteenaho (2002) I constrain the
lower left corner of   to zero, which means that there is no feedback from rm-
level state variables to market-wide state variables. Also, because the variables
are not cross-sectionally demeaned, the do not necessarily have zero means, and
thus and intercept vector A is included in the VAR.
Several specications of the model are possible. In Table 2.12, I show the
di¤erent options. This table only shows the rst equation of the VAR for the
di¤erent specications (where the dependent variable is the rm-level excess log
return). Firm-level variables include the excess log return, the previous year
return (excluding the last month) in excess of the risk free rate during the same
period, the log book to market ratio, and the log protability in excess of the risk
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free rate. I include two sets of market-wide variables. The rst one comprises
the cross-sectional medians of the rm-level state variables, and the second one
includes the four aggregate variables used to estimate the aggregate VAR in the
previous section.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.12 show the results when including the two
di¤erent blocks of market-wide variables. In column (1) we can observe that
all market-wide variables have predictive power consistent with previous liter-
ature, except the cross-sectional median of the variable MOMt. In column (2)
we also observe that all the aggregate variables have some predictive power as
well, though not all them very signicant. In order to have a relatively parsi-
monious VAR and choose the most signicant variables, I conduct a horse-race
of all the variables, as shown in column (3). Once all eight market-wide vari-
ables are included, we can see that three of the four cross-sectional medians
cease to be signicant, whereas the market return and term yield spread still
have explanatory power. Although the cross-sectional median of protability is
signicant in this specication, it appears insignicant if the insignicant vari-
ables are dropped (this and other horse-race options have been evaluated but
not shown for the sake of brevity). The nal set of variables I use are the ones
shown in column (4).
Table 2.13 shows all the coe¢ cients for the VAR corresponding to column
(4) in the previous table. Intercepts are included in the VAR, however the mag-
nitude is very small and insignicant in all cases. All state variables in the rst
equation are signicant at the 1%. The sign of the variables is as expected: the
coe¢ cient for excess log return is negative (showing the short-term reversal),
positive and strong for momentum, protability, market return and term yield
spread. The equations corresponding to the aggregate variables are consistent
with the aggregate VAR estimated in the previous section: market return ex-
hibits momentum at the monthly level, and term yield spread predicts positively
market return. The R-Square, 2%, is also similar (although lower, because there
are only two variables predicting market returns now) to the previous aggregate
VAR 2.81%.
I then extract the news from this new VAR, NiDR;t and NiCF;t, and compute
the changes in cash ow and discount rate betas after the addition in the S&P
500 index, as before. The only di¤erence is that I now estimate the betas with
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di¤erent news, the ones extracted from this alternative specication of the VAR.
Table 2.14 shows the changes in overall beta (included again for comparison
purposes), in the new cash-ow and discount rate betas. The main results are
robust to this di¤erent specication of the VAR. In column three we observe
that the change in beta after an S&P 500 addition comes from the cash-ow
beta. The overall change in beta is a stronly signicant 0.430, the change in
discount rate beta is an insignicant 0.036, and the change in cash ow beta is
a stronly signicant 0.357. And as in the previous Section, when compared the
changes in betas with matched stocks, the di¤erence in di¤erence is all coming
from the cash-ows, and is less signicant than for the event stocks.
2.4.9 Alternative cash ow risk measure
There is a recent novel method of estimating cash-ow news alternative to the
use of a VAR decomposition, suggested by Da and Warachka (2009). They use
revisions in analyst earnings forecasts to construct an analyst earnings beta,
that measures the covariance between the cash ow innovations of a stock and
those of the market. Empirical analysis of S&P 500 index inclusions using this
specication yields results more ambiguous than the ones derived from the VAR
procedure. This is not surprising, as Da and Warachka (2009) also show that
their results are not consistent with the use of cash-ow news extracted from a
VAR.
2.5 Conclusion
Using a two beta decomposition, I provide evidence of changes in cash-ow
covariances after stock additions to the S&P 500 index. I show that the well-
known beta change e¤ect after index inclusions is associated with the cash-ow
news components of the individual stocks that are added into the index. These
results are robust to alternative specications of the VAR, such a second-order
VAR, and a unique VAR that encompasses rm-level and aggregate variables as
state variables.
I also study direct measures of cash ows, coming from accounting variables,
as a robustness check of my VAR approach, and show that the results do not
depend on my particular specication.
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The results from the benchmark study, from a matching procedure and from
subsample analysis, as well as from a direct approach, are consistent with a
story where it is Standard and Poors selecting stocks that will exhibit a growth
in betas.
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2.6 Tables
Table 2.1: Aggregate VAR
This table shows the OLS parameter estimates for a rst-order monthly aggregate VAR model
including a constant, the log excess market return (reM ), the term yield spread (TY ), the log
price-earnings ratio (PE), and the small-stock value spread (V S). Each set of two rows
corresponds to a di¤erent dependent variable. The rst ve columns report coe¢ cients on
the ve explanatory variables and the sixth column reports the corresponding adjusted R2.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period for the dependent variables is December
1928 - May 2009, providing 966 monthly data points.
Aggregate VAR to predict market return
Constant reM;t TYt PEt V St R
2
reM;t+1 0.0674 0.1118 0.0040 -0.0164 -0.0117 2.81%
(Log excess market return) (0.0189) (0.0318) (0.0025) (0.0048) (0.0054)
TYt+1 -0.0278 0.0001 0.9212 -0.0051 0.0620 86.40%
(Term yield spread) (0.0943) (0.1585) (0.0127) (0.0243) (0.0269)
PEt+1 0.0244 0.5181 0.0015 0.9923 -0.003 99.10%
(Log price-earnings ratio) (0.0126) (0.0212) (0.0017) (0.0032) (0.0036)
V St+1 0.0180 0.0045 0.0008 -0.0010 0.9903 98.24%
(Small-stock value spread) (0.0169) (0.0283) (0.0022) (0.0043) (0.0048)
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Table 2.2: Firm-level VAR
This table shows the pooled-WLS parameter estimates for a rst-order monthly rm-level VAR
model. The model state vector includes the log stock return (r), stock momentum (MOM ),
and the log book-to-market (BM ). I deneMOM as the cumulative stock return over the
last year, but excluding the most recent month. All three variables are market-adjusted: r is
adjusted by subtracting rM whileMOM and BM are adjusted by removing the respective
month-specic cross-sectional means. Rows corresponds to dependent variables and columns
to independent (lagged dependent) variables. The rst three columns report coe¢ cients on
the three explanatory variables and the fourth column reports the corresponding adjusted
R2. The weights used in the WLS estimation are proportional to the inverse of the number of
stocks in the corresponding cross section. Standard errors (in parentheses) take into account
clustering in each cross section. The sample period for the dependent variables is January
1954 - December 2008, providing 660 monthly cross-sections and 1,658,049 rm-months.
Firm-level VAR for market-adjusted returns
Variable ri;t MOMi;t BMi;t R2
ri;t+1 -0.0470 0.0206 0.0048 0.64%
(Log stock return) (0.0066) (0.0023) (0.0007)
MOMi;t+1 0.9555 0.9051 -0.0015 91.85%
(One year momentum) (0.0052) (0.0018) (0.0007)
BMi;t+1 0.0475 -0.0107 0.9863 97.10%
(Log book-to-market) (0.0050) (0.0017) (0.0011)
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Table 2.3: Changes in Beta - Benchmark Case
This table shows the changes in the slope of regressions of returns of stocks added to the S&P
500 on returns of the S&P 500 index and the non-S&P 500 rest of the market. The sample
includes those stocks added to the S&P 500 between 1976 and 2008 that were not involved in
mergers or related events around the stock addition. I estimate a pooled regression with data
from 36 months before to 36 months after the addition. I interact the returns on the S&P 500
and the non S&P 500 with a dummy Iit that takes value 1 if the stock is in the index. This
way, the coe¢ cient associated with the interaction terms reveals the change in beta after the
addition. The bivariate regression estimated is the following:
rei;t = i + 
b
SP r
e
SP;t + 
b
nSP r
e
nSP;t + SP Iitr
e
SP;t + nSP Iitr
e
nSP;t + "i;t
The excess return on the S&P 500 index, reSP , is computed as the di¤erence between the
monthly return on the S&P 500 index, obtained from the CRSP Index File, and the monthly
riskfree rate, obtained from Professor Kenneth Frenchs website. The return renSP are excess
returns on a capitalization-weighted index of the non-S&P 500 stocks in the NYSE, AMEX,
and Nasdaq, and are inferred from the following identity:
rM;t =

CAPM;t 1   CAPSP;t 1
CAPM;t 1

rnSP;t +

CAPSP;t 1
CAPM;t 1

rSP;t
where total capitalization of the S&P 500 (CAPSP ) is from the CRSP Index on the S&P 500
Universe le. Returns on the value-weighted CRSP NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq index (rM )
and total capitalization (CAPM ) are from the CRSP Stock Index le. I include rm dummies,
and the standard errors are clustered by time to account for cross-sectional autocorrelation.
rei;t
reSP;t 0.550***
(0.082)
Iitr
e
SP;t 0.425***
(0.068)
renSP;t 0.557***
(0.067)
Iitr
e
nSP;t -0.291***
(0.062)
Constant 0.007***
(0.001)
Observations 24016
R-squared 0.253
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Table 2.4: Changes in cash-ow and discount rate betas
This table shows the changes in the slope of regressions of returns (and its components) of
stocks added to the S&P 500 on returns of the S&P 500 index and the non-S&P 500 rest of the
market. The sample and denition of variables is described in Table 2.3. This table shows the
results of regressions similar to the previous table, but replacing the returns on the left hand
side variable with (negative of) discount-rate news ( Ni;DR) and cash-ow news (Ni;CF ) of
the event stocks. The equations estimated are the following:
rei;t = i + 
b
SP r
e
SP;t + 
b
nSP r
e
nSP;t + SP Iitr
e
SP;t + nSP Iitr
e
nSP;t + "i;t
 NiDR;t = i + DRbSP reSP;t + DRbnSP renSP;t + DRSP IitreSP;t + DRnSP IitrenSP;t + "i;t
NiCF;t = i + 
CFb
SP r
e
SP;t + 
CFb
nSP r
e
nSP;t + 
CF
SP Iitr
e
SP;t + 
CF
nSP Iitr
e
nSP;t + "i;t
I include rm dummies, and the standard errors are clustered by time to account for cross-
sectional autocorrelation.
rei;t  NiDR;t NiCF;t
reSP;t 0.550*** 0.629*** -0.107
(0.082) (0.065) (0.108)
Iitr
e
SP;t 0.425*** -0.008 0.391***
(0.068) (0.036) (0.059)
renSP;t 0.557*** 0.249*** 0.209**
(0.067) (0.056) (0.087)
Iitr
e
nSP;t -0.291*** 0.049* -0.286***
(0.062) (0.029) (0.057)
Constant 0.007*** -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 24016 24016 24016
R-squared 0.253 0.607 0.024
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Table 2.5: Direct measures of cash ows
This table shows the changes in the slope of regressions of return on equity of stocks added to
the S&P 500 on return on equity of the S&P 500 index and the return on equity of non-S&P
500 rest of the market. The sample includes those stocks added to the S&P 500 between 1976
and 2008 that were not involved in mergers or related events around the stock addition. I
interact the returns on the S&P 500 and the non S&P 500 with a dummy Iit that takes value
1 if the stock is in the index. This way, the coe¢ cient associated with the interaction terms
reveals the change in beta after the addition. The equation I estimate is:
roei;t = i+
b
SP roeSP;t+
b
nSP roenSP;t+SP IitroeSP;t+nSP IitroenSP;t+"i;t
where roeit is the log of return on equity, dened as roeit = log(1+NIt=BEt 1) whereNI
is net income andBE book equity, in t and t 1 respectively. To avoid extreme observations,
ROEit is winsorized between  1 and 3 (on a given quarter, the return on equity cannot be
lower than  100% or higher than 300%). roeSP;t and roenSP;t are calculated as the log
of 1 plus the sum of NIt over the sum of BEt 1, for all December scal year end stocks
in each group of S&P 500 and non S&P 500 stocks. As in the previous analyses, I include
rm dummies, and the standard errors are clustered by time to account for cross-sectional
autocorrelation.
roei;t
roeSP;t 0.227***
(0.080)
IitroeSP;t 0.261**
(0.122)
roenSP;t 0.716***
(0.106)
IitroenSP;t -0.505***
(0.150)
Constant 0.011***
(0.003)
R-squared 0.170
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Table 2.12: Alternative VAR: di¤erent specications
This table shows the pooled-WLS parameter estimates for the rst equation of a rst-order
monthly rm-level VAR model. The state variables include a constant, a set of rm-level
variables, and two sets of aggregate variables. The rm level variables are: the excess log
stock return (rei;t), stock momentum (MOM
e
i;t), the log book-to-market ratio (BMi;t), and
the log protability in excess of the risk free rate. The rst set of aggregate variables is formed
by the cross-sectional median of each of the rm-level variables. The second set of aggregate
variables consists of the log excess market return (reM ), the term yield spread (TY ), the log
price-earnings ratio (PE), and the small-stock value spread (V S). Standard errors are in
parentheses. The weights used in the WLS estimation are proportional to the inverse of the
number of stocks in the corresponding cross section. Standard errors (in parentheses) take
into account clustering in each cross section. The sample period for the dependent variables
is January 1954 - December 2008, providing 660 monthly cross-sections and 1,658,049 rm-
months.
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Predicting rm-level excess returns, dependent variable: rei;t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
rei;t -0.0526*** -0.0478*** -0.0524*** -0.0477***
(0.0060) (0.0075) (0.0060) (0.0076)
MOMei;t 0.0170*** 0.0146*** 0.0171*** 0.0151***
(0.0023) (0.0046) (0.0022) (0.0045)
BMi;t 0.0050*** 0.0069*** 0.0050*** 0.0073***
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0015)
ROEei;t 0.0135*** 0.0184*** 0.0141*** 0.0206***
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0035)
median rei;t 0.2950*** 0.0928
(0.0488) (0.1041)
median MOMei;t -0.0072 -0.0162
(0.0149) (0.0158)
median BMi;t 0.0240*** 0.0147
(0.0099) (0.0142)
median ROEei;t 0.1534*** 0.2742**
(0.0522) (0.1362)
reM;t 0.2698*** 0.1926* 0.2753***
(0.0490) (0.1037) (0.0479)
TYt 0.0059* 0.0050* 0.0068**
(0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0031)
PEt -0.0103* -0.0116
(0.0059) (0.0102)
V St 0.0224* 0.0146
(0.0119) (0.0153)
R2 0.0203 0.0192 0.0226 0.0182
Observations 1,658,049 1,658,049 1,658,049 1,658,049
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: Evolution of rolling betas around S&P 500 index inclusions
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This gure plots the evolutions of rolling betas around S&P 500 index in-
clusions. In the top panel I plot the evolution of the overall beta, in the mid
panel I show the evolution of discount-rate betas, and in the bottom panel the
evolution of cash-ow betas.
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of rolling betas around S&P 500 index inclusions for
event and matched stocks
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This gure shows rolling betas around S&P 500 index inclusions. From left
to right it shows total, discount rate, and cash-ow betas. The top panel shows
the evolution of betas for event stocks, and the bottom panel shows the evolution
of betas for matched stocks.
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3 Comovement in the CDS Market
(Joint work with Daniel Bergstresser)
3.1 Introduction
Economic theory suggests that in a frictionless economy with rational investors,
securitiesprices should at all times reect their fundamental values. In this
idealized setting, comovement in the securitiesvalues and returns should reect
only comovement in underlying fundamentals. Recent research, however, doc-
uments comovement in securitiesreturns that appears to exceed fundamental
comovement. This research includes work on US equity markets by Barberis,
Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005), analysis of Japanese equity markets by Greenwood
and Sosner (2007), and earlier work by Vijh (1994).
Research on comovement in equity markets has often used inclusion in and
deletion from benchmark indexes as part of the research design. Many mutual
funds and exchange traded funds are explicitly tied to these benchmark indexes.
The ow of investorsmoney into and out of these funds induces correlation
in trading activity across the index constituents. In a frictionless market this
correlated trading would have no e¤ect on prices or returns. But frictions and
illiquidity, even among relatively liquid equity securities, appear to induce ex-
cessive index-based comovement in American and international equity markets.
This paper extends the existing literature by exploring index-based comove-
ment in the market for Credit Default Swaps (CDS). CDS contracts are deriv-
ative contracts whose cashows are tied to credit events at underlying bond
issuers. An investor who has sold protection on an issuer using a CDS contract
has taken on that issuers credit risk, similar to the purchaser of the issuers
bonds. Like equity markets, CDS markets have several benchmark indexes.
These indexes are used both as barometers for market activity and as trading
instruments in their own right. We use the most liquid CDS index benchmark:
the Markit North American Investment Grade CDX index (CDX.NA.IG here-
after). The indexs constituents are updated biannually, providing a large sample
of inclusion and deletion events for our analysis.
3 COMOVEMENT IN THE CDS MARKET 111
Because bonds and CDS contracts both o¤er investors economic exposure to
an issuerscredit risk, exploring comovement in the two markets jointly allows us
to control for fundamentals-based comovement. This approach for controlling
for underlying fundamentals has not been available to researchers analyzing
comovement in equity markets. With index inclusions, we nd that comovement
of CDS spreads with the other issuers in the index increases signicantly around
the inclusion date CDX. The mean beta against the index rises 0.284 after
inclusion. The di¤erence in di¤erences of mean betas from CDS spreads and
bonds is a statistically signicant 0.301 after inclusion. This evidence supports
the hypothesis that the bond and CDSmarkets are at least somewhat segmented.
Index inclusion appears to change the comovement patterns of CDS spreads in
a way that is not matched by the comovement patterns of the underlying bonds.
To better understand the source of this non-fundamental comovement, we
also estimate Dimson (1979) betas. We nd that our results are very strong even
using Dimson betas, which suggests that the origin of this shift in comovement
is not an information di¤usion channel, but rather a category based explanation
for non-fundamental comovement. Many investors buy protection in baskets,
buy the index, however they do not buy individual CDS. This clientele e¤ect is
translated into an excess comovement of those CDS that are part of the index.
Though most of our analysis is focused on additions to the index, we also
show that deletions from the index see no statistically signicant change in the
mean beta of the CDS on the index. The betas are high prior to deletions
because issuers being deleted from the CDX Investment Grade index are often
being removed because they lose their investment grade status: as rms approach
distress their bonds begin to take on a larger share of the companys risk. On
net, these results indicate that index-based comovement is a characteristic of
CDS markets as well as equity markets.
The paper proceeds in ve sections. Sections I and II review in more detail
the relevant literatures on comovement and on CDS markets. Section III and
IV describe the empirical design and the data used in the study. Results are
presented and discussed in Section V. A brief nal section concludes.
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3.2 Related literature on comovement
A number of researchers have investigated patterns of comovement in equity
prices. Research has focused on whether patterns of comovement reect joint
movement in expected returns and rational discount rates, or rather are driven by
commonality of trading activity across di¤erent securities. Pindyck and Rotem-
berg (1993) focus on US equity securities, estimate a factor model of stock price
returns similar to Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), and nd comovement across the
residuals from this regression. They show that comovement is particularly large
among stocks held by institutional investors, which they interpret as indicating
that these investorsows drive securities away from fundamental value.
Vijh (1994) looked at the betas of securities included and excluded from
the S&P 500, showing that securities in the S&P 500 have higher betas. Vijh
estimates that 8.5 percent of the total variance of daily returns of the market
portfolio is based on ow-related price pressure. Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler
(2005) also focus on the S&P 500 index inclusions and deletions and nd evidence
of comovement in excess of what can be explained with fundamentals.
Greenwood (2005) focuses on Japan, and exploits the fact that the Nikkei
225 index is equally weighted, rather than value-weighted. Some stocks in the
index are thus overweighted by a factor of ten or more relative to other stocks in
the index. Thus, when investor demand for the Nikkei 225 index rises, investors
have to purchase signicantly more of some stocks (relative to value) than they
would if the index were value-weighted. In particular, rms with small market
capitalizations have larger demand shocks, relative to size. Greenwood and
Sosner (2007) also focus on Japan, on the April 2000 redenition of the Nikkei
225 index. Daily index return betas of the additions rose by an average of 0.45;
index return betas of the deleted stocks fell by an average of 0.63.
Antón and Polk (2009) have investigated comovement in a bottom-up frame-
work, and nd that stocks that are held by the same active fund managers and
covered by the same analysts comove more than other stocks, controlling for
other similarities between stocks. This e¤ect is stronger when the stocks in the
pair are small and common owners are experiencing strong inows and outows.
A related paper by Greenwood and Thesmar (2009) develops and applies a mea-
sure of co-fragilityin US equity markets, that captures the correlation of the
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trading needs of two assetsowners: two assets are co-fragileif they are held
by investors with correlated inows and outows. Another related paper by
Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks (2009) looks at comovement among stocks with high
and low institutional ownership, and nd that the stocks with high mutual fund
ownership have comovement that is twice as pronounced as among stocks with
minimal institutional ownership.
Evans and Lyons (2002) investigate trading-based price pressure in the cur-
rency market, and nd that order ow explains a very signicant share of daily
movements in exchange rates. Evans and Lyons focus on the US Dollar-German
Mark and US Dollar-Japanese Yen exchange rates for May 1-Aug 31, 1996, and
nd that order ow accounts for 60 percent of the daily changes in the German
exchange rates and 40 percent of the changes in the Yen. Brandt and Kavajecz
(2004) focus on the US Treasury market, nding an e¤ect of ows on yields that
is large and strongest when liquidity is low. Finally, Ambrose, Lee, and Peek
(2007) explore comovement in the REIT (Real Estate Investment Trust) market,
looking at an event study created when REITs were added to the S&P general
indices. They nd that not only do the REITs included in the S&P indices com-
move more strongly with those indices after inclusion, the non-included REITs
also commove more strongly with the indices after inclusion as well.
In all of this literature there is a concern that index-based comovement in re-
turns reect fundamentals, rather than common trading-induced price pressure.
Our research is somewhat di¢ cult: the inclusion in and especially deletions from
the CDX indexes are driven by corporate events in direct way. Downgrades in
particular induce deletion from the CDX investment grade index, and changing
patterns of comovement include some fundamental component. But the CDS
market is also a derivative market based on the underlying bonds, and hence we
are able to use the changes in spreads on these underlying bonds as a control
from rm fundamentals. We nd that CDS spread betas increase more than
bond spread betas after inclusion, and viceversa after deletion. This nding
provides strong evidence for non-fundamental-based comovement in the CDS
market.
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3.3 Related literature on bond and CDS markets
This paper is related to the growing literature on bond and CDSmarkets. Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) investigate the patterns of credit spread
changes. They show that, using proxies that measure changes in default proba-
bilities and changes in recovery rates, they are able to explain about 25 percent
of observed credit spread changes. They nd that the residuals from these ex-
planatory regressions are highly cross-correlated, and appear to be driven by a
single common factor. One potential explanation for this common factor would
be market ows into and out of credit markets. The authorsapproach is di¤er-
ent from ours: they focus on bonds, where we focus on CDS markets.
Longsta¤ et al (2005) use the market for CDS to estimate the default and
non-default components of corporate bond spreads. Their research uses the CDS
spread to construct the true default probability of a corporate issuer, and apply
that estimated default probability to corporate bonds to parse out the default
and non-default related parts of bond spreads. They nd that their measures of
default probabilityexplains that bulk of bond spreads, but that a sizable part
remains unexplained. Exploring the unexplained component of bond yields, they
nd that bond liquidity is an important determinant. Our paper is starting from
an entirely di¤erent point in showing patterns of CDS comovement around the
inclusion and deletion of CDS issuers from the major indices, we are showing
evidence of a liquidity-based component in the movements of these spreads.
3.4 Empirical design: inclusion in and deletion from the
CDX indexes
CDS contracts are bilateral contracts used to transfer the risk of a credit event
between market participants. The protection sellersells insurance to the pro-
tection buyer. For single-name CDS contracts, the risk transferred is the risk
of a credit event, typically a default, by a single issuer. This issuer can be a
corporate or sovereign issuer, or an ABS. By transferring the risk of a credit
event, credit default swaps accomplish a function that parallels the purchase of
a physical bond; just as the purchaser of a physical bond holds the risk that the
bond will default, the seller of protection under a credit default swap contract
takes on an economically similar exposure.
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The seller of credit protection is compensated by the payment of a credit
spread, measured as some percentage of the notional value. This credit spread
has always been regarded as a pure measure of the credit risk of the underlying
reference entity, unpolluted by interest rate risk.
The CDS market has grown explosively over the past 10 years, with the
notional single-name CDS exposure now exceeding the total notional value of
the corporate bond market. As CDS contracts are traded in over-the-counter
(OTC) markets rather than on exchanges, the market centers around a handful
of major dealers. Pricing, although somewhat opaque, is available from sources
such as Markit and CMA. The rst indices of credit derivatives were created
in 2001, and by 2004 the major index administrators (Trac-x and iBoxx) had
merged to create the CDX indexes for North American credit and the iTraxx
indexes for Europe. Markit Partners acquired both sets of indices in 2007, and
is currently the administrator for all of the major credit derivative indexes.
There are a variety of di¤erent indexes covering di¤erent market subseg-
ments. The North American market is covered by the CDX indexes: the In-
vestment Grade (IG) index, the HVol subindex of the IG universe (HVol), the
Crossover index, and the High Yield index and subindexes, and the sector-based
indexes. There are also CDX Emerging market indexes. The iTraxx indexes, also
owned by Markit, include European, Asian, and Australian markets. Additional
credit indexes cover asset backed securities (the ABX, CMBX, and TABX), loans
(the LCDX and LevX), sovereign debt (the SovX), and municipal securities (the
MCDX).
Table 3.1 describes the current outstanding single-name and index credit
derivatives contracts that were outstanding and registered with the Depository
Trust Clearing Corporation (DTCC) as of May 2010. The DTCC registers the
vast majority of all CDS contracts traded. The table shows the gross notional
and net notional outstanding, as well as the total number of contracts. Many
rms have o¤setting positions in underlying instruments: the net notional pro-
vides a picture aggregating institutions net exposure. The CDX North America
Investment Grade indexes, alongside the similar index for Europe, have the high-
est total outstanding gross and notional amounts, with outstanding amounts
that are many times the next nearest contracts. Other index products are the
most heavily traded individual instruments. Among single-name CDS contracts,
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the most heavily traded instruments are contracts referencing sovereign bonds.
In particular, Italy, Turkey, Brazil, and Russia have large notional amounts.
There appears to be a discontinuous jump in the trading activity in CDS
contracts that are included in the index versus contracts that are not included
in the index. Causation works in both ways here: the dealer poll that drives
index inclusion is based on selecting the more liquid and active CDS contracts
for the index. At the same time, inclusion in the index drives trading related to
index ows and products. Table 3.2 and table 3.3 show the magnitude of the
activity discontinuity for names included in the index. Table 3.2 includes only
the corporations among the top 1000 CDS reference entities in terms of trading
activity, for a total of 442 rms. Trading activity is based on gross notional
outstanding (columns 1-3), net notional outstanding (columns 4-6), and the
number of contracts outstanding as of September 3, 2010.
There is a strong relationship between CDS trading activity and the amount
of debt outstanding. Controlling for this relationship, though, inclusion in the
CDX.IG index is associated with $9 Billion more gross outstanding in CDS
contracts. Again, causation works both ways in this relationship, with inclusion
in the index also being a reection of underlying trading activity. Table 3.3
repeats the analysis of table 3.2, but tting Tobit regressions using the entire
sample of Compustat rms, with a truncation point set to the minimum value
of each activity measure observed among the top 1000 issuers. The results
are qualitatively similar, but the much larger coe¢ cients on the CDX inclusion
dummy variables reect the truncated nature of the sample used in Table 3.2.
Table 3.4 shows the constituents for the most recent series (Series 14) of the
CDX North American Investment Grade index. The constituents are chosen
every 6 months by a poll of dealers, and as the name suggests are required to be
investment-grade rms domiciled in North America. Table 3.5 shows the index
additions and deletions for the recent rolls of the index. Deletions from the
investment grade index commonly occur because of downgrades, but also follow
mergers. In the case of Wells Fargo, a merger with Wachovia made Wells Fargo
a CDX market maker, hence not eligible for inclusion in the index.
We use these periodic rolls of the CDX index to investigate patterns of co-
movement in the CDS market. Our hypothesis is that on inclusion in the index,
the CDS spreads of an issuer will commove more with the average spreads in
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the index, due to the impact of correlated trading in index-based products and
correlated hedging of index exposures. Specically, both the beta of the spread
on the index, as well as the R-squared, will go up.
3.5 Data
The main sample consists of CDS spreads of corporate issuers available from
Datastream, which sources CDS data from CMA. CMA is a major provider of
OTC market data, and along with Markit is the dominant provider of data on
CDS spreads. We consider CDS spreads of issuers that were added or deleted
from the CDX North America Investment Grade Index (CDX.NA.IG hereafter)
between September 2004 and March 2009. The index inclusion and deletion
dates for individual issuers are based on the sequence of constituents of the
di¤erent series of the CDX.NA.IG index. The constituents of each of the CDX
Index series are provided by Markit.com.
CDS contracts are written for a variety of di¤erent maturities, with 1,3,5,7,
and 10 year contracts being the most common. Among these, the 5 year con-
tracts are generally the most active and liquid and often viewed as the bench-
mark contracts for the issuer. We use the Datastream-reported spreads on the 5
year contracts in the analysis that follows. Because there are two main sources
of data, we also show that the results are robust to the use of the CDS data
provided by Markit. Relevant literature in CDS uses both sources of data. Al-
though Markit has been widely considered as a more accurate source for CDS
data, recent papers use CMA as the main source (see Bongaerts, Driessen, and
De Jong, 2011, and Giglio, 2011). A recent study by Mayordomo, Peña, and
Schwartz (2010) compares the major sources of corporate CDS prices and con-
cludes that CMA database quotes lead the price discovery process in comparison
with the quotes provided by other databases.
Data on the bonds matched to the CDS reference entities also come from
Datastream, with the asset swap spread used as the primary measure of the bond
spread. The asset swap spread reects the equivalent spread over a oating-rate
benchmark of a bond whose cash ows have been swapped from xed to oating.
This spread benchmark removes the direct impact of interest rate movements
and is conceptually the closest match to the reported spread on a CDS contract,
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which also primarily reects credit risk rather than interest rate e¤ects. CDS
are matched to the underlying bonds, with an algorithm used to select a liquid
bond closest to the 5-year point. Data on the time series of the CDX.NA.IG
comes from Bloomberg.
The total number of issuers that were included or deleted from the index
ascends to 120. For an issuer to be included in our sample it has to be added to
or deleted from the CDX.NA.IG between September 2004 and March 2009, and
we also require a minimum of 80% of trading days per regression estimated. The
nal sample of issuers after the screening amounts to 95. There are 51 additions
and 54 deletions that match our criteria. There are 10 issures that are both
added to and deleted from the index in di¤erent rolls of the index.
Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 provide some descriptive statistics for the sample
used in the paper. Table 3.6 aggregates the period between 2004 and 2010,
while table 3.7 shows statistics for the pre-crisis period (up to July 2007), and
table 3.8 shows the post-crisis period (after July 2007).
3.6 Results
To test our hypothesis, we run two regressions for each CDS issuer that has
been included or excluded from the index, one the year before the event (the
255 trading days before the event), and another one the year after the inclusion
(255 trading days after the event). For each issuer we regress the change in CDS
spread on the change in the CDX spread:
CDSi;t = i + ciCDXt + "i;t
We then compute the di¤erence between the beta after the event and beta
before the event, and label it ci, where the subindex c denotes CDS and i
the issuer. The hypothesis predicts that the average change in beta, c should
be signicantly positive after an inclusion in the index, as well as the average
change in the R2.
As mentioned in our identication strategy, we need to control for fundamen-
tals, and we do so by computing the change in betas for the Asset Swap Spread
(ASP) of the underlying bonds identied as the specic reference obligations of
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the CDS contract:
ASPi;t = i + biCDXt + "i;t
Before showing the results, it is important to understand the distribution of
our data. CDS contracts only are widely available since 2004, this is why our
sample spams only for 6 years. Table 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 show the summary statis-
tics for our full sample, the pre-crisis sample, and the crisis sample, respectively.
If we have a closer look at table 3.6, panel A (all observations), three aspects
are worth noticing. First, there is a lot of variability in the CDS spreads during
the whole period, with an average CDS spread of 284 and a median of 110.
The sample is skewed positively. Second, we observe a very similar average
and summary statistics for the bonds underlying, except at the very tail of
the distribution. This conrms the fact that both assets are tied to the same
issuer and should reect the same credit risk. Third, we see that the median for
changes in spread at the daily and weekly frequency is zero. As a consequence,
in panel B we show the summary statistics for the observations where the change
in daily CDS spreads is not zero. The number of such cases is not negligible,
however it does not compromise our analysis, because the results are robust to
this subsample of observations. For the full sample, as we can see comparing the
column "Obs" for observations in the two panels, there is a 12% of observations
for which there is no change in daily CDS spreads.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show the same statistics for the pre-crisis and crisis sub-
samples. A clear manifestation of the crisis was the high levels of CDS spreads
for many corporate issuers. It is therefore important to show how the distrib-
ution of the main variables change for the di¤erent subsamples. In short, the
mean and median of CDS spreads for the pre-crisis period were 129.87 and 84.10
respectively. The average CDS spread was more than tripled during the crisis
period, to 482.22, and the median CDS spread was doubled to 163.20. The
distribution became more skewed during the crisis period.
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3.6.1 Additions
Table 3.9 shows the rst set of results of our tests. In panel A we show the
results using daily spread changes. Average betas of CDS spread changes are
signicantly higher after the addition than before the addition. For the full
sample we see that the average change in beta for CDS amounts to 0.211 and
is signicant at the 1% level. The asterisks in the table reect signicance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% for one-sided tests, where we test whether the change
in beta is bigger than zero. Because some of the additions take place in the
same date, the standard errors are robust to cross-sectional correlation within
addition dates. The average R-Squared also rises signicantly after the addition
by 0.040. However, this change in beta could be a consequence of the selection
by the dealers poll. To account for changes in fundamentals of the issuer, we
repeat the same exercise for the underlying bonds. If the change in betas for
the changes in CDS spreads carry some information on the credit quality of
the issuers, then it should be reected as well in the changes in betas for the
underlying bonds, and the di¤erence in di¤erences should not be signicantly
di¤erent from zero. We however nd that the di¤erence in di¤erences of beta
changes is a signicant 0.307 with a standard error of 0.080. The same can
be observed with the R-Squared, that has a di¤erence in di¤erences of 0.05,
signicant at the 5% level.
An important question raises when considering the sample period we use: is
this e¤ect being driven by the large increase of CDS spreads during the recent
crisis? We nd that the answer to that question is no. The e¤ect that we
document does not hinge in the great variability of CDS spreads of corporations
during the crisis, rather in the increased attention and trading patterns of CDS
index products. Our results conrm that this is the case. We then divide the
sample in two subsamples, labeled "pre-crisis" (2004-2006) and "crisis" (2008-
2010). We avoid using additions for which we need data both before the crisis
and during the crisis to better disentangle the e¤ect. Specically, additions that
occurred in March 2007 and September 2007 are not included in the pre-crisis
nor in the crisis period, because the beta estimated before the addition will
mainly contain data before the crisis whereas the post-event beta will use crisis
period data.
Interestingly, the di¤erence in di¤erence results are stronger for the pre-
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crisis subsample than for the crisis subsample. The di¤erence in di¤erences
in changes in bega for the pre-crisis period is 0.435 estimated accurately with
a standard error of 0.134, whereas the di¤erence in di¤erences for the crisis
period is 0.237 with a standard error of 0.145. The di¤erence in di¤erence is
strong and signicant in the pre-crisis sample because the change in betas for
the underlying bonds was negative, while there is not a clear patter for the CDS
change in beta. On the contrary, for the crisis sample, it is the beta in the CDS
that is signicantly positive and the underlying bond insignicant.
In panel B of the same table we show the results using weekly (Wednesday)
spread changes, instead of daily, to mitigate the tradeo¤ between market mi-
crostructure e¤ects when using high-frequency data and the statistical power of
the tests. The change in betas for CDS spreads remains for the three sample
periods, but the magnitude is bigger when using weekly data. The results are
very robust to the use of weekly data, suggesting that the frequency with which
we measure beta does not inuence the results much.
These results point out at the clear existence of an excess-comovement trig-
gered by the inclusion of a CDS into the CDX index that is not driven by
fundamentals. The mechanisms underlying this comovement are discussed in
the fourth subsection.
3.6.2 Robustness to sample of liquid observations
Although the companies that are included in the index tend to be very liquid,
there are still companies for which there is no change in daily spread for more
than one day. As explained above, there is a 12% of observations for which
there is no change in the daily CDS spread. One could worry that the results
might be driven by the lack of liquidity and the zero observations could a¤ect
this change in betas. To show that our results are not driven by this lack of
variation in some instances, we repeat the analysis but using only observations
for which there is a change di¤erent from zero in the daily CDS spread.
This results are shown in table 3.10. Results are by and large unchanged.
Magnitudes are in line with thouse found in the benchmark specication. The
di¤erence in di¤erence for the pre-crisis period is now 0.426 estimated accurately
with a standard error of 0.196. The results are thus not driven by a lack of varia-
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tion in CDS spreads, but rather remain strong and signicant using a subsample
of non-zero CDS spread changes.
3.6.3 Robustness to Markit database
It is important to test the robustness of the results with a di¤erent database, as
Markit is the major vendor of CDS data. Markit has been widely considered as
a more accurate source for CDS data, however recent papers use CMA as the
main source (see Bongaerts, Driessen, and De Jong, 2011, and Giglio, 2011). A
recent study by Mayordomo, Peña, and Schwartz (2010) compares the major
sources of corporate CDS prices and concludes that CMA database quotes lead
the price discovery process in comparison with the quotes provided by other
databases.
In table 3.11 we show the results when using a di¤erent dataset for CDS
spreads, Markit. Only 35 of the 38 benchmark additions could be matched
with Markit database. All the results seem largely unchanged, with very small
di¤erences. Di¤erence in di¤erences for weekly returns are still very accurately
estimated in the pre-crisis period, with a signicance at the 1% level for both
the full sample and the pre-crisis sample, conrming that the pre-crisis e¤ect is
dominant in magnitude and signicance over the crisis sample. Table 3.12 we
show the results only using observations for which there is a non-zero change in
daily CDS spread, and the patterns are very similar to the ones in table 3.10.
3.6.4 Dimson betas
Previous research on comovement in the stock market attempts to dissentan-
gle the sources of the observed change in comovement. According to Bar-
beris, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005), three are the possible sources of friction- or
sentiment-based comovement, namely, category view, habitat view, and infor-
mation di¤usion. The category view, initially proposed by Barberis and Shleifer
(2003), argues that investors tend to simplify portfolio decisions by allocating
funds at the category level, instead of at the asset level. In the presence of
noise traders with correlated sentiment that can a¤ect prices, there appears an
excess comovement into each category by moving funds from one to another
group. Habitat view reects the fact that many investors have a limited in-
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vestment universe (a preferred habitat), due to transaction costs, or lack of
information. This creates a common factor in the returns of these assets that
is non-fundamental. Finally, the information difussion predicts that, due to
market frictions, the information is incorporated quicker into the prices of some
stocks than others.
The use of Dimson (1979) betas allows us to test whether the excess comove-
ment is just a change in speed at which information is incorporated (due to
market frictions), or else comes from a more sentiment-driven explanation such
as category view or habitat view. We can do so by including leads and lags of
the index in the daily analysis, to see if individual CDS react with "less" delay
after being included in the index. We specically run the following regression
before and after each inclusion or deletion event:
CDSi;t = i +
5X
s= 5

(s)
ci CDXt+s + "i;t
and then we compute the di¤erence between the sum of Dimson betas after the
event and the sum of Dimson betas before the event. We then average them
clustering for cross-sectional correlation. Similarly, to control for fundamentals,
we estimate the same regression for the changes in asset swap spread:
ASPi;t = i +
5X
s= 5

(s)
bi CDXt+s + "i;t
This di¤erence will give us then the change in comovement that would hap-
pen if there were no information difussion e¤ects. In other words, if the e¤ect
disappears, then the excess comovement found in the previous section comes
from the information difussion channel. If, however, there still remains a signif-
icant change in comovement, that would be evidence of an e¤ect coming from
the two other channels.
Empirical evidence on the importance of the information di¤usion channel
is mixed. Using this Dimson betas approach, Barberis et al. nd that most of
the excess-comovement associated with an S&P 500 index inclusion comes from
an information di¤usion explanation. However, a recent study by Green and
Hwang (2009) shows that the excess-comovement that arises after a stock-split
not only comes from information di¤usion but from a pure category or habitat
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based explanation.
Table 3.15 shows that in the CDS market, information difussion is not driving
our results. Results actually become even stronger than when using a single
beta, as in the previous section. In Panel A we show the di¤erences in betas
after addition, where the betas are not single betas, but the sum of the 11
Dimson betas (current, plus 5 leads and 5 lags). For the full-sample, we observe
that the change in Dimson beta for CDS is a signicant 0.515 (compared to the
0.211 from a single beta, in table 3.9), and once controlled for the change in the
associated betas from the bonds, it still remains a signicant 3.58 (compared to
the 0.307 from table 3.9). Panel B shows the composition of Dimson betas, and
helps understand the results from Panel A. All the betas for CDS except two are
positive, whereas ve betas for the bonds are negative. The contemporaneous
e¤ect is very strong for the CDS and not for the bond. Table 3.16 shows that the
results are by and large unchanged if we use the alternative Markit database.
These results strongly suggest that the category and preferred habitat chan-
nels play an important role in explaining the changes in comovement of CDS
contracts added to the CDX index.
3.6.5 Deletions
In this subsection we comment on the results that come from deletions from
the CDX index. Deletions from the index are in most cases a consequence of a
downgrade in the underlying bond, or a merger of the company with another
one already in the index. However, because we do test jointhly changes in betas
for CDS spreads as well as the underlying bonds, these results are also relevant
for our study.
Table 3.13 shows three main ndings related to deletions using the full sam-
ple. First, changes in betas for CDS spreads are slightly negative, but not sig-
nicantly di¤erent from zero. Second, there is a positive change in beta for the
underlying bonds, especially using weekly spread changes. The intuition for this
result is as follows. When the downgrade is announced, CDS spreads become
more sensitive to changes in the CDX Index spread, and hence the beta before
deletion is already high. With the downgrade, rms approach distress and their
bonds begin to take on a larger share of the companys risk, so the underlying
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bonds beta also experience an increase. However, after deleltion, not-belonging
to the index causes the comovement of the CDS spreads of the downgraded com-
pany to drop more than that of the underlying bonds, which were not linked to
the CDX index. For weekly returns is especially clear. The change in beta for
CDS spreads is -0.075 poorly estimated with a standard error of 0.256, whereas
the change in beta for the underlying bonds is 0.440 with a standard deviation
of 0.156. The diference in diferences is however not signicant.
3.7 Conclusion
By exploring additions and deletions of corporate CDS into the CDX Index we
provide evidence of an excess co-movement in CDS markets not driven by fun-
damental reasons. Many mutual funds and exchange traded funds are explicitly
tied to these benchmark indexes. The ow of investorsmoney into and out of
these funds induces correlation in trading activity across the index constituents.
To control for fundamentals we propose the novel approach of comparing
changes in betas of CDS around inclusions with changes in betas of the under-
lying bonds. Because bonds and CDS contracts both o¤er investors economic
exposure to an issuerscredit risk, their variation in a frictionless and unseg-
mented market should be parallel. We nd that average changes in betas for
CDS exceed signicantly average changes in beta for the underlying bonds. We
estimate Dimson betas, and nd that the excess-comovement is not driven by an
information di¤usion channel, but induced by a category and preferred habitat
channel.
We also show that deletions from the index see no statistically signicant
change in the mean beta of the CDS on the index, whereas changes in betas for
the underlying bonds do. The betas are high prior to deletions because issuers
being deleted from the CDX Investment Grade index are often being removed
because they lose their investment grade status.
In net these results suggest that the markets for CDS and their underlying
bonds are somewhat segmented, and that there is an excess co-movement among
the CDS spreads that belong to the major CDX Index, the North American
Investment Grade.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Index and Single-Name CDS contracts
These are contracts registered with the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporations Trade
Information Warehouse (the DTCC Warehouse), reported as of May 7, 2010. Gross notional
and net notional amounts are in Billions of USD.
Indexes and Index tranches Gross notional Net notional Contracts
CDX North American Investment Grade index 3,955 361 20,002
iTraxx Europe main index 3,362 424 11,033
CDX North American High Yield indexes 672 78 1,785
iTraxx Europe sector indexes 489 73 27
ITraxx Europe crossover index 390 36 547
CMBX indexes 194 35 28
iTraxx Europe HiVol index 182 37 113
iTraxx SovX indexes 181 13 1,328
Loan indexes 175 13 923
CDX.NA.IG.HVOL index 138 31 309
ABX and TABX indexes 137 28 60
CDX.EM index 108 18 461
iTraxx Asia ex-Japan Indexes 95 9 149
iTraxx Australia Index 94 8 623
iTraxx Japan index 65 10 53
CDX.NA.XO index 32 6 68
MCDX index 11 3 44
Total index 10,280 1,182 37,553
Single-name CDS contracts Gross notional Net notional Contracts
Republic of Italy 216 24 5,537
Republic of Turkey 173 5 11,576
Federative Republic of Brazil 147 13 11,120
Russian Federation 115 4 8,383
United Mexican States 104 6 8,715
Kingdom of Spain 101 14 4,240
JPMorgan Chase & Co 84 5 9,239
General Electric Capital 83 11 7,690
Bank of America Corporation 82 6 9,191
Hellenic Republic (Greece) 75 8 3,645
Total single name 14,637 1,220 2,152,319
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Table 3.4: Markit CDX.NA.IG index constituents, Series 14
Table shows issuer, average credit rating of bonds issued by entity, and industry classication.
ACE Ltd / A / Fin Duke Energy / A / Ut Ryder Sys Inc / A / Ind
Aetna Inc. / A / F in E I du Pont / A / Mats Safeway Inc / BBB / Cons Stab le
A lcoa Inc. / BBB / Mats Eastman Chem Co / BBB / Mats Sara Lee Corp / BBB / Cons Stab le
A ltria Gp Inc / BBB / Cons Stab le ERP Oper Ltd Pship / A / F in Sempra Engy / A / Ut
Amern E lec Pwr Co Inc / BBB / Ut F irstEnergy Corp / BBB / Ut Simon Ppty Gp L P / A / Fin
Amern Express Co / A / Fin Fortune Brds / BBB / Cons Stab le SLM Corp / BBB / Fin
Amern Intl Gp Inc / BBB / Fin Freep ort M cMoran / BBB / Mats Southwest / BBB / Cons Cyc
Amgen Inc. / A / Cons Stab le G A T X Corp / BBB / Ind Stap les Inc / BBB / Cons Cyc
Anadarko / BBB / Energy Gen E lec Cap Corp / AA / Fin Target Corp / A / Cons Cyc
Arrow E lectrs Inc / BBB / Ind Gen M ls Inc / BBB / Cons Stab le A llstate Corp / BBB / Fin
AT&T Inc / A / Comm+Tech Goodrich Corp / BBB / Ind B lack&Decker Corp / A / Ind
AT&T Mobility / A / Comm+Tech Halliburton Co / A / Energy Chubb Corp / A / F in
Autozone Inc / BBB / Cons Cyc Hew lett Pckd / A / Comm+Tech Dow Chem Co / BBB / Mats
Avnet, Inc. / BBB / Ind Honeywell Intl Inc / A / Ind Hartford F in l / BBB / Fin
Barrick Gold Corp / BBB / Mats Ingerso ll Rand Co / A / Ind Home Depot Inc / BBB / Cons Cyc
Baxter Intl Inc / A / Cons Stab le IBM Corp / A / Comm+Tech The Kroger Co. / BBB / Cons Stab le
Boeing Cap Corp / A / F in Intl Pap er Co / BBB / Mats Sherw in W illiam s Co / A / Cons Cyc
Boston Pptys / BBB / Not given Johnson Ctls Inc / BBB / Ind TJX Cos Inc / A / Cons Cyc
Bristo l Myers / A / Cons Stab le K inder Morgan / BBB / Energy Walt D isney Co / A / Cons Cyc
Burlington Nthn / BBB / Ind Kohls Corp / BBB / Cons Cyc T IME WARNER C / BBB / Not given
Campbell Soup / A / Cons Stab le K raft / BBB / Cons Stab le T im e Warner Inc / BBB / Comm+Tech
Cdn Nat Res Ltd / BBB / Energy Lockheed Martin Corp / A / Ind Toll B ros Inc / BBB / Cons Cyc
Cap One / A / F in Loews Corp / A / Cons Stab le Transo cean Inc / BBB / Energy
Card inal H lth/ BBB / Cons Cyc Lowes Cos Inc / A / Cons Cyc Un Pac Corp / BBB / Ind
Carn ival Corp / A / Ind M D C Hldgs Inc / BBB / Cons Cyc Utd Parcel Svc Inc / AA / Ind
Caterp illar Inc / A / Cons Cyc Marriott Intl Inc / BBB / Cons Cyc UnitedHealth Gp Inc / A / F in
CBS Corp / BBB / Cons Cyc Marsh&Mclenn / BBB / Fin Unvl Health / BBB / Cons Stab le
CenturyTel / BBB / Comm+Tech McDonalds Corp / A / Cons Cyc Valero Energy Corp / BBB / Energy
C igna Corp / BBB / Fin M cKesson Corp / BBB / Cons Cyc Verizon / A / Comm+Tech
C isco Sys Inc / A / Comm+Tech MetL ife Inc / A / F in V iacom / BBB / Not given
Comcast / BBB / Comm+Tech Motorola Inc / BBB / Ind Vornado R lty LP / BBB / Fin
Comp Sci / BBB / Comm+Tech NRUC / A / Ut Wal Mart / AA / Cons Cyc
ConAgra / BBB / Cons Cyc Newell Rubbmd. / BBB / Ind Whirlp ool Corp / BBB / Cons Cyc
ConocoPhillips / A / Energy News Am / BBB / Comm+Tech Xerox Corp / BBB / Cons Cyc
Const Engy Gp / BBB / Ut Nordstrom Inc / A / Cons Cyc XL Cap Ltd / BBB / Fin
Cox / BBB / Comm+Tech Norfo lk Sthn Corp / BBB / Ind XTO Engy Inc / BBB / Energy
CSX Corp / BBB / Ind Northrop G rumm / BBB / Ind YUM Brands Inc / BBB / Cons Cyc
CVS / BBB / Cons Cyc Omnicom Gp Inc / A / Comm+Tech
Darden Rest / BBB / Cons Cyc Pzer Inc / AA / Cons Stab le
Deere&Co / A / Cons Cyc Progress Engy Inc / BBB / Ut
Dell Inc / A / Comm+Tech Quest D iagnostics Inc / BBB / Ind
Devon Engy Corp / BBB / Energy R R Donnelley / BBB / Comm+Tech
D IRECTV / BBB / Comm+Tech Raytheon Co / A / Ind
Dom inion Res Inc / BBB / Ut Reynolds A Inc / BBB / Cons Stab le
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Table 3.9: Changes in betas and R-Squares in CDS after addition to CDX
This table shows the average changes in estimated betas for changes in CDS spreads before
and after the inclusion in the CDX.NA.IG Index. Reported coe¢ cients show changes in betas
and changes in R-Squares from 1 year estimation windows. Panel A reports results from
the regressions using daily data, whereas Panel B shows results using weekly (Wednesday)
data. Standard erros (in parenthesis) are robust to cross-setional correlation within cluster of
additions. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%, for one-sided tests,
where the test is whether the coe¢ cient is greater than zero.
PANEL A: DAILY SPREAD CHANGES
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 38 0.211*** 0.040* -.096 -.010 0.307*** 0.050**
2004-2010 (0.081) (0.027) (0.074) (0.005) (0.080) (0.027)
Pre-crisis 11 0.082 -.002 -.353 -.008 0.435*** 0.006
2004-2006 (0.144) (0.062) (0.071) (0.001) (0.134) (0.060)
Crisis 21 0.180** 0.049** -.057 -.015 0.237* 0.064**
2008-2010 (0.094) (0.028) (0.071) (0.010) (0.145) (0.029)
PANEL B: WEEKLY SPREAD CHANGES
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 38 0.320*** 0.040 0.054 -.009 0.266** 0.049
2004-2010 (0.133) (0.042) (0.161) (0.009) (0.158) (0.043)
Pre-crisis 11 0.074 -.066 -.498 -.031 0.572*** -.035
2004-2006 (0.280) (0.052) (0.247) (0.010) (0.076) (0.059)
Crisis 21 0.253** 0.049 0.175 0.004 0.078 0.045
2008-2010 (0.139) (0.039) (0.173) (0.010) (0.250) (0.048)
3 COMOVEMENT IN THE CDS MARKET 135
Table 3.10: Results for additions, only non-zero daily spread changes
This table shows the average changes in estimated betas for changes in CDS spreads before
and after the inclusion in the CDX.NA.IG Index, using only the observations for which the
daily change in CDS spread is di¤erent from zero. Reported coe¢ cients show changes in
betas and changes in R-Squares from 1 year estimation windows. Panel A reports results from
the regressions using daily data, whereas Panel B shows results using weekly (Wednesday)
data. Standard erros (in parenthesis) are robust to cross-setional correlation within cluster of
additions. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%, for one-sided tests,
where the test is whether the coe¢ cient is greater than zero.
PANEL A: DAILY SPREAD CHANGES
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 38 0.168** 0.039* -.121 -.011 0.290*** 0.050**
2004-2010 (0.102) (0.027) (0.089) (0.006) (0.091) (0.028)
Pre-crisis 11 -.031 0.003 -.457 -.006 0.426** 0.009
2004-2006 (0.192) (0.064) (0.068) (0.001) (0.218) (0.065)
Crisis 21 0.167* 0.046* -.056 -.017 0.224* 0.063**
2008-2010 (0.106) (0.030) (0.067) (0.010) (0.157) (0.031)
PANEL B: WEEKLY SPREAD CHANGES
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 38 0.279** 0.039 0.050 -.004 0.229* 0.043
2004-2010 (0.139) (0.038) (0.167) (0.010) (0.148) (0.045)
Pre-crisis 11 -.017 -.046 -.541 -.019 0.524*** -.028
2004-2006 (0.227) (0.050) (0.228) (0.020) (0.116) (0.068)
Crisis 21 0.211** 0.032 0.181 0.009 0.031 0.023
2008-2010 (0.126) (0.041) (0.170) (0.014) (0.226) (0.054)
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Table 3.11: Results for additions (Markit)
This table shows the average changes in estimated betas for changes in CDS spreads before and
after the inclusion in the CDX.NA.IG Index, using a di¤erent source of data for CDS: Markit.
Reported coe¢ cients show changes in betas and changes in R-Squares from 1 year estimation
windows. Panel A reports results from the regressions using daily data, whereas Panel B
shows results using weekly (Wednesday) data. Standard erros (in parenthesis) are robust to
cross-setional correlation within cluster of additions. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%;
*** signicant at 1%, for one-sided tests, where the test is whether the coe¢ cient is greater
than zero.
PANEL A: DAILY SPREAD CHANGES
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 35 0.204** 0.027 -.062 -.010 0.266*** 0.037
2004-2010 (0.090) (0.034) (0.066) (0.006) (0.099) (0.035)
Pre-crisis 8 0.073 0.003 -.302 -.004 0.376** 0.008
2004-2006 (0.175) (0.057) (0.126) (0.001) (0.178) (0.058)
Crisis 21 0.170* -.006 -.057 -.015 0.227* 0.009
2008-2010 (0.132) (0.038) (0.071) (0.010) (0.175) (0.047)
PANEL B: WEEKLY SPREAD CHANGES
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 35 0.305** 0.055 0.116 -.005 0.189 0.060
2004-2010 (0.152) (0.049) (0.153) (0.009) (0.177) (0.054)
Pre-crisis 8 0.050 -.023 -.429 -.020 0.479*** -.003
2004-2006 (0.366) (0.030) (0.383) (0.020) (0.171) (0.043)
Crisis 21 0.228 0.010 0.175 0.004 0.054 0.006
2008-2010 (0.188) (0.058) (0.173) (0.010) (0.290) (0.068)
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Table 3.12:
Results for additions, only non-zero daily spread changes (Markit)
This table shows the average changes in estimated betas for changes in CDS spreads before
and after the inclusion in the CDX.NA.IG Index, using a di¤erent source of data for CDS:
Markit. We only use here the observations for which the daily change in CDS spread is
di¤erent from zero. Reported coe¢ cients show changes in betas and changes in R-Squares
from 1 year estimation windows. Panel A reports results from the regressions using daily
data, whereas Panel B shows results using weekly (Wednesday) data. Standard erros (in
parenthesis) are robust to cross-setional correlation within cluster of additions. * signicant
at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%, for one-sided tests, where the test is
whether the coe¢ cient is greater than zero.
PANEL A: DAILY SPREAD CHANGES
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 35 0.227*** 0.033 -.093 -.010 0.320*** 0.044*
2004-2010 (0.087) (0.032) (0.080) (0.006) (0.108) (0.033)
Pre-crisis 8 0.162 0.026 -.459 -.002 0.621*** 0.028
2004-2006 (0.177) (0.051) (0.092) (0.005) (0.148) (0.055)
Crisis 21 0.176* -.003 -.056 -.017 0.232* 0.014
2008-2010 (0.131) (0.036) (0.067) (0.010) (0.171) (0.045)
PANEL B: WEEKLY SPREAD CHANGES
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 35 0.305** 0.055 0.117 -.005 0.188 0.060
2004-2010 (0.152) (0.049) (0.153) (0.009) (0.177) (0.054)
Pre-crisis 8 0.049 -.023 -.430 -.020 0.478*** -.003
2004-2006 (0.366) (0.030) (0.383) (0.021) (0.171) (0.044)
Crisis 21 0.228 0.010 0.174 0.004 0.055 0.006
2008-2010 (0.188) (0.058) (0.172) (0.010) (0.291) (0.068)
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Table 3.13: Changes in betas and R-Squares after deletions from the CDX
This table shows the average changes in estimated betas for changes in CDS spreads before
and after the deletion from the CDX.NA.IG Index. Reported coe¢ cients show changes in
betas and changes in R-Squares from 1 year estimation windows. Panel A reports results from
the regressions using daily data, whereas Panel B shows results using weekly (Wednesday)
data. Standard erros (in parenthesis) are robust to cross-setional correlation within cluster of
additions. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%, for one-sided tests,
where the test is whether the coe¢ cient is greater than zero.
PANEL A: DAILY SPREAD CHANGES
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 38 -.076 0.003 0.177 0.009 -.252 -.007
2004-2010 (0.187) (0.030) (0.148) (0.015) (0.248) (0.026)
Pre-crisis 9 0.123 0.009 -.250 -.019 0.373*** 0.028
2004-2006 (0.288) (0.076) (0.413) (0.035) (0.125) (0.043)
Crisis 18 -.204 -.026 0.118* -.009 -.322 -.019
2008-2010 (0.391) (0.057) (0.089) (0.010) (0.468) (0.059)
PANEL B: WEEKLY SPREAD CHANGES
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 38 -.093 -.044 0.424*** 0.026*** -.517 -.070
2004-2010 (0.284) (0.081) (0.129) (0.011) (0.374) (0.078)
Pre-crisis 9 -.239 -.008 0.509** 0.008 -.747 -.016
2004-2006 (0.231) (0.093) (0.278) (0.029) (0.495) (0.068)
Crisis 18 -.173 -.124 0.406* 0.023** -.579 -.146
2008-2010 (0.664) (0.117) (0.289) (0.012) (0.864) (0.131)
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Table 3.14: Results for deletions, only non-zero daily spread changes
This table shows the average changes in estimated betas for changes in CDS spreads before
and after the deletion from the CDX.NA.IG Index, using only the observations for which
the daily change in CDS spread is di¤erent from zero. Reported coe¢ cients show changes in
betas and changes in R-Squares from 1 year estimation windows. Panel A reports results from
the regressions using daily data, whereas Panel B shows results using weekly (Wednesday)
data. Standard erros (in parenthesis) are robust to cross-setional correlation within cluster of
additions. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%, for one-sided tests,
where the test is whether the coe¢ cient is greater than zero.
PANEL A: DAILY SPREAD CHANGES
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 38 -.114 -.002 0.198* 0.012 -.312 -.014
2004-2010 (0.190) (0.031) (0.138) (0.015) (0.259) (0.028)
Pre-crisis 9 0.118 0.007 -.242 -.021 0.359*** 0.027
2004-2006 (0.280) (0.079) (0.339) (0.035) (0.060) (0.045)
Crisis 18 -.240 -.031 0.169* -.001 -.409 -.029
2008-2010 (0.376) (0.057) (0.104) (0.014) (0.463) (0.063)
PANEL B: WEEKLY SPREAD CHANGES
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 38 -.075 -.047 0.440*** 0.023** -.516 -.070
2004-2010 (0.256) (0.077) (0.156) (0.013) (0.359) (0.074)
Pre-crisis 9 -.144 -.000 0.530** -.004 -.674 0.004
2004-2006 (0.223) (0.083) (0.228) (0.030) (0.410) (0.058)
Crisis 18 -.139 -.127 0.461 0.020* -.599 -.147
2008-2010 (0.625) (0.112) (0.370) (0.016) (0.861) (0.126)
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Table 3.15: Changes in CDS Dimson betas after addition to the CDX
In Panel A we show the average changes in the sum of up ve leads and lags of estimated
betas (Dimson betas) before and after the deletion from the CDX.NA.IG Index. In Panel B we
show each of the components of the Dimson betas. Reported coe¢ cients show changes in betas
and changes in R-Squares from 1 year estimation windows. Standard erros (in parenthesis)
are robust to cross-setional correlation within cluster of additions. * signicant at 10%; **
signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%, for one-sided tests, where the test is whether the
coe¢ cient is greater than zero.
PANEL A: DIMSON BETA
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 38 0.515** 0.036 0.117 -.012 0.398*** 0.048**
2004-2010 (0.225) (0.039) (0.229) (0.016) (0.170) (0.027)
Pre-crisis 11 0.174 -.058 -.577 -.050 0.752*** -.008
2004-2006 (0.469) (0.084) (0.158) (0.028) (0.312) (0.064)
Crisis 21 0.569* 0.067*** 0.397 0.004 0.172** 0.062***
2008-2010 (0.362) (0.014) (0.320) (0.013) (0.104) (0.003)
PANEL B: COMPONENTS OF DIMSON BETA
Full sample t  5 0.064 0.114*** -.050
2004-2010 (0.067) (0.041) (0.063)
t  4 0.006 0.083 -.078
(0.032) (0.077) (0.061)
t  3 -.051 -.133 0.082
(0.105) (0.138) (0.077)
t  2 0.051 0.135*** -.084
(0.068) (0.054) (0.055)
t  1 0.041 -.034 0.075
(0.075) (0.061) (0.070)
t 0.241*** -.078 0.320***
(0.084) (0.061) (0.086)
t+ 1 0.030 0.121*** -.091
(0.067) (0.051) (0.063)
t+ 2 -.048 -.050 0.002
(0.021) (0.063) (0.054)
t+ 3 0.017 0.117* -.100
(0.046) (0.090) (0.110)
t+ 4 0.126** 0.018 0.108***
(0.067) (0.070) (0.040)
t+ 5 0.038* -.176 0.214*
(0.026) (0.137) (0.144)
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Table 3.16: Changes in CDS Dimson betas (Markit)
In Panel A we show the average changes in the sum of up ve leads and lags of estimated betas
(Dimson betas) before and after the deletion from the CDX.NA.IG Index, for the Markit data-
base. In Panel B we show each of the components of the Dimson betas. Reported coe¢ cients
show changes in betas and changes in R-Squares from 1 year estimation windows. Standard
erros (in parenthesis) are robust to cross-setional correlation within cluster of additions. *
signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%, for one-sided tests, where the
test is whether the coe¢ cient is greater than zero.
PANEL A: DIMSON BETA
CDS Underlying Bond Di¤erence
N c Rc b Rb  R
Full sample 35 0.536*** 0.020 0.146 -.003 0.390** 0.023
2004-2010 (0.210) (0.031) (0.233) (0.011) (0.171) (0.032)
Pre-crisis 8 0.258 -.044 -.713 -.025 0.971*** -.020
2004-2006 (0.535) (0.044) (0.160) (0.026) (0.414) (0.039)
Crisis 21 0.537** -.002 0.397 0.004 0.140*** -.006
2008-2010 (0.317) (0.013) (0.320) (0.013) (0.042) (0.014)
PANEL B: COMPONENTS OF DIMSON BETA
Full sample t  5 0.077* 0.116*** -.039
2004-2010 (0.054) (0.046) (0.057)
t  4 0.010 0.049 -.039
(0.025) (0.076) (0.078)
t  3 -.004 -.067 0.063
(0.036) (0.103) (0.090)
t  2 -.015 0.117** -.131
(0.033) (0.051) (0.051)
t  1 0.102** -.011 0.112**
(0.050) (0.045) (0.060)
t 0.218*** -.061 0.278***
(0.087) (0.062) (0.093)
t+ 1 0.043 0.137*** -.093
(0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
t+ 2 -.037 -.022 -.014
(0.027) (0.059) (0.056)
t+ 3 0.032 0.057 -.026
(0.041) (0.054) (0.081)
t+ 4 0.063* -.036 0.098**
(0.042) (0.050) (0.048)
t+ 5 0.047** -.133 0.180*
(0.024) (0.109) (0.113)
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